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Abstract
This thesis is an application of Random Matrix Theory (RMT) to portfolio management and
financial networks. From a portfolio management perspective, we apply the RMT approach to
clean measurement noise from correlation matrices constructed for large portfolios of stocks of
the FTSE 100. We apply this methodology to a number of correlation estimators, i.e., the sample
correlation matrix, the Constant Conditional Correlation Model (CCC) of Bollerslev (1990), the
Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) Model of Engle (2002) and the Regime-Switching Beta
CAPM Correlation Model, based on Ang and Bekaert (2004). For these estimators, we find that
the RMT-filtering delivers portfolios with the lowest realised risk, the best prediction accuracy
and also the highest cumulated returns and Sharpe Ratios. The gains from using the RMT-
filtering, in terms of cumulated wealth, range from 65%, for the sample correlation matrix to
30%, for the regime-dependent correlation estimator. In the case of regime switching CAPM
models, we find that the regime switching correlation matrices, in the high volatility regime are
found to be a good filter which makes further RMT-filtering to be redundant. This establishes the
validity of using regime sensitive portfolio management to deal with asymmetric asset correlations
during high and low volatility regimes.
From a financial network perspective, we assess the stability of a global banking network built
from bilateral exposures of 18 BIS reporting banking systems to net debtor countries. For this,
we applied the eigen-pair method of Markose (2012), which is based on the work of May (1972,
1974) for random networks. We use a stability condition based on the maximum eigenvalue
(λmax) of a matrix of net bilateral exposures relative to equity capital as a systemic risk index
(SRI). We provide evidence of the early warning capabilities of λmax, when this surpasses a
prespecified threshold. We use the right and left associated eigenvectors as a gauge for systemic
importance and systemic vulnerability, respectively. The λmax SRI was found to be superior in
terms of early warning when compared to the standard SRIs based on market price data, viz. the
DCC-MES of Acharya et al. (2010), the SRISK of Acharya et al. (2012) and the DCC-∆CoVaR
of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011).
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Over the last decades, financial research and practitioners have made use of tools borrowed from
other fields in an effort to maximise their returns while minimising the risks of their investments.
Random Matrix Theory (RMT) is an example of this. Originally developed by Wigner (1955)
in the field of Statistical Physics to explain the behaviour of energy levels of complex nuclei, it
has been recently applied to clean noise from financial correlations. RMT seeks to compare the
eigenvalue distribution of the empirical correlation matrix with the eigenvalue distribution of a
random matrix, generated from random i.i.d returns. The distribution of the random correlation
matrix acts as a “null hypothesis”, allowing a separation of noise and information in the empirical
correlation matrix. The RMT approach has been used with great success in a number of studies
to clean noise from correlation matrices, delivering better portfolio analytics (see, Laloux et al.,
1999, 2000; Plerou et al., 1999, 2000a,b, 2001, 2002). Applications of the RMT to a financial
context have been mainly focused on the sample correlation matrix of stock market returns, but
this represents only the starting point of a large family of correlation estimators that are used
in academia and in the financial industry to describe the behaviour of financial correlations. In
this thesis, we seek to extend the RMT approach to different correlation estimators and markets,
and assess its performance using a wide battery of portfolio analytics. In addition, we also use
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some results of RMT to assess the stability of financial networks in a cross-border setting.
From a portfolio management perspective, we review research using RMT, which shows how
the eigenvalue density of the sample correlation matrix can be fitted relatively well by the density
of a correlation matrix calculated from random returns, with the exception of some large eigen-
values that deviate. This suggests that these eigenvalues carry economically relevant information,
whereas the rest can be regarded as “noisy”. In Laloux et al. (1999) and Plerou et al. (2002)
filtering techniques aimed at eliminating these “noisy” eigenvalues have been successfully proved
to be beneficial in reducing both, the realised risk of optimal portfolios, and to correctly predict
this realised risk.1 In a similar vein, some results based on RMT have been very successful in
reflecting the growing instability of financial networks, with great early warning capabilities (see,
Markose et al., 2015).
In this thesis, we assess the benefits of the RMT-filtering using a wide battery of tests and
correlation estimators. We test how the RMT-filtering can be used to reduce the realised risk
of minimum variance portfolios and also its implications for portfolio returns and risk-adjusted
measures. We also assess the dynamic stability of financial networks and show under what
conditions these are said to be stable. Here dynamic stability is understood as the ability of the
network to remain in equilibrium in face of a small perturbation.
1.2 Objectives
The main objectives of this thesis are summarised as follows:
1. Following the work of Laloux et al. (1999) and Plerou et al. (2002), we recreate some of
their standard results, by applying the RMT approach to large portfolios of stocks from
the FTSE 100. We test the performance of the different filters used in the literature and
determine under which conditions the RMT-filtering will be more beneficial, in terms of
realised risk reduction, prediction accuracy and risk-adjusted measures of portfolio returns.
2. We extend the use of the RMT-filtering to other correlation estimators, which may also be
aﬄicted by noise. Examples of these estimators are the Constant Conditional Correlation
1By realised risk we refer to the standard deviation of portfolio returns over the investment period.
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model (CCC) of Bollerslev (1990), the Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) model
of Engle (2002) and the Regime-Switching Beta-CAPM correlation estimator, based on
Ang and Bekaert (2004). At least for the last two estimators, we are the first to apply
the RMT-filtering to large correlation matrices, with great improvements in realised risk
estimates.
3. As far as we are concerned, we are the first to combine the RMT approach with a Vector
Autoregressive Analysis (VAR) to explore the macroeconomic determinants of the Chilean
stock market. Here the main objective is to build portfolios with different degrees of
exposure to the market portfolio as predicted by the RMT approach and then explore their
macroeconomic determinants. Here we make a clear distinction between macroeconomic
factors that are local from those that are external.
4. Finally, using some RMT results for the stability of financial networks, we assess the
dynamic stability of a global banking network built from bilateral exposures of national
banking systems to debtor countries. Here we apply the eigen-pair method of Markose
(2012), who based on the work of May (1972, 1974) for random networks, develops a
stability condition based on the maximum eigenvalue (λmax) of a matrix of net bilateral
exposures relative to equity capital. Here we provide further evidence of the early warning
capabilities of λmax, when this surpasses a prespecified threshold. We also use the right and
left associated eigenvectors as a gauge for systemic importance and systemic vulnerability,
respectively. The early warning capabilities of these metrics are then compared with recent
systemic risk indices (SRIs) based on market price-based data, namely, the DCC-MES of
Acharya et al. (2010), the SRISK of Acharya et al. (2012) and the DCC-∆CoVaR of Adrian
and Brunnermeier (2011). We also provide a thorough analysis for these metrics, in terms
of their significance and what are their main determinants.
1.3 Thesis Outline
This thesis has been organised as follows. In Chapter 2 we review the mainstream literature on
applications of RMT for improving realised risk estimates (Section 2.2), while in Section 2.3 we
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introduce the seminal results of May (1972, 1974) for network stability. Section 2.4 reviews some
results from cross-border contagion and introduces the increasing role of cross-border financial
networks for analysing systemic risk. In Chapter 3 we provide more detail on how the RMT works
(Section 3.2) and also about the different filtering methods used in the literature (Section 3.3). In
Section 3.4 we detail the test methodology that has been applied. In particular, for the portfolio
analysis, we divide the analysis in an in-sample analysis (Section 3.4.1) and an out-of-sample
analysis (Section 3.4.2). Section 3.5, introduces the eigen-pair method of Markose (2012) applied
to a cross-border setting.
The results of this thesis have been divided into five chapters:
Chapter 4 provides a spectral analysis of correlations by using some standard RMT tools.
Section 4.2 provides an interpretation of the meaning of eigenvalues in a financial context, while
in Section 4.3 we introduce the concept of inverse participation ratio to identify the number of
significant stocks in the associated eigenvectors. Section 4.4 and Section 4.5 examine the time-
evolution of eigenvalues and eigenvectors and show how the behaviour of eigenvalues is able to
describe some stylised facts of financial markets, such as correlation asymmetries and collectivity
during market drawdowns.
Chapter 5 provides an application of RMT-filtering to a FTSE 100 portfolio by assessing
the amount of noise in the system, as mesured by the RMT. We then examine the effect of
RMT-filtering on realised risk estimates. We compare the effects of filtering on in-sample risk by
using bootstrapping techniques (Section 5.4). We then assess the filtering method out-of-sample,
by using the optimal estimation windows obtained in the in-sample analysis. Here we focus on
assessing the performance of the RMT-filtering on a wide range of metrics, from realised risk to
risk adjusted measures of returns and diversification measures.
Chapter 6 applies the RMT-filtering to regime-dependent correlation matrices. In Section 6.3
we provide a spectral analysis of correlation matrices under two different regimes (e.g., high and
normal volatility regimes) and underline the main differences in the applicability of the RMT-
filtering. In Section 6.4 we introduce the correlation estimators that will be used in the analysis,
while in Section 6.5 and Section 6.6, these are assessed in and out-of-sample using a wide battery
of tests.
Chapter 7 is an application of RMT to the Chilean Stock Market. Although many results are
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repeated from previous chapters, one of the main contributions is the analysis of Section 7.3.3,
where we apply the RMT-filtering to some standard correlation estimators, namely, the Con-
stant Conditional Correlation model (CCC) of Bollerslev (1990) and the Dynamic Conditional
Correlation (DCC) model of Engle (2002). Section 7.4 uses the RMT approach and explores the
macroeconomic determinants of the Chilean Stock Market.
Chapter 8 provides a network analysis of the Core Global Banking System Network (CGBSN)
for 18 BIS reporting countries. Here we introduce our systemic risk indices (SRIs) in a cross-
border setting (Section 8.2) and provide an analysis of the behaviour of the network over time
(Section 8.4), while in Sections 8.5-8.6 we assess the early warning capabilities of the different
SRIs. Section 8.6.3 explores the determinants of market price-based SRIs.
In Chapter 9 we summarise all findings. We provide a discussion of our conclusions and
also discuss some lines of future research. Finally, in Appendices A-B-C, we report some tables
corresponding to Chapters 5-7-8, respectively.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
Markowitz (1959) Portfolio Theory is one of the most relevant topics in quantitative finance.
It basically seeks to determine the optimal portfolio weights which either maximise return for
a given level of risk, or minimise risk for a given return. In its different flavours, Markowitz
Portfolio Theory relies upon a series of assumptions and is constructed based on the first and
second sample moments of financial asset returns. While the first moments may be estimated
by calculating the sample mean returns or by some univariate econometric specification, the
estimation of the second moments, i.e., the covariance matrix of returns, can be more difficult
to estimate. This is particularly true, when the length of the time-series, T is not very large
compared to the number of assets, N . For instance, for a time-series of length T , in order to build
a portfolio of N assets, we would need to estimate (N2+N)/2 covariances from NT returns. This
results in estimation noise, since for a given number of assets, we have few records available to
estimate all the parameters. This latter would suggest the use of a longer time-series. However,
financial correlations are not stable over time (i.e., non-stationary), therefore data should not be
too old, in order to better capture current market conditions.
Thus, the problem boils down to find ways to estimate financial correlation matrices over
relatively short time horizons, but at the same time dealing with the estimation noise arising
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from the choice of a short time-series. A possible solution to this shortcoming has been found in
the field of Econophysics, by analysing the spectral properties (i.e., eigenvalues) of the sample
correlation matrix. For instance, Laloux et al. (1999) and Plerou et al. (1999) find that the
eigenvalue distribution of the sample correlation matrix can be fitted relatively well by the spec-
trum of a random correlation matrix, constructed from i.i.d time-series returns. This suggests
that most of the informational content in the sample correlation matrix is mainly dominated by
measurement noise. Conversely, deviations from this random counterpart could indicate relevant
economic information. The Econophysics literature has employed these insights using Random
Matrix Theory (RMT), a technique borrowed from Statistical Physics, which allows a separation
of noise and information and has been used to obtain only statistically significant correlation
estimates. These correlations have been found to be stable over time and have been employed in
a number of studies in the framework of Markowitz Portfolio Theory. Filtered correlation esti-
mates using only statistically significant eigenvalues as predicted by the RMT approach, resulted
in better correlation forecasts than unfiltered estimates (Plerou et al., 1999, 2000a,b, 2001, 2002;
Gopikrishnan et al., 2001).
The use of Random Matrix Theory (RMT) has not been limited to correlation matrices. It
has also been used to assess the dynamical stability of financial networks. Dynamical stability
of networks takes into account the time evolution of the network. In dynamical systems, a
system is said to be stable, if small perturbations from an equilibrium decay with time. Keeping
this in mind, May (1972) derives a stability condition for complete random matrices, where
the dynamical stability of the network will depend on the maximum eigenvalue of the weighted
adjacency matrix. While his results were based on random networks, which are by definition,
unstructured. Recent studies have shown the applicability of these results to structured networks,
i.e., small-world networks, which are more similar to real-world networks (Sinha, 2005).
In the rest of this chapter we review the key literature which supports the argument of
this thesis. We first introduce the role of Random Matrix Theory (RMT) in physics and its
applications to a financial context. We then review the role of RMT in improving Markowitz
portfolio optimisation. Of central importance to this thesis is the work carried out by three
independent groups: Laloux et al. (1999, 2000), Plerou et al. (1999, 2000a,b, 2001, 2002) and
Pafka and Kondor (2003, 2004); Pafka et al. (2004). We also discuss the applications of RMT to
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assess the stability of financial networks, in particular the work carried out by May (1972, 1974),
in the field of theoretical biology and Markose (2012); Markose et al. (2012) on the stability of
financial networks in the OTC derivative market.
2.2 Applications of Random Matrix Theory to Portfolio
Management
Applications of Random Matrix Theory (RMT) to portfolio management started by the end
of 1990s, with the work of three independent groups of researchers; Laloux et al. (1999, 2000),
Plerou et al. (1999, 2000a,b, 2001, 2002) and Pafka and Kondor (2003, 2004); Pafka et al. (2004).
2.2.1 Laloux et al. (1999, 2000)
They studied the eigenvalue distribution of a sample correlation matrix for N = 406 assets of
the S&P 500, based on daily normalised returns during 1991-1996, for a total of T = 1309 days.
They find that the largest eigenvalue λ1 is 25 times larger than the predicted value by the RMT
approach, λmax.This means that the largest eigenvalue and its associated eigenvector reflect the
“market” itself, as the associated eigenvector carries roughly equal components on all of the N
stocks. Regarding the remainder eigenvalues, the authors find that 94% of them fall in the region
predicted by the RMT. Thus, less than 6% of the eigenvectors, which are responsible for the 26%
of the total volatility, would seem to carry some information.1 This suggests that most of the
eigenvalues of the sample correlation matrix are dominated by noise.
As there is a closed-form solution for the theoretical bounds of the eigenvalue spectrum of a
random matrix, “information” can be separated from “noise” and this can be used in practice
to improve the estimates of realised risk of Markowitz portfolios.2 Keeping this in mind, the
authors designed a “filter” for the correlation matrix, by keeping only the statistically significant
1The percentage of the variation explained by the deviating eigenvalues can be calculated as the ratio between
the sum of the deviating eigenvalues and the total number of assets N (recalling that the total sum of eigenvalues
is equal to N).
2The theoretical bound for the eigenvalue distribution of a random matrix, under certain conditions, it will be
given by the bounds of the Marc˘enko-Pastur Distribution. This will provides us with a cut-off point to choose the
number of significant eigenvalues in the sample correlation matrix. This will be developed further in the coming
sections.
8
eigenvalues predicted by the RMT.3 The “filtered” correlation matrix is then used to construct
optimal portfolios. For doing this, they split their sample in two subperiods. They estimate the
filtered correlation matrix using the first subperiod and construct a family of optimal portfolios
and the so-called “efficient frontiers”. In order to isolate the effects of noise in the correlation
matrix from any additional source of noise in the estimation of returns, they use realised returns.4
Likewise, using realised returns they calculate a measure of realised risk by constructing portfolios
using the second subperiod. They find that the use of the sample correlation matrix tends to
underestimate realised risk by a factor of 3. When using the filtered correlation matrix this factor
is reduced to 1.5.
2.2.2 Plerou et al. (1999, 2000a,b, 2002); Gopikrishnan et al. (2001)
In addition to their eigenvalue density, symmetric random matrices have universal statistical
properties. For example, the distribution of spacings between neighbouring eigenvalues is the
same for all real symmetric random matrices. Real symmetric random matrices whose elements
are independently drawn from a Gaussian distribution constitute the Gaussian Orthogonal En-
semble (GOE) and are, with respect to their statistical properties, representative for all real
symmetric random matrices.5 In Plerou et al. (1999) they study whether the sample correlation
matrix exhibits these universal statistical properties predicted by Random Matrix Theory. For
that purpose, they use two datasets: (i) 30-min data on 1000 records of U.S. publicly traded
companies over the 2-year period 1994-1995 and (ii) one-day prices fluctuations of 422 U.S. stocks
for the 35-year period 1962-96. In line with Laloux et al. (1999), they find that the 98% of the
eigenvalues of the sample matrix fall within the theoretical eigenvalue density. In order to test
whether these eigenvalues are genuinely random, they test for the universal properties such as
eigenvalue spacings and correlations and find that the Nearest-Neighbour distribution as well as
long range spectral correlations show good agreement with the universal predictions of the GOE
(Plerou et al., 1999, 2002). This in turn verifies that the bulk of the eigenvalue spectrum of
3That is, only keeping the eigenvalues that deviate from the theoretical edge of the spectrum.
4By doing this, they assume perfect forecast on the future average returns. While this would not make sense
in that if we knew future returns we would not need to make any forecast, it is a plausible way to assess the
effects of noise filtering on the ability to forecast realised risk.
5The study of these properties is important as the eigenvalue pdf alone does not prove the randomness and
lack of information on the eigenvalue spectrum.
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the sample correlation matrix does not contain economically relevant information. In a similar
vein, when analysing the eigenvectors associated to noisy eigenvalues, they find that these can be
described by a normal distribution. Also, the eigenvectors associated to the eigenvalues located
at the lower edge of the theoretical spectrum were found to be localised, that is, they were dom-
inated by very few large components (Plerou et al., 1999, 2002). In Gopikrishnan et al. (2001),
the eigenvectors associated with the twelve largest eigenvalues were found to have an economic
interpretation; the eigenvector associated with the largest eigenvalue was found to describe cor-
relations reflecting the market index, while the remainder ones describing correlations between
large capitalisation companies, industry sectors or shared business in certain geographical areas
(Gopikrishnan et al., 2001; Plerou et al., 2002). These statistically significant correlations were
found to be stable in time and therefore suitable for forecasting purposes.
Similar to Laloux et al. (2000), the authors use these notions to construct optimal portfolios.
For doing so, they split the sample 1994-1995 into two one-year periods. For the first period,
they calculate the sample correlation matrix C1994 and use the returns of the second period to
construct a family of optimal portfolios and obtain the predicted risk, Ω1994.
6 For this family
of portfolios, they also compute the realised risk in 1995, Ω1995, but using C1995. Since the
meaningful information in C is contained in the deviating eigenvectors, they construct a “filtered”
correlation matrix, Cf1994, with a similar method to the one of Laloux et al. (2000), by keeping
only the statistically significant eigenvalues and construct a family of optimal portfolios. They
find that:
• When using the sample correlation matrix, the gap between predicted and realised risk is
significantly large, by a factor of 2.7.
• When using the filtered correlation matrix, using only the statistically significant eigenval-
ues as predicted by the RMT, this gap is reduced to 1.25. This suggests that the portfolios
constructed using the filtered correlation matrix are significantly more stable in time.
We next summarise the work of Pafka and Kondor (2003, 2004); Pafka et al. (2004) who
built on the above research, introduce a slightly different approach for estimating the correlation
6Predicted risk is defined as the standard deviation of portfolio returns using either the sample correlation
matrix or its unfiltered counterpart. It is therefore not a proper forecast, but forward validation to verify the time
stability of correlation coefficients
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matrix: Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) correlation matrices combined with
RMT.
2.2.3 Pafka and Kondor (2003, 2004); Pafka et al. (2004)
The work carried out by Pafka and Kondor (2003, 2004) and Pafka et al. (2004) is with no
doubt illuminating, since they were the first to apply the RMT-filtering on estimated correlation
matrices, i.e., exponentially weighted moving average correlation matrices (EWMA).
In Pafka and Kondor (2003, 2004), they studied the effects of noise on portfolio risk using
simulation results. Non-random covariance matrices were built, and then they introduced noise
to these. The true (non-random) risk was assumed to be known, in order to calculate minimum
variance portfolios. The advantage of this approach is that is not necessary to have the forecasted
returns as inputs and therefore the only noise in the system could be attributed to the covariance
matrix.
One of their main findings is that the effects of noise differ depending on whether we derive
portfolio weights from a portfolio optimisation framework or we are measuring the risk of a
portfolio with a risk fixed weights (i.e, not derived from a portfolio optimisation problem). In
the first case, noise has an important effect, as weights are also depending on the noisy covariance
matrix, whereas in the second case, it becomes of second order, typically between 5-15%.7 This
is so, because investors do not really care about the composition of their portfolios, but instead
the overall risk of their portfolios. In the presence of noise, weights can be substantially different
from the true optimum, but not necessarily the overall risk. Based on this reasoning, the authors
conclude that in practice, the risk of optimal portfolios, calculated with the noisy covariance
matrices should be reconciled.
These latter results, partly clashed with the findings of Laloux et al. (1999, 2000), Plerou
et al. (1999, 2000a,b, 2002) and Gopikrishnan et al. (2001) and it was further argued that the
large discrepancies between the “predicted” and “realised” risk obtained in these studies were
attributed to low values of Q = T/N , whereas for large values of T/N this effect becomes
much smaller. However, as pointed out by Daly et al. (2008), although the simulation results
7That is, the difference between the “true” risk of the minimum variance portfolio determined in the presence
of noise and the portfolio risk calculated from the “true” covariance matrix.
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of Pafka and Kondor (2003, 2004) were indicative, there were a number of aspects that made
the approach less than satisfactory for assessing the realised risk of medium term investments.
The use of generated covariance matrices is very simplistic and therefore fails to account for
the full market structure. This is so, because markets change over time (are heteroskedastic)
introducing additional sources of error when using real data and definitively not accounted in
generated data. In addition to this, the time scale used in these studies is much shorter than
what they used in their simulations. The simulations also only considered the effect of noise at
each level of Q = T/N . They did not take into account the possibility that the optimal value of
Q may be quite different in the presence of noise than without. Finally, all the studies shown so
far only considered the case of equally weighted covariances, where each observation contributes
equally to the estimates of the covariance matrix. As pointed out by Litterman and Winkelmann
(1998), volatilities and correlations tend to vary over time, and thus the older returns are, the
less relevant they are for revealing the covariance structure at a given time. This is why, the use
of decay weights became a widely spread practice for risk management. There are many ways
to apply decaying weights to covariance matrices, while the most popular are the ones based on
the likelihood function.
In later work, Pafka et al. (2004) extended the RMT approach to Riskmetrics (Zangari, 1996)
type financial forecast. They derived a covariance estimator to take account the heteroskedas-
ticity of financial returns, by using an exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) and
then applied the RMT approach to filter the noise of the covariance matrix. They calculated
the spectrum of a large exponentially weighted random matrix, whose upper bound needed to
be known to apply the filter. The spectrum is valid in a limiting case, as the number of assets
becomes infinite, and the decay factor tends to unity. They found good agreement between that
limiting case and the one with a finite number of assets and a realistic decay factor. From this
spectrum they were able to find its upper bound and developed RMT filters, in the same context
as in the equally weighted case. Using this bound, they kept the eigenvalues above the bound
and the rest were filtered. They show using empirical data that this approach outperformed in
a portfolio optimisation context over both, the method of exponentially weighted moving alone
and the equally weighted standard RMT-filtering.
Using bootstrapping techniques, Pafka et al. (2004) tested six methods for forecasting realised
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risk, based on equally and exponentially weighted forecasts. The unfiltered forecasts were com-
pared to those filtered using RMT, and those filtered by retaining only the largest eigenvalue.
Their results can be summarised as follows:
• The RMT filtered exponentially weighted forecasts resulted in the lowest realised risk from
the six methods. The unfiltered forecasts were found to perform better when a low number
of assets were used, or alternatively when using a larger T (for equal weights) or when
the decay factor approached to one (for exponential). The largest eigenvalue filter was the
least successful method for both weightings.
• In agreement with previous simulations, Pafka and Kondor (2003, 2004) found that the
benefits of filtering were reduced, for fixed N , as the value of T increased. A similar effect
was noted for exponential weights, where increasing the decay factor was broadly found
to reduce the effect of filtering. In the presence of filtering, however, the best parameter
values reduced the amount of data used, compared to the unfiltered case.
• In general and assuming the existence of sufficient data, the improvements seen after fil-
tering were of the same order and even below, the simulated effect of noise (Pafka and
Kondor, 2003, 2004). These authors also found that the decay factors, which produced
the least risky portfolios, were higher than the range suggested by Riskmetrics (0.94) and
further concluded that the unfiltered Riskmetrics recommended forecast was unsuitable for
their portfolio optimisation problem, more than doubling portfolio risk compared to the
best filtered result.
2.2.4 Other similar studies
Emerging markets have also been studied. For example, studies applying the RMT approach to
emerging markets, namely, Nilantha et al. (2007) for Sri Lanka and Kulkarni and Deo (2007);
Pan and Sinha (2007) for India, Medina and Mansilla (2008) for Mexico, find good agreement
with the universal properties of the RMT, with fewer deviations. In particular, Pan and Sinha
(2007), using 201 stocks of the National Stock Exchange (NSE), found fewer deviations from
the bulk distribution than those found for the NYSE. The authors argue that this was due to
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the relative weakness of intra-sector interactions between stocks, compared to the market mode.
Based on this, they suggested that the emergence of an internal structure of multiple groups of
strongly correlated components is an indication of market development.
Wilcox and Gebbie (2004, 2007) analysed the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). In this
case, they had to deal with difficulties of missing data and illiquid stocks. In the presence of such
data, they still found good agreement with the RMT. For all data cleaning methods tested, the
authors reported that most eigenvalues agreed with the RMT, while there were a small number
of large deviating values. They also noted that the choice of data cleaning method affected the
results, with some introducing more noise than others. The portfolios considered here were also
large, containing between 250 and 350 shares.
While these studies have been very successful in establishing the broad applicability of the
RMT approach to a number of different economic contexts and financial markets, most of the
existing literature using RMT to forecast realised risk has focused on relatively tranquil times
in financial markets. One of the few recent studies focusing on more turbulent periods is that of
Sandoval et al. (2012), who used the RMT approach to clean the correlation matrix of Brazilian
stocks contained in the BOVESPA Index. They use this procedure to construct portfolios of
stocks based on the Markowitz framework to build better predictions of future risk based on
past data. They do this for years of low and high volatility for the Brazilian market during
the years 2004-2010. They find that the filtered correlation matrix using the RMT approach
is certainly better than the unfiltered one, but it fails to provide a better forecast during high
volatility periods.
There have also been some work focusing on the performance of the filtering method itself.
This is the case of Daly et al. (2010) who study the effects of using different RMT-based filters on
realised risk estimates. They find that the filtering method matters, with some filters providing
more stability than others. They further developed a filter that maximises the eigenvalue spacings
in the trace of the correlation matrix (Krzanowski stability-based filter) and find that their filter
lowers realised risk, on average, by up to 6.7%.
14
2.3 Applications of Random Matrix Theory to Network
Stability
Networks change over time, examples of this, are the spread of diseases along with patterns
of human travel, people make new friends and more nodes are added to the social network.
In complex networks the node dynamics can be very different, for example, neural networks
might be featured by very complicated non-linear, even chaotic dynamics, while in SRI-models
of disease, spreading nodes can take only one of three possible states (susceptible, recovered and
infected). In both of these cases, the individual node dynamics is influenced by the wiring of the
network. Stability, which is a dynamical property, is determined by the topology of the network.
Mathematical models have been developed to analyse dynamic stability in the presence of
perturbances. Perturbances can be different, so as stability, in whose case we can distinguish
between static stability and dynamic stability. By static stability, we refer to the ability of
the network to retain its connectivity properties after nodes have been removed.8 In contrast,
dynamical stability, takes into account the time-evolution of the network. In dynamical systems,
a system is said to be stable, if small perturbations from an equilibrium decay with time.
In the seminal work of May (1972, 1974), the Wigner condition of eigenvalues for complete
random matrices was extended to sparse random networks. He was the first to state that the
stability of a dynamical network system will depend on the size of the maximum eigenvalues of
the weighted adjacency matrix of the network. May (1974) derived the maximum eigenvalue of
the network, denoted by λmax, in terms of three network parameters;
λmax =
√
Npσ2, (2.1)
where p, is the probability of connectivity, N the total number of nodes and σ, is the standard
deviation of node strength. May (1974) stated that network instability follows when
√
Npσ > 1.
Then, an initially small perturbation will gradually grow with time and drive the system away
from its equilibrium state. This led to the so-called May-Wigner Stability Theorem, which states
8The difference between random and intentional removal can be quite drastic: in scale-free network structure
that describes, for instance, the internet, a random removal of nodes has only a minor effect on connectivity and
average path length, whereas a targeted attack on the most highly connected nodes can quickly disconnect the
network into separate clusters (Boccaletti et al., 2006).
15
that increasing the complexity of a network inevitably leads to its destabilisation, such that a
small perturbation will be able to disrupt the entire system. This theorem poses a trade-off
between heterogeneity in node strength, σ and connectivity p, in order for the network to remain
stable. In a non-zero mean random matrix, highly connected networks can remain stable only if
they are homogeneous in node strength, viz. σ should be very small.
May’s suggestion that increasing network complexity leads to decrease in stability was sup-
ported by numerical simulations, but it ran counter to the empirically established conventional
wisdom that biodiversity promotes ecosystem stability. Similarly, in the economics literature,
Allen and Gale (2000) gave rise to a mistaken view that only follows in the case of homogenous
graphs, that is, increasing connectivity monotonically increases system stability in the context
of diversification of counterparty risk.
The criticism to the May-Wigner Stability Theorem, is that is only valid for random networks
and cannot be applied to real-world networks, which presumably are structured. Most networks
occurring in nature are not random. Some studies suggest that introducing a hierarchical or-
ganization (by partitioning the adjacency matrix of the network into blocks) can increase the
stability of a network under certain conditions.
Small-world networks allow the possibility of having different kinds of structures in a network.
These networks have the global properties of a random network (short average path length
between the elements) while at the local level they resemble regular networks with a high degree
of clustering among neighbours.
In Sinha (2005) is examined how the introduction of small-world topological structure into
networks affect their stability. His main results indicate that, regardless of the network struc-
ture, the parameter values at which the stability-instability transition occurs with increasing
complexity is identical to that predicted by the May-Wigner criteria, but the nature of this tran-
sition changes with the topology. In this context, the May-Wigner criteria are valid for analysing
system stability of small world networks.
As we will show, for analysing the stability of networks, under certain conditions, the explicit
dynamics at the nodes can be ignored and the dynamic stability is governed by the maximum
eigenvalue of the linear stability (adjacency) matrix. In the following chapters, we will explain
how this condition is extended by Markose (2012) to the context of a global banking network
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constructed from bilateral exposures of national banking systems to net debtor countries, relative
to their equity capital. From this, we will derive the maximum eigenvalue of the stability matrix,
which will give us some insights into the stability of the global banking network over time and
also the possibility of early warning signals.
2.4 Financial Contagion in a Cross-Border Setting and the
Role of Financial Networks
Since the emerging markets crises in Asia, Russia and Brazil in the late 1990s, there has been
increasing interest in the study of cross-border contagion and spillovers that can spread a financial
crisis from one country to another (Claessens and Forbes, 2001). Calvo and Reinhart (1996)
distinguish between fundamental-based contagion (spillover), which arises when the infected
country is linked to others via trade or finance, and “pure” contagion, which arises when common
shocks and all channels for potential interconnection are either not present or have been controlled
for. There are at least three main strands of research exploring cross-border contagion. The first
studies the co-movement of asset prices and tests whether a change in asset prices in country A
has some effect on asset prices in country B, using a number of econometric techniques (Baig
and Goldfajn, 1999; Bae et al., 2003; Corsetti et al., 2002; Forbes and Rigobon, 2001).
A second strand of the literature investigates the existing financial and trade links by exploring
the channels through which contagion could take place (Dornbusch et al., 2000; Kruger et al.,
2000). For example, in the literature of early warning signals (EWS), Cata˜o and Milesi-Ferretti
(2014) suggest the ratio of net foreign liabilities to GDP as being informative of an eventual
economic crisis in a cross-border setting. They find that when this ratio exceeds the threshold of
50% in absolute terms and 20% of country specific historical mean, it becomes a good signal for
external crisis prediction. Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) using data from 1973 to 2010, find
that the rapid increase in leverage and sharp appreciation of the currency are two factors that
emerge consistently as the most robust and significant predictors of financial crises. Bruno and
Shin (2015a,b) build a model of international banking systems and identify bank leverage cycle as
a main determinant of the transmission of financial conditions across borders through banking.
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They identify that local currency appreciation together with higher leverage in the banking sector
as main determinants of financial instability and develop a model that links exchange rate and
financial stability.
A third strand of the literature, the network-based one, which is more recent, has focused on
the role of international banks in transmitting financial shocks across borders.Von Peter (2007)
and Minoiu and Reyes (2013) and Hattori and Suda (2007) analyse the topological properties of
the global banking network using BIS Locational Banking Statistics spanning over 30 years. They
study the evolution of connectivity and density of transactions over the period 1978-2010 and find
that the global banking system is much more connected during 2000s, when compared to previous
decades, while the main trend is a procyclical path with the global capital flows. Von Peter
(2007) provides centrality measures of reporting countries to the 200 or so peripheral countries.
He calculates a banking centre measure, or “global hub” and measures of both unweighted node
degree, closeness and betweenness, as well as weighted centrality measures (“intermediation”,
based on weighted node degrees) and “prestige” (based on a weighted centrality indicator). His
results place the UK and US as the main international banking centres that can explain the
market share dominance in attracting foreign deposits. Network statistics based on BIS data
have also been used to develop early warning signals for cross-border financial crisis. Minoiu
et al. (2013) find that network statistics improve the performance of EWS compared to more
traditional macroeconomic variables.
So far, there are few studies testing contagion risk and the stability of cross-border flows.
Degryse et al. (2010) is one of the first to analyse the systemic importance of countries such
as the US with large global liabilities using the BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics for 17
reporting countries and carry out Furfine (2003) style contagion exercise for national banking
systems from country specific defaults over the period 1999-2006. They find that high level of
liabilities coming from the UK and US can pose a huge threat for the rest of the global financial
system. Another study is that of Castre´n and Rancan (2014), who introduced the notion of
Global Macro-Networks, which is a combination of cross-border exposures of banking systems
of countries with the flow of funds between sectors within countries. The authors quantify the
magnitude of contagion losses stemming from the failure of key debtor countries and the sectors
within them with a metric they call Loss Multiplier, which they use as a measure of systemic
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risk. Despite, the seminal nature of their concept of a global macro-net, as contagion losses are
greater after the onset of a crisis than before, the Castre´n and Rancan (2014) Loss Multiplier
SRI gives no early warning and peaks well after the crisis, Markose et al. (2015). However, there
is yet no consensus on a financial network-based systemic risk index.
As pointed out by Markose (2013) an approach based on cross-border liabilities relative to
equity capital of national banking systems for analysing systemic risk allows a more complete
picture of the role of leverage in destabilising the global financial system. The concept of tipping
points have been used in the context of financial contagion and domino effects from the failure
of a trigger bank or from negative shocks, concepts made popular by Furfine (2003). However,
few have acknowledged that such instability propagation in a network is a property of dynamical
systems and for that reason needs to be studied by using spectral or eigenvalue methods as
seminally pointed out by May (1974, 1972). Markose (2012) uses the May approach and adapts
the epidemiology framework in Wang et al. (2003) to show how a weighted graph of financial
liabilities can provide an appropriate dynamic characterisation of a financial system. Stability
conditions are governed by a “cure” rate, defined as a threshold of equity capital that provides a
permissible buffer against contagion losses, and “infection” rates, arising from the exposures of
financial participants to their counterparties. This provides the basis for the so-called eigen-pair
method which simultaneously determines the maximum eigenvalue of the network of liabilities
(adjusted for equity capital), to indicate the stability of the overall system, along with eigenvector
centrality measures. This will be developed in further detail in Chapter 3, Section 3.5.
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Chapter 3
Background and Methodologies
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we define the tools that will be used across the chapters of this thesis. We begin
by explaining how the Random Matrix Theory-based filtering (henceforth, RMT-filtering) works
and how it can be used in a portfolios optimisation context. We describe how the separation
between information and noise takes places in the eigenvalue spectrum for which there is a
theoretical benchmark given by the Marc˘enko-Pastur Distribution (Section 3.2.1). This allows
us to compare the properties of the sample correlation matrix with those of a random matrix and
identify noisy eigenvalues. This is done by using the theoretical bounds of the Marc˘enko-Pastur
Distribution, which provides us with a cut-off point, above which we can keep informationally
relevant eigenvalues and discard the noisy ones. A detailed discussion on the different filtering
methods is given in Section 3.3.
Once the filtered and unfiltered correlation estimators are obtained, these are used as inputs
for portfolio optimisation as described in Section 3.4, where we divide our analysis in an in-sample
analysis (Section 3.4.1) and out-of-sample analysis (Section 3.4.2). In both cases, we analyse the
performance of the RMT-filtering on Minimum Variance Portfolios. In Section 3.4.2, we also
provide a detailed description of the performance metrics used in all the chapter of this thesis.
In particular, this methodology will be used in three chapters of this thesis: Chapter 5 analyses
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the performance of the RMT-filtering on the sample correlation matrix for portfolios constructed
from 77 stock in the FTSE 100 Index; Chapter 6 applies the RMT-filtering to regime-switching
correlations for portfolios using the same 77 stocks and; Chapter 7, is a novel application of the
RMT-filtering, where we analyse the macro determinants of the Chilean Stock Market (Eterovic
and Eterovic, 2013), by using only the statistically significant principal components as predicted
by the RMT approach.
Finally, in Section 3.5 we introduce the eigen-pair method pioneered by Markose (2012) for
financial networks. Here we are particularly interested in analysing the Core Global Banking
Network constructed from the BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics for 18 national banking sys-
tems. This is then combined with data on the value of equity capital, from Bankscope, to build
the Stability Matrix, which represents the net exposures of national banking systems relative to
their equity capital. The maximum eigenvalue of the stability matrix (henceforth, λmax) will
give us some insights into the stability of the Core Global Banking Network over time. There-
fore, λmax can be regarded as a “systemic risk index” (SRI). In addition, the eigen-pair method
delivers the associated right and left eigenvectors, reflecting rankings for “systemic importance”
and “systemic vulnerability”, respectively. This approach is used in Chapter 8.
3.2 Random Matrix Theory (RMT)
Random Matrix Theory (RMT) was originally conceived during the 1950s by Eugene Wigner in
the field of mathematical physics. Wigner was seeking to describe the general properties of energy
levels of excited states of heavy nuclei as measured in nuclear reactions (Wigner, 1958). Such
a complex nuclear system is represented by an Hermitian operator H (called the Hamiltonian)
living in an infinite-dimensional Hilbert space governed by physical laws. Unfortunately, for
every specific case, H is not known and even if it were known, it would be extremely complicated
to write down and even if we could write it down, no computer would be able to solve its
eigenequation, Hv = λv (the so-called Schro¨dinger Equation of the physical system), where λ
and v are the eigenvalue-eigenvector corresponding to H.
Faced with these constraints, Wigner argued that one should instead regard a specific Hamil-
tonian H as behaving like a large random matrix that is a member of a large class (or ensemble)
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of Hamiltonians, all of which would have the similar universal properties as the H in question
(Wigner, 1955).1 Under this setting, the energy levels (represented by the eigenvalues of H) of
the physical system could then be approximated by the eigenvalues of a large random matrix.
Since the 1960s, Wigner and his colleagues, including Freeman Dyson and Madan Lal Mehta,
have worked on Random Matrix Theory (RMT) and developed it to the point that it became a
very powerful tool in mathematical physics (Mehta, 1991). During the last decades, more inter-
est has been paid to RMT. One of the most important discoveries in RMT was its connection
to quantum chaos, which led to a Random Matrix Theory of quantum transport. The RMT
approach has since become a major tool in many fields, ranging from number theory and combi-
natorics, wireless communications to multivariate statistical analysis and principal components
analysis. A common element shared in these kind of situations is that RMT has been used as an
indirect method for solving complicated problems arising from physical or mathematical systems.
Using these insights, Laloux et al. (1999, 2000), Plerou et al. (1999, 2000a,b, 2001, 2002) and
Gopikrishnan et al. (2001) have applied the RMT approach to a financial context. In finance,
RMT predictions represent an average over all possible interactions between assets. In this
context, deviations from the universal predictions of RMT identify system-specific, non-random
properties of the system considered, providing clues about the significant interactions.
The understanding of the stability of correlations between different stocks has been an ongoing
quest in the last decades, not only because of a better understanding of the economy as a complex
dynamical system, but also for practical reasons such as asset allocation and risk forecast. As
opposed to most physical systems, where correlations between subunits can be related to basic
interactions, in the case of financial markets, the underlying interactions are not known.
In order to quantify the cross-correlations between financial assets, we first calculate the price
returns of stocks over a period of time ∆t:
Gi(t) = lnSi(t+ ∆t)− lnSi(t), (3.1)
where Si(t) denotes the price of stock i. As different stocks have different volatility levels, we
1One of Wigner’s most famous results is the Semicircle Law, for a more detailed explanation, see Appendix ??.
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proceed to define the normalised returns:
gi =
Gi(t)− < Gi >
σi
, (3.2)
where σi =
√
< G2i > − < Gi >2 is the standard deviation of Gi and 〈·〉 denotes a time
average over the period considered. We then compute the equal-time cross-correlation matrix C
with elements:
Cij =< gi(t)gj(t) > . (3.3)
By construction, the elements Cij are bounded to the domain −1 ≤ Cij ≤ 1, where Cij = 1
corresponds to perfect correlations, Cij = −1 corresponds to perfect anti-correlations, and Cij =
0 corresponds to uncorrelated pairs of stocks.
As pointed out by Plerou et al. (1999, 2000a, 2002), when estimating correlation matrices we
have the following dilemma: (i) if we use a long time-series of returns to calculate the correlation
matrix, we will have that as market conditions change over time, the correlations between any
pair of stocks may not be stationary, which lead us to use a short time-series, but (ii) if we use a
short time-series, the finite length of the time-series available to estimate correlations introduces
“measurement noise”.
This poses the following question: How can we identify from Cij those stocks that remained
significantly correlated (on average) over the period studied? To answer this question, the statis-
tics of C have to be analysed against the “null hypothesis” of a random matrix, that is, a
correlation matrix constructed from mutually uncorrelated time-series. If the properties of C
agree with those of a random correlation matrix, then it follows that the contents of the em-
pirically measured C are random. Conversely, deviations of the properties of C from those of a
random correlation matrix convey information about “genuine” correlations (Plerou et al., 2002).
23
3.2.1 The Marc˘enko-Pastur Distribution (MP)
While in the previous section we defined the way the empirical correlation matrix C is con-
structed, we turn now to define its random counterpart:
R =
1
T
AAT , (3.4)
where R has the same dimension of C and A is a TxN matrix containing random i.i.d normal
returns with zero mean and unit variance. By construction R belongs to the type of matrices
often referred to as Wishart Matrices in multivariate statistics. The analysis of Wishart matrices
is carried out on an eigenvalue basis, through the following decomposition:
R = V ΛV −1, (3.5)
where the columns of V are represented by each eigenvector and the diagonal matrix Λ
contains each eigenvalue associated to each eigenvector. An interesting feature of these random
matrices is that their properties are known. In particular, in the limit N → ∞, T → ∞ such
that Q = T/N > 1 is fixed, the distribution Prm(λ) of eigenvalues λ of the random correlation
matrix R is given by:
Prm =
Q
2pi
√
(λ+ − λ)(λ− λ−)
λ
. (3.6)
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Figure 3.1: The Marc˘enko-Pastur Distribution for different values of Q. When T →∞, Q→∞,
the noise band shrinks to zero.
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This distribution is known as the Marc˘enko-Pastur Distribution. In the limiting case, eigen-
values λ are bounded in the interval λ− ≤ λi ≤ λ+ (minimum and maximum eigenvalues of R)
which are given by:
λ± = 1 +
1
Q
± 2
√
1
Q
. (3.7)
In Figure 3.1, we can see how the distribution behaves under different values of Q. In
particular, by examining Equation 3.7 we can see that in the extreme case where T → ∞ and
keeping the number of assets N constant, the gap between the largest and smallest eigenvalues
predicted by the RMT shrinks to zero. We then compare the eigenvalue distribution Pc(λ) of C
with Prm(λ). Plerou et al. (1999) and Laloux et al. (1999) find the presence of a well-defined
“bulk” of eigenvalues of C that falls within the bounds λ− ≤ λi ≤ λ+ for Prm(λ). This in turn
suggests that the contents of C that agree with Prm(λ) are mostly random except for the values
that deviate. These latter eigenvalues would therefore be the ones that contain economically
relevant information.
The distinction between information and noise, with the help of the bounds of the Marc˘enko-
Pastur Distribution in the eigenvalue spectrum, can then be used to “filter” the sample correlation
matrix. This “filtered” correlation matrix should provide more stable correlations than the
standard sample correlation matrix. In what follows, we review some methods used to filter the
correlation matrix. While they all share in common the use of the eigenvalues that deviate from
the Marc˘enko-Pastur Distribution, they differ in the replacing values at the noisy part of the
spectrum.
3.3 The RMT-Filtering
There are many methods for filtering the correlation matrix based on the predictions of the
RMT. We will focus on the two most popular methods. These methods are basically based on
replacing the eigenvalues inside of the spectrum of the sample correlation matrix and at the same
time maintaining its trace. For this purpose, the eigenvalues inside of the spectrum are chosen
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to be the ones that are less or equal than the maximum eigenvalue predicted by the RMT.2 In
both filtering methods, only the deviating eigenvalues in the upper bound are considered. The
reason why the smallest deviating eigenvalues are not considered in these filters is that while large
eigenvalues are clearly separated from the MP bounds, the same does not always applies for the
smallest deviating eigenvalues. In general, small eigenvalues can be found outside of the lower
edge of the spectrum, which is consistent with the fact that the length of the time-series T and
the number of assets N are finite. In addition to this, by simple inspection of the eigenvectors
associated to the largest eigenvalues, clear non-randomness, and stability over time has been
verified, while this has not been verified in the eigenvectors associated to the smallest deviating
eigenvalues. In what follows, we discuss these two methods.
3.3.1 Laloux et al. (2000)’s Filter
The filtering method proposed by Laloux et al. (2000) takes the set, Λ = {λi}ni=1, of eigenvalues
of some NxN matrix, C, and the corresponding eigenvectors V and defines a subset
Λnoisy = {λ ∈ Λ : λ ≤ λ+}, (3.8)
with the noisy eigenvalues, where λ+ is the maximum eigenvalue predicted by RMT. Then
the filtered eigenvalues are defined as
Λfiltered = Λnew ∪ (Λ− Λnoisy), (3.9)
where
Λ− Λnoisy = {λ ∈ Λ : λ /∈ Λnoisy}, (3.10)
are the eigenvalues assumed to contain information and
Λnew = {λi : λi = Λ¯noisy∀i = 1, ..., n}, (3.11)
2That is, the upper bound of the Marc˘enko-Pastur Distribution, i.e., λ± = 1 + 1Q ± 2
√
1
Q
.
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where n is the number of elements in Λnoisy and Λ¯noisy is the mean of all elements of Λnoisy.
Put it differently, the noisy eigenvalues are all replaced by their means. These filtered eigen-
values Λfiltered are then combined, through the eigendecomposition theorem,
3 with the original
eigenvectors, V , to construct a filtered matrix
Cfiltered = V ΛfilteredV
−1, (3.12)
where Λfiltered is a matrix with Λfiltered on the main diagonal and zeroes elsewhere. By
replacing the noisy eigenvalues by their mean noisy eigenvalue implies that the trace of Cfiltered
is equal to the trace of C.
3.3.2 Plerou et al. (2002)’s Filter
As developed in Plerou et al. (2002), this method is the same as Laloux et al. (2000), but differs
in that the noisy eigenvalues are all replaced by zeroes. Then, they build the filtered correlation
matrix Cfiltered, by setting its main diagonal elements equal to 1 to preserve the trace of the
original matrix C to prevent system distortion.
3.4 Methodology for Portfolio Analysis
Having defined the different RMT-filtering methods, we use the filtered and unfiltered correlation
estimators as inputs in our portfolio optimisation framework. For this, we first make a very
strong assumption on individual return volatilities, that is, we assume that these are known
as we are mainly focused on correlations, which are the main purpose of this thesis. In this
context, individual volatilities are calculated over the investment horizon. Therefore, any source
of variation in our estimates comes strictly from the improvements in correlations. In addition,
we focus on minimum variance portfolios. As pointed out by Rosenow (2008), the volatility
prediction for minimum variance portfolios is a more powerful test for assessing the performance
of the RMT-filtering, as it not only gauges the prediction of the average covariance, but of the
whole covariance structure: the covariance matrix is first used to calculate the portfolio weights,
3Let C be a square matrix and let V be a matrix of its eigenvectors. If V is a square matrix then C = V ΛV −1
where Λ is a diagonal matrix containing the associated eigenvalues on the main diagonal.
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and then used to estimate the variance of that portfolio. Another advantage of estimating
minimum variance portfolios is that their weights only depend on the return variances and
covariances, but not on the expected returns. This means that we can assess the use of the RMT
approach in filtering noise due to measurement error isolated from any other additional source
of noise that could arise in case we had to perform a forecast of returns.
Put it differently, on each test date, we estimate the minimum variance portfolio by choosing
the weights that minimise the total expected risk. The predicted portfolio volatility at time t is
given by:
Ω2t,predicted =
N∑
i,j=1
wi,twj,tΣij,t, (3.13)
where, wi,t are the weights of capital invested in stock i at time t. Regarding the minimum
variance portfolio weights:
wi,t =
∑N
j=1 Σ
−1
ij,t∑N
k,l=1 Σ
−1
k,l
, (3.14)
which minimises the variance under the constraint that the total invested money is equal to
one. Regarding our measure of realised risk, we define:
Ω2t,realised =
N∑
i,j=1
wi,twj,t(< gi,tgi,t > − < gi,t >< gj,t >), (3.15)
where the “< · >”, represents the average of the time-series returns over the investment
horizon, which consist in the ex-post volatility over the evaluation period (i.e. an investment
horizon tf = 20 days, 1-month). As pointed out by Pafka and Kondor (2003, 2004), this realised
measure of risk can be considered a good proxy for the true portfolio risk, which is always
unknown.
3.4.1 In-sample Methodology
Following Pafka et al. (2004) and Daly et al. (2008), the test methodology for evaluating the
in-sample performance of the RMT-filtering is a bootstrap approach. This analysis consists in
taking bootstrapped samples, together with the mean across these samples. That is, for a given
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value of N (in this case, N = 77), we randomly select a test date t. Everything up to t is
used for estimation and everything afterwards as realised, future information. We repeat this
random selection 1000 times, with replacement, and calculate the mean, across all bootstrapped
samples, of the realised forecast of minimum variance portfolios, calculated using the forecasted
covariance matrix. The forecasted matrices consist on the filtered and the standard sample
correlation matrices. We measure the performance of the RMT-filtering by calculating the ratio
γ, which is the ratio between the realised portfolio risk and the predicted portfolio risk, using
the filtered and sample correlation matrices. More formally,
γ =
Ωt,realised
Ωt,predicted
=
√√√√ ∑Ni,j=1 wi,twj,tΣrealisedij,t∑N
i,j=1 wi,twj,tΣ
predicted
ij,t
. (3.16)
This measure will give us some insights into how close our predictions are from the realised
ones. This ratio will be calculated as an average over many test dates across 1000 bootstrapped
samples. This method is in contrast to the one used by Laloux et al. (1999, 2000) and Plerou
et al. (2000a, 2001); Gopikrishnan et al. (2001); Rosenow et al. (2002); Plerou et al. (1999) in
that in these studies use a single test date in the middle of the sample. In addition, these studies
were focused on measuring the performance of the RMT-filtering for all the portfolios along the
efficient frontier, rather than on minimum variance portfolios.
3.4.2 Out-of-sample Methodology
As we mentioned in Equation 3.7 of Section 3.2.1, the bounds of the Marc˘enko-Pastur Distribu-
tion are highly dependent on Q = T/N , which is the ratio between the length of the time-series
and the total number of assets. We also argued that for a fixed N when T increases, the noise
band shrinks to zero. This means that realised risk estimates are highly dependent on the ra-
tio Q, with higher values of Q being less noisy than low values. However, as we mentioned in
Section 3.2, the use of longer time-series is problematic, as these are nonstationary, which calls
for the use of shorter time-series that are aﬄicted by measurement noise and this needs to be
cleaned.
Our out-of-sample methodology consists in using the optimal value of Q obtained in our in-
sample results, which for a given number of assets N , is mainly dependent on the length of the
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time-series T and use this optimal T to estimate our minimum variance portfolios.
As opposed to the in-sample testing where we use 1000 randomly sample dates, in the out-of-
sample testing we are assessing each available date only once. Using these insights, we forward
validate as follow: For a given test date t, for a given filtering method f , we use the estimation
window T and estimate the ratio γ associated with this forecasting method. It is worthwhile
noting that for this analysis we only consider portfolios invested before t− tF , or on that date,
where tF stands for the investment period (20 days). This happens, because on day t, we do not
have knowledge of investments made after t− tF , since conceptually they are still invested.
Keeping this in mind, we assess the out-of-sample performance of the different correlation
estimators, by comparing the average ratio γ, introduced in the in-sample section. This ratio
will provide us with some insights into how close the predicted risk is to the realised risk for
the different correlation estimators. We also assess the performance of the different strategies in
their ability to produce portfolios with the lowest average realised risk. In addition, we calculate
the Mean Squared Error (MSE) as a gauge for the volatility of our risk forecast.4 More formally,
these performance measures are defined as follows:
γ =
Ωt,realised
Ωt,predicted
=
√√√√ ∑Ni,j=1 wi,twj,tΣrealisedij,t∑N
i,j=1 wi,twj,tΣ
predicted
ij,t
, (3.17)
MSE =
T∑
t=1
(Ωt,real − Ωt,predicted)2
T
. (3.18)
As opposed to most studies in the RMT literature, we are the first in analysing the implica-
tions of using the RMT-filtering on portfolio returns. For doing this, we calculate the cumulated
wealth at the end of the out-of-sample period, which is defined as the compounded returns
constructed for the different strategies (i.e. weights) using the realised returns over the invest-
ment horizon (Equation 3.19). We also judge the out-of-sample performance of our portfolios by
computing risk-adjusted measures of returns, such as the Sharpe Ratio (Equation 3.20), Sortino
Ratio (Equation 3.21) and Omega Ratio (Equation 3.22). These performance metrics are defined
4For the purpose of the thesis, the MSE is used to gauge the volatility of the volatility forecast. However,
throughout the thesis, we’d rather use the term “risk” rather than volatility, this is why, we refer to the volatility
of the risk forecast.
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as follows:
ΠTt=1(1 + rt) (3.19)
SP =
E(rt − rft )
V ar(rt − rft )
, (3.20)
Sortino =
Rp −MAR√
1
T
∑T
t=0,RP<MAR
(RP,t −MAR)2
(3.21)
Ω(L) =
∫ b
L
(1− F (x))dx∫ L
a
F (x)dx
(3.22)
The Sharpe Ratio (Equation 3.20) is calculated as the ratio between expected excess returns
of a portfolio and its standard deviation.5 This ratio will provides us with insights into how
well the returns for the different strategies compensate investors for the risk taken. The Sortino
Ratio is an enhanced version of the Sharpe Ratio (Equation 3.21), which only takes into account
downside volatility by separating volatility in the upside from volatility in the downside by setting
a Minimum Acceptable Return (MAR), which in this case we set at 0.5%.6
In Equation 3.22, the Omega ratio as defined by Shadwick and Keating (2002) is a non-
parametric method, since it does not rely upon calculating the moments of a distribution of
returns for determining the ranking of each hedge fund versus a threshold level. The ratio
considers returns below and above a specific loss threshold return level. By doing this, it places
a threshold return on the unit distribution of returns (the return PDF with an area of one
underneath) which have been accumulated by summing (taking the integral) from the left hand
side to form the CDF, F (x). The returns below a certain threshold are considered as losses, and
5Excess returns are defined as the difference between the expected portfolio returns and the risk-free asset,
which in this case is the 1-month Libor.
6One of the main disadvantages of using the Sharpe Ratio is that it uses volatility as a measure of risk for the
entire time-series returns. Consequently, both large upswing and large downswing values are penalised and they
translate into higher volatility and lower Sharpe Ratio. The idea behind this measure is that investors do not
want their upside risk to be penalised. In this context, by setting a Minimum Acceptable Return (MAR) we split
returns into two categories, i.e. those returns greater or equal than MAR (upside deviations) from those returns
less than MAR (downside deviations). Thus, the Sortino Ratio only uses a measure of downside returns in the
calculation of its denominator, which means that the higher the Sortino Ratio is, the better the manager is at
controlling downside returns while not being penalised by upside returns (Sortino and Price, 1994).
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the returns above this threshold are considered as profits. The Omega ratio is non-parametric
and reflects all moments of the distribution so a fund with a high excess kurtosis will be ranked
lower than one with no excess kurtosis assuming both funds have the same return, volatility and
skewness.
Finally, following Pantaleo et al. (2011) we assess the performance of our portfolios by measur-
ing their degree of diversification across stocks in the portfolio. This will allow us to disentangle
the differences between the different strategies from an asset allocation perspective. Formally,
these measures are defined as follows:
Neff =
1∑N
i w
2
i
, (3.23)
Np = arg min
l
l∑
i=1
≥ p
N∑
i=1
|wi|, (3.24)
w−/w+ = Mean
(∑N
i |w−i |∑N
i w
+
i
)
, (3.25)
Equation 3.23 stands for effective portfolio diversification, where Neff is equal to 1 when
all wealth is invested in one stock, whereas it is N when the wealth is equally divided among
stocks, i.e., wi = 1/N . When short-sale is not permitted, Neff has a clear meaning. In contrast,
when short-sale is permitted there might be some ambiguity in the interpretation. This is why
in Equation 3.24, we consider the absolute value of the weights and we compute the smallest
number of stocks for which the sum of absolute weights is larger than a given percentage p of the
sum of the absolute value of all weights. For our analysis, we consider p = 0.9, thus N90 will be
the minimum number of stocks in the portfolio, such that their absolute weight cumulate to 90%
of the total of asset absolute weights. We are also interested in how extreme portfolio weights
are when short-sale is permitted. For doing this, we analyse the ratio between the absolute sum
of positive and negative weights, which is defined in Equation 3.25.
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3.4.3 Summary of Performance Measures
It is worthwhile noting that for the In-sample analysis of Section 3.4.1, we are mainly interested
in the ratio γ, while in the Out-of-sample analysis, we provide a more complete battery of tests
to assess the performance of our correlation estimators in a portfolio context. This does not
mean, however, that we use the same performance metrics for all the correlation estimators used
in this thesis. For example, measures of portfolio diversification are more relevant to assess the
performance of portfolios using the sample correlation matrix and its RMT-filtered version in
Chapter 5 than for assessing the performance of the regime-switching correlation matrix and its
RMT-filtered version in Chapter 6. For this latter, we focus on the ability of the correlation
estimators to deal with downside volatility, hence we use the Sortino and Omega ratios. In all
chapters, we test the ability of the RMT-filtered correlation estimators to produce (i) portfolios
with the lowest realised risk and (ii) to correctly predict realised risk. In Table 3.1 we provide a
summary for the performance measures described above.
Out-of-Sample Metrics Chapter 5 Chapter 6 Chapter 7
γ Section 5.5.1 Section 6.6.1 Section 7.3.3
MSE Section 5.5.1 Section 6.6.1 Section 7.3.3
Ωrealised Section 5.5.1 Section 6.6.1 Section 7.3.3
Ωpredicted Section 5.5.1 Section 6.6.1 Section 7.3.3
Neff Section 5.5.3 - -
Np Section 5.5.3 - -
w−/w+ Section 5.5.3 - -
ΠTt=1(1 + rt) Section 5.5.2 Section 6.6.2 -
Sharpe Ratio Section 5.5.2 Section 6.6.2 -
Sortino Ratio - Section 6.6.2 -
Omega Ratio - Section 6.6.2 -
Table 3.1: Summary of performance metrics used across the chapters.
3.5 The Eigen-Pair Method for Network Stability
Before introducing the approach to assess the stability of financial networks, it is worthwhile
mentioning some of the challenges faced in the financial network literature. As pointed out by
Castre´n and Rancan (2014), despite the evident usefulness of network tools in modelling inter-
connections, the financial applications are still very limited. A reason for this, is that network
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representation requires very granular data on counterparty exposures, which is rarely available,
at least from public sources. In order to deal with this shortcoming, previous research has often
been based on estimated linkages. Facing these constraints, most of the pre 2007 literature sim-
ulated financial network models assuming that they were random graphs or used the Entropy
method for network formation which aims to maximize the homogeneity of financial flows be-
tween FI and its counterparties. Many have discussed (Mistrulli, 2011; Cont et al., 2013) why
networks produced by the entropy method or as random graphs are not suited to characterize
real world financial networks. In a recent paper Solorzano-Margain et al. (2013) based on the
extensive bilateral data on liablities and exposures of FIs in the mexican financial system, fi-
nancial contagion arising from the unexpected failure of an FI on others s found to be more
widespread than from results obtained from calibrated financial network models mostly based
on maximum entropy algorithm surveyed in Upper (2011). This means that in order to avoid
model risk from calibration algorithms, structural bilateral balance sheet and off-balance sheet
data based network models are needed to study systemic risk from financial interconnections. In
this context, we limit our analysis to observed cross-border exposures and ignore within country
interlinkages, which are not observable and would be subject to mismeasurement in case of being
estimated by the methods mentioned above.
We introduce the eigen-pair method of Markose (2012, 2013) based on the spectral analysis of
cross-border exposures of national banking systems relative to their equity capital. In contrast
to a portfolio generalisation of risk as in the case of market price-based systemic risk indices
(henceforth, SRIs), the spectral method involves the power iteration algorithm for the matrix
representing bilateral exposures, which characterises the long range impact of individual node
failure on counterparties of counterparties in the chain of indebtedness.
The main focus here is on the Core of the Global Banking System Network (CGBSN) (18 BIS
reporting countries). We first define a network by two sets: a set of N nodes (vertices), E and
a set of links between the nodes (edges).
The CGBS network is a directed weighted network, that is, there is only one non-reciprocal
link, where the direction of a link represents obligations that all sectors of a country at the start
of an arrow have towards the banking system of another country at the end of the arrow. The
links are weighted by the amount due. In this context, the weighted matrix of the CGBS network
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is defined as:
X =

0 x12 · · · x1j · · · x1N
x21 0 · · · x2j · · · x2N
...
... 0 · · · · · · · · ·
xi1
... · · · 0 · · · xiN
...
... · · · · · · 0 ...
xN1 xN2 · · · xNj · · · 0

. (3.26)
Here X is an NxN matrix, and xij are the gross liabilities of country i to banking system of
country j. Likewise, the transpose of xij , i.e., xji, denotes the gross liabilities of country j to
banking system of country i. Notice that xii = 0. The sum of an i-th row
∑N
j=1 xij represents
the total payable amount of a country i to all j countries’ banking systems. The sum of an j-th
column
∑N
i=1 xij represents the total receivable amount of the banking system of a country j.
The causal direction of contagion comes from the default of a net debtor country i to the net
creditor national banking system j. Specifically, this occurs if country i owes more to the banking
system of country j, than what country j owes to the banking system of country i relative to
j’s equity capital. The default of country i will have an impact on the solvency of country j’s
banking system and on its non-banking sectors. This can be expressed as θij =
(xij−xji)+
Cj0
, where
the numerator takes only positive values and is equal to zero if the net exposure is negative
(xij − xji) < 0. The denominator Cj0, is initial capital of country j. This matrix Θ is referred
to as the stability matrix:
Θ =

0 (x12−x21)
+
C20
· · · 0 · · · (x1N−xN1)+CN0
0 0 · · · (x2j−xj2)+Cj0 · · ·
(x2N−xN2)+
CN0
...
... 0 · · · · · · · · ·
(xi1−x1i)+
C10
... · · · 0 · · · (xiN−xNi)+CN0
...
... · · · · · · 0 ...
0 (xN2−x2N )
+
C20
· · · (xNj−xjN )+Cj0 · · · 0

, (3.27)
Here, we will discuss the importance of matrix Θ in describing the dynamics of the cascade
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failure of a trigger debtor country on the rest of the system. In the first instance, a failure of a net
debtor country or a subset thereof, can lead to failures in the national banking systems that are
directly exposed to it. Unlike Degryse et al. (2010), we will focus on the contagion propagated
solely from the failure of national banking systems on their liabilities to other national banking
systems. For this the Θ matrix will be scaled each quarter by the proportion of cross-border
banking system liabilities to total cross-border liabilities of both banking and non-banking sector
liabilities. The rationale behind the scaling is that the BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics does
not report interbank data, but exposures of national banking systems to debtor countries. This
is why we need to apply this transformation to approximate interbank data. As a fixed scalar
is used to scale the Θ matrix at each quarter, this will directly scale the maximum eigenvalue
that we will produce as the SRI for the cross-border banking financial network. Hence, in what
follows the notation for the Θ matrix will remain unchanged. The overall dynamics for the rate
of failure of banking system of country i at q + 1, is given by:
ui,q+1 = (1− ρ)ui,q +
∑
j
(xj,i − xi,j)+
Ci0
uj,q = (1− ρ)ui,q +
∑
j
θj,iuj,q, (3.28)
= (1− ρ)
(
1− Ci,q
Ci,0
)
+
∑
j
θj,iuj,q. (3.29)
Here, in the first term of Equation 3.28, ρ can be seen as the capital threshold for banking
system losses and it can be considered as the rate of cure in the epidemic literature. Hence,
(1 − ρ) provides the local rate of failure of a banking system stemming from a lack of its own
capital buffer. The failure rate depends on uiN = 1 − Ci,q/Ci,0, for q > 0. Here, Ci,q is the
remaining capital at q relative to initial capital at q = 0. The second term,
∑
j θj,iuj,q, adds up
to the infection rates sustained from counterparties weighted net liabilities.7 In matrix notation,
7We will briefly compare the spectral method for contagion with the popular Furfine (2003) contagion algo-
rithm. In the latter, it is assumed that a country (originally a financial institution) can spread contagion only
if the losses it faces due to the failure of counterparties exceeds a given threshold of its capital buffer. In Equa-
tion 3.28, the latter condition of failure implies that uj,q = 1, and otherwise, uj,q = 0 for i’s counterparties and
if i is deemed to have failed at q + 1 , uiq+1,j = 1 and i will trigger a wave of contagion at q + 1. In the spectral
method, there is no threshold condition for failure and contagion losses are propagated at the rate of ui,q > 0.
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the dynamics of failure of national baking systems is given by:
Uq+1 = [Θ
′ + (1− ρ)I]Uq, (3.30)
where Θ′ is the transpose of matrix in Equation 8.1 with each element θ′ij = θji and I is the
identity matrix. The system stability of Equation 3.30 is evaluated on the basis of the power
iteration of the initial matrix Q = [Θ′ + (1− ρ)I], where Uq takes the form:
Uq = [Θ
′ + (1− ρ)I]q U0 = QqU0, (3.31)
where U0 with elements (u10, u20, ...., uN0) gives the initial failure rate of a national banking
system. For instance, when U0 = (u10, u20, ...., uN0) = (1, u20, ...., uN0), this means that the
trigger banking system that fails at initial date 0 is banking system 1, and the non-failed national
banking systems have a zero but low initial failure rate of ui0 = 1/Ci0. Moving forward, the
ratio of capital at q to initial capital, Ciq/Ci0, gives the probability of survival for a non-failed
banking system and hence at the q+1th iteration, the rate of failure of a non-failed bank is given
by uiq+1 = (1 − Ciq+1/Ci0). Based on the work of May (1974, 1972), Markose (2012) shows
that the stability of the network system is determined by the maximum eigenvalue of the initial
matrix Q = [Θ′ + (1− ρ)I] when it satisfies the following conditions:
λmax(Q) = (1− ρ) + λmax(Θ) < 1, (3.32)
Hence,
λmax(Θ) < ρ. (3.33)
Here ρ is the homogeneous capital loss threshold. The threshold ρ can be regarded as a
percentage of banking system equity capital to buffer losses. In order to capture the effects of
failure of net debtor banking systems on a net creditor banking systems, λmax is rescaled by the
proportion of bank-to-bank cross-border flows over the total amount of cross-border flows (i.e.,
bank-to-bank plus bank-to-nonbank), as reported by Bruno and Shin (2015a).8 If this condition
8In Appendix C.4, we derive an absolute total equity capital loss threshold TC which is equivalent to the
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is violated, then any negative shock, in the absence of outside interventions, can propagate
through the networked system as a whole and potentially cause capital losses proportionate to
λmax(Θ). The specific estimates of capital losses, when the stability condition in Equation 8.2
is violated depends on the left eigenvectors. Further, note λmax(Θ) where Θ has been scaled by
a scalar for each quarter to reflect the proportion of cross border banking sector liabilities in the
BIS data to the total of all sectors, is a simple linear adjustment. The matrix Θ has two sets
of eigenvectors: right (V R) and left (V L) eigenvector. The right eigenvector V R gives the rank
order of systemic importance, while the left eigenvector V L gives the rank order of the countries
that are vulnerable. The right eigenvector centrality assigns a relative centrality score to all
nodes in the network based on the principle that connections to high-scoring nodes contribute
more to the score of the node in question than equal connections to low-scoring nodes. This
means that the importance of a node is not ranked based on the size of the exposure, but instead
based on how important a banking system’s neighbours are. In other words, a node is important
because is connected to other important nodes. Likewise, the left eigenvector centrality, which
is a reflection of the right eigenvector centrality, provides the impact of the exposures of each
banking system to others. Under the same principle, a node is vulnerable because is connected
to highly vulnerable nodes. Since the i-th node’s centrality is proportional to the inverse of the
maximum eigenvalue λ−1max and the centrality measure of all its neighbours (Newman, 2010), then
denoting the right eigenvector centrality of i-th node as the i-th element of the right eigenvector
(V Ri ), we define:
V Ri = λmax(Θ)
−1
N∑
j=1
θijV
R
j , (3.34)
Using matrix notation, we obtain the eigenvalue equation:
ΘV R = λmax(Θ)V
R. (3.35)
Similarly, for λmax(Θ), there is another associated eigenvector V
L, which by definition of the
empirical average total equity capital to risk weighted assets of the cross border banks for all the 18 countries
when the regulatory ratio for this is 10%.
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eigenvalue equation we get:
V LΘ = Θ′V L = λmax(Θ)V L. (3.36)
The matrix Θ is a non-negative matrix with real entries, hence λmax(Θ) is a real positive
number. The Perron-Frobenius theorem guarantees non-negative eigenvectors V R and V L under
the assumption that Θ represents the irreducible network.9 Using the power iteration algorithm
in Equation 3.31, it can be shown that in the steady state, the potential capital loss for banking
system of country i can be estimated as the product of λmax(Θ) and country i’s left eigenvector
centrality while using the infinity norm, vLi,∞:
ui,# ∼= λmax(Θ′)vLi,∞. (3.37)
Note that when using the infinity norm, the left eigenvector centrality of the most vulnerable
country is equal to 1.10 This implies that the maximum percentage potential capital loss of the
most vulnerable country is given by λmax(Θ). Likewise, the most systemically important country
can potentially bring about λmax(Θ)% of equity capital for the system as a whole. The proof of
Equation 4.1 can be found in Appendix C.1.
9For any randomly selected pairs of nodes (i, j) in an irreducible network, there is a path between them, viz.
Θ is strongly connected.
10For this analysis, it is important to make sure that the right and left eigenvectors associated with the largest
eigenvalue are given using the infinity norm. The infinity norm of a vector x denoted as, ||x||∞, is the largest
number in the vector. Hence, the highest ranked country, in terms of its eigenvector centrality an index of 1.
There is a simple conversion from the eigenvector produced using the Euclidean norm to one using the infinity
norm (see, Markose, 2012).
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Chapter 4
Eigenvalue Analysis for the FTSE
100
4.1 Introduction
As we described in Section 3.2, the RMT approach allows us to identify the optimal number of
eigenvalues in the sample correlation matrix. In general, the leading eigenvalues are the ones
expected to carry most of the economically relevant information about market correlations and
therefore, these can be used for forecasting purposes by using the filters defined in Section 3.3.
In addition to this, an eigenvalue analysis also has the property to deliver some very interesting
results about market behaviour. For example, Plerou et al. (2001) show that the time evolution of
the largest eigenvalue reflects the degree of collective behaviour of stocks. Song et al. (2011) finds
that the time evolution of the largest eigenvalue is related to the average correlation coefficient
of the sample correlation matrix. They also find that the time evolution of the second largest
eigenvalue and its associated eigenvector was closely related to certain market events, such as
financial crises and currency crashes. The analysis of the information content of eigenvalues can
also be used to identify the presence of clusters characterised by economic sectors of stocks with
similar correlation structures (see Coronnello et al., 2005).
Using these insights, we provide an eigenvalue analysis for the FTSE 100. For doing this,
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in Section 4.2 we first investigate the spectral properties of the sample correlation matrix and
contrast it with those of a random matrix. We also provide a financial interpretation of the
deviating eigenvalues and their associated eigenvectors. In Section 4.3 we introduce the notion
of Inverse Participation Ratio, which allows us to identify the number of significant stocks that
belong to each eigenvector. In Section 4.4 we analyse the time evolution of the largest eigenvalue
and eigenvectors and show how sensitive market correlations are to common shocks arising in
financial markets. Finally, in Section 4.5 we show how the behaviour of eigenvalues can be useful
to illustrate some stylised facts of financial correlations, i.e., asymmetries and participation of
financial assets.
4.2 A Spectral Analysis: The RMT Approach in Practice
Here we provide a spectral analysis of the sample correlation matrix for 78 stocks contained in
the FTSE 100, using daily data for the year 2007.1 We therefore have T = 260 and N = 78,
which implies Q = T/N = 3.33.
We then construct the correlation matrix C2007 based on the average time-series returns and
normalised variance equal to 1. Using Equation 3.7, we can obtain the upper and lower bounds
of the theoretical Marc˘enko-Pastur (MP) distribution. In this case, we have λ+ = 2.395 and
λ− = 0.2045.
Similarly, we generate a Wishart correlation matrix R composed by cross-correlations of mu-
tually independent returns (bounded by the aforementioned edges).2 We then plot the Marc˘enko-
Pastur (henceforth, MP) density of the eigenvalues for 10000 trials and compare it with the eigen-
value density of the sample correlation matrix C2007. The results of this exercise are presented
in Figure 4.1.
As expected, the “bulk” of the eigenvalues lies within the bounds of the MP distribution.
However, there are obvious deviations from the RMT predictions. The largest eigenvalue is
well above the maximum predicted by the RMT predictions (λ+ = 2.395). This value as well
1Throughout this section, we will be using these 78 stocks for our estimation period and out-of-sample forecast
for the years 2000-2012. The selection of these stocks was based on two criteria: (i) their availability over the
entire sample, which allows to make reliable comparisons and (ii) were the most frequently traded.
2R = A
′A
T
, where A is a TxN matrix of i.i.d normal returns.
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Figure 4.1: The Marc˘enko-Pastur Distribution vs. The Sample Eigenvalue Density of C2007. We
can see two clear deviations from the upper edge of the spectrum.
as the remaining deviating eigenvalues, are the ones we expect to carry economically relevant
information, while those within the distribution bounds can be considered just as noise.
For the year 2007, there are two large deviations from the upper bound predicted by the RMT,
λ1 = 35.09 and λ2 = 3.043. We also find two clear deviations in the lower bound, λ78 = 0.0247
and λ77 = 0.0562. From a portfolio management perspective, the list of eigenvalues can be seen
as different levels of risk of a certain portfolio. Likewise, the eigenvector components associated
with each eigenvalue can be regarded as the weights of different stocks in a certain portfolio,
where some stocks are long while others are short (Plerou et al., 2002). In order to better clarify
this point, in Figure 4.2, we plot the eigenvector components corresponding to the two largest
eigenvalues.
In Figure 4.2(a), we observe that the eigenvector components associated with the largest
eigenvalue are all positive and contribute in a similar way to the eigenvectors. This suggests a
strong collective behaviour of stocks. Typically, it has been found in the literature that the largest
eigenvalue, λ1, represents the risk of the market portfolio. Similarly, the eigenvector components
associated with the second largest eigenvalue (panel(b)) have been found to be represented by
companies with the largest market capitalisations (Gopikrishnan et al., 2001).
In stock markets, the largest eigenvalue corresponds to the risk of a portfolio whose weights
are the same for each asset. There is no neutrality in this portfolio: the only bet is whether the
42
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
Large st e igenve c tor c omponents
Pane l (a)
−4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
4
Pane l (c )
Normal iz e d re tu rn s of G1
N
o
rm
a
li
z
e
d
F
T
S
E
1
0
0
re
tu
rn
s
 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
Pane l (b )
Se c ond large st e igenve c tor c omponents
β ol s= 0 .976
Figure 4.2: Eigenvector Components of the Two Largest Eigenvalues: Year 2007.
market as a whole goes up or down, this is why the risk is large. Conversely, if two stocks move
very tightly together (e.g., Coca-Cola and Pepsi), then buying one and selling the other leads to
a portfolio that hardly moves, being only sensitive to events that strongly differentiate the two
companies (Bouchaud and Potters, 2009).
For example, if we construct a time-series returns using the weights contained in the largest
eigenvector u1, using the following expression:
G1t =
n∑
j=1
u1jGj(t). (4.1)
This basically defines the returns on the portfolio defined by u1.3 We then proceed to nor-
malise these returns and run an OLS regression against the normalised returns of the market
index GFTSEt .
We plot the results of this regression in Figure 4.2(c). We can see that there is a clear linear
and positive relationship between the returns G1t and G
FTSE100
t , with a strong partial correlation
coefficient < GFTSE100t , G
1
t >= 0.9761. From this, we can therefore conclude that the largest
eigenvalue corresponds to the risk of the market mode. We repeat the same exercise for the
3In multivariate statistical analysis, equation 4.1 defines the first principal component.
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smallest eigenvector, u78. We plot the correlation coefficients in Figure 4.3(c).
From a portfolio perspective, the smallest eigenvector determines the least risky portfolio one
can build. This can be corroborated by the nearly zero beta coefficient of the regression against
the market index. This implies that the portfolio constructed from the smallest eigenvalues is
almost totally immune to the systematic risk emanating from the collective behaviour of stocks
represented by the largest eigenvalue.
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Figure 4.3: Eigenvector Components of the Two Smallest Eigenvalues: Year 2007.
Figure 4.3(a,b) plots the eigenvector components corresponding to the smallest deviating
eigenvalues, λ78 and λ77. Here we can see that the eigenvector corresponding to the smallest
eigenvalue exhibits clear preference for some pairs of stocks with the highest correlations. Finally,
we plot the eigenvector components of two eigenvalues inside the bounds of the MP distribution
in Figure ??.
As we mentioned above, the eigenvalues inside of the bulk of the MP distribution are assumed
to be random and therefore should not carry economically relevant information. This appears to
be the case, as the eigenvector components in both cases, do not seem to show clear preferences
for any stocks. Overall, our results are in line with the findings of most of the existing literature
on the subject (Laloux et al., 1999, 2000; Plerou et al., 1999, 2000a,b; Gopikrishnan et al., 2001;
Plerou et al., 2001, 2002; Bouchaud and Potters, 2009). In the next section, we look deeper into
the significant eigenvalues and eigenvectors to identify the individual stocks that participate in
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Figure 4.4: Eigenvector Components Associated with Two Noisy Eigenvalues: Year 2007. Their
components do not exhibit a clear preference for some stocks over others.
each of them.
4.3 The Number of Significant Components in the Devi-
ating Eigenvectors
Since the eigenvalues that are close to the bounds of the MP distribution are more likely to be
noisy, we quantify the number of components that participate significantly in each eigenvector.
For doing this, we use the notion of inverse participation ratio (IPR), often applied in localisation
theory (Guhr et al., 1998).4 The IPR of eigenvector uk is defined as
Ik =
N∑
l=1
[ukl ]
4, (4.2)
where ukl , l = 1, .., 78 are the components of eigenvector u
k. The meaning of Ik can be illus-
4In physics, the Inverse Participation Ratio (IPR) is a simple way to quantify how many states (eigenvectors) a
particle (company) is distributed over when there is some intrisic uncertainty about where the particle is located.
In quantum mechanics, the source of uncertainty arises because a particle can exist in a quantum superposition
of states over many locations. In this context, the IPR provides a sensitive count for how many atoms a bond
is delocalised over. This result also applies in cases where the probability distribution is not evenly distributed.
More formally, the IPR can be expressed as follows: IPR = 1/
∑n
i p
2
i , where pi is the probability that the particle
is in state i. For a quantum system, pi = |ψi|2, where ψi is the amplitude of the wave function in state i.
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trated by two limiting cases: (i) a vector with identical components, ukl = 1/
√
N has Ik = 1/N ,
whereas (ii) a vector with one component uk1 = 1 and a remainder zero has I
k = 1. Thus, the
IPR quantifies the reciprocal of the number of eigenvector components that contribute signifi-
cantly. In our case, for 2007, we have that the eigenvector associated to the largest eigenvalue has
IPR1 = 0.0140, which implies PR1 = 71.46 ≈ 71 significant stocks in the largest eigenvector,
which is almost the total number of stocks used.
The significant firms in the largest eigenvector are presented in Table A.1a in Appendix A.
By inspecting the largest eigenvector we can see that it has very strong components in the Life
Insurance sector, Financial Services, Banking and Real Estate Investments Trust and Mining to
some extent. In general, the largest eigenvector would seem to include most sectors in the FTSE
100 index.
Regarding the rest of the deviating eigenvectors, the interpretation of their meaning is not
as straightforward as in the former case. This is so, because the largest eigenvalue is of order
of magnitude larger than the others, hence constraining the remaining N − 1 since TrC = N .
Therefore, in order to avoid the effect of the largest eigenvalue, we first need to remove it from
the rest. For doing this, we regress, G1(t), calculated in Section 4.2, against each return and
compute the residuals i(t).
5 Then, we calculate again the correlation matrix using i(t) and
compute the eigenvectors uk of C. The number of significant participants in the second largest
eigenvector for the year 2007, can be found in Table A.1b in Appendix A.
In this case we have PR2 ≈ 32.21 significant components with strong emphasis in the Real
Estate Investment Trust, Banking, Life Insurance, Mining and Oil & Gas sectors. Also, the
removal of the first component allowed to identify a third and fourth deviating eigenvalues in the
upper bound, PR3 ≈ 34 and PR4 ≈ 35 with strong weights on the Banking, Pharmaceutical &
Biotechnology and Banking sectors.
Finally, the eigenvectors corresponding to the smallest eigenvalues, each has PR78 ≈ 3 and
PR77 ≈ 15 significant participants. We find these contain as significant participants, pairs of
stocks with the largest correlations of the sample. For example, the two largest components of
u78 correspond to stocks belonging to the same multinational, SDR and SRDC (Schroders Plc)
5Alternatively, we could have used the returns on the FTSE 100 index and the results would not change
stemming from the high correlation between both of an order of 0.9761.
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with Ci,j = 0.8989, the largest correlation of the sample. Typically, it has been found in the
literature that the components in the smallest eigenvectors represent a very small number of
stocks with large correlations.6 In particular, in each of these eigenvectors the relative sign of
the two largest components is negative. That is, pairs of stocks with correlation coefficients well
above the average < Ci,j > effectively “decouple” from the rest of the stocks.
These results are enlightening from an asset allocation perspective, where the use of the
RMT approach allows us to identify groups of stocks that can be used to contruct portfolios
with different degrees of exposure to the systematic risk embeded in the market index.
4.4 The Evolution of the Largest Eigenvalues and Eigen-
vectors Over Time
In the last section, we studied the number of significant components in the eigenvectors associated
to the deviating eigenvalues predicted by the RMT. Now we ask whether these eigenvector
components are stable over time and whether these are sensitive to common shocks. As we showed
in the last section, each of the deviating eigenvectors defined “eigenportfolios” of correlated
clusters of stocks. In this context, by assessing the stability of eigenvectors, we want to verify
whether these clusters of stocks remain correlated over time and also whether these clusters
participate collectively when faced to common shocks.
To answer these questions, we first examine the time evolution of the two largest eigenvectors
calculated on an daily rolling window of length 100 days starting from year 2000. In Figure 4.5, we
show a colour representation where we grouped the eigenvector components in sectoral clusters of
companies and their time evolution. Vertical lines represent common shocks affecting all sectors
at a given point in time, as they represent a colour change across sectors, while horizontal colour
lines represent whether eigenvector components remained stable over time. In Figure 4.5(a), we
observe that the components of the eigenvector associated to the largest eigenvalue would seem
to be mostly positive indicating the presence of a common factor driving the behaviour of most
stocks. This common factor has highly positive components in the Mining, Banking, Food and
6See, Laloux et al. (1999, 2000); Plerou et al. (2000a); Gopikrishnan et al. (2001); Plerou et al. (2002); Bouchaud
and Potters (2009).
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Panel (a): Evolution of the largest eigenvector components
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Figure 4.5: Time Evolution of the Eigenvector Components.
Drug retail and General Retail sectors. The vertical lines, represent common shocks that affect
most sectors at a given time. All in all, it would seem that most sectors were strongly affected by
the current crisis, particularly during the years 2008-2010. Regarding the eigenvector components
associated to the second largest eigenvalue (Figure 4.5(b)), these have a more complex structure
and it would not seem to carry meaningful information, except during periods of stress in financial
markets, especially in the Banking, Financial Services and Support Services sectors. This is in
line with the findings of Song et al. (2011).
In sum, the components of the largest eigenvalue seem to reflect common global and domestic
factors affecting the FTSE index. In order to fully understand the direct relationship between
macroeconomic determinants and the evolution of the eigenvalues a proper regression analysis is
needed. We leave this interesting endeavour for Chapter 7.
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4.5 Asymmetries and Company Participation in Financial
Correlations with RMT Tools
The RMT approach can be useful to describe some stylised facts of financial correlations, such as
correlation asymmetries and co-movement of stocks under different volatility periods. It has been
often argued that financial assets are more correlated during drawdowns than during drawups,
suggesting that the benefits of financial diversification may not be as strong as we believe (Ang
and Chen, 2002).
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Figure 4.6: Time evolution of the Largest Eigenvalue (Left y-axis) vs. Average Correlation
Coefficient and the FTSE Returns (Right y-axis).
A straightforward way to verify this is to examine the evolution of the largest eigenvalue
calculated on a daily rolling window of length 100 days and compare its evolution with the average
correlation coefficient calculated with the same length. This is done in Figure 4.6. Here we
observe that in times when the average correlation coefficient is high, the largest eigenvalue follows
the same dynamics (Rosenow et al., 2003). As we showed in Section 4.2, eigenvalues represent the
risk of the portfolio returns defined by their associated eigenvectors (i.e., principal components)
and as the largest eigenvalue reflects the market, which means that during drawdowns the market
has become riskier.
Another very interesting phenomenon is the degree of participation of financial assets under
different volatility periods. That is, we do not only find that correlations increase in high volatil-
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Figure 4.7: Time evolution of the Participation Ratio (PR) Associated to Largest Eigenvector of
C vs. the PR for Random Returns (Right y-axis) and the Average Correlation Coefficient (Left
y-axis).
ity periods, but also there are more companies participating significantly in the eigenvectors
associated to the largest eigenvalue (Fenn et al., 2011). In order to verify this, we plot the time
evolution of the Participation Ratios (PR), introduced in Section 4.3, calculated over a daily
rolling window of length 100 days. This is done in Figure 4.7. In addition, we plot the average
correlation coefficient calculated on a rolling window of the same length.
Here we observe that the PR of the largest eigenvalue increased considerably from 2000 to
2012, and there was a sharp increase between 2006 and 2008. This sharp rise of the PR implies
that many assets were highly correlated during the ensuing financial crisis. In order to test
the significance of the PR for the largest eigenvalue, we compare it to the corresponding PR
for random returns. Figure 4.7 shows that between 2006 and 2010, the PR of the observed
returns was significantly larger than the expected for random returns, which emphasises the
larger number of different assets that were correlated during this period.
4.6 Summary of main findings
In the present chapter we have shown the benefits of the RMT approach to describe market
correlations. Our findings can be summarised as follows:
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1. The information content of the deviating eigenvalues/eigenvectors predicted by the RMT
has the potential to identify groups or clusters of highly correlated stocks. These results are
very appealing from an asset allocation perspective, since the analysis of the eigenvector
components can be of great help to build portfolios with decreasing levels of risk.
2. By examining the evolution of the largest eigenvalue and its associated eigenvector, we find
that there are clusters of correlated stocks that remain stable over time. We also find that
these clusters behave in a similar way in face to common shocks affecting the stock market.
This is particularly true during periods of crisis.
3. The evolution of the largest eigenvalue is able to reproduce most stylised facts of financial
correlations, such as the asymmetric behaviour of correlations under different volatility
periods. During market drawdowns, that is, when average correlations increase and market
returns are low, the largest eigenvalue peaks the highest.
4. The use of RMT tools can also be very useful to identify the number of stocks that par-
ticipate significantly under different volatility periods, which is not easy reveal by using
standard financial tools. That is, by using the participation ratios introduced in section 4.3,
we find that average correlations do not only increase, but also that stocks that were not
significantly correlated under periods of low volatility, in face of a downturn, their correla-
tions will become significant. We interpret this as co-movements between assets in face of
a shock, rather than as correlations between assets per se.
All in all, we show that the use of Random Matrix Theory (RMT) can be a very powerful tool
of analysis by providing valuable informations about market behaviour, which could be used by
institutional investors to take their investment decisions or by policymaking institutions seeking
to monitor financial markets by examining very few indicators.
In what follows, we apply these insights into a portfolio optimisation context and show how the
RMT-filtering can be used to improve the forecast of the sample correlation matrix in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 5
Portfolio Analysis for the FTSE
100: RMT-Filtering
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter we apply the concepts introduced in the previous sections and consider the case
of a portfolio manager trading stocks of the FTSE 100 and assess whether the RMT-filtering
can be used to reduce portfolio risk. For doing this, in Section 5.2 we first illustrate the benefits
of noise filtering by replicating the standard methodology used in the literature (Laloux et al.,
2000; Rosenow et al., 2002). Following these studies, we split the sample into two subperiods
of one year and apply the RMT-filtering to the sample correlation matrix of the first subperiod
and construct a family of optimal portfolios. Then, for the same family of optimal portfolios
we compute the realised risk, by using next year’s sample correlation matrix and then compare
the percentage deviation between the predicted risk and the realised one. This quantity is then
compared with the one obtained using the sample correlation matrix. In order to capture different
volatility periods, we do this for the whole sample considered 2000-2012. For this setting we find
that the RMT-filtering has the potential to provide the best realised estimates for the whole
sample. These results are more pronounced when short-sale is permitted.
As pointed out by Pafka and Kondor (2003, 2004) and Daly et al. (2008), the effects of noise
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on risk estimates are strongly dependent on the ratio Q = T/N , where T is the length of the
time-series and N is the total number of assets. This is why in Section 5.3 we review some work
dealing with the sensitivity of noise to the ratio Q. We then apply these insights into a more
realistic environment, that is, by applying the different strategies as if we were an active portfolio
manager for different values of Q.
In Section 5.4 and Section 5.5, results are separated into in-sample and out-of-sample, respec-
tively. For the in-sample analysis, we assess the effects of noise filtering on realised portfolio risk
for different values of Q by using boostrapping techniques. Here we find that the RMT-filtering
performs the best for low values of the ratio Q, which is consistent with the findings of Pafka
and Kondor (2003) and Daly et al. (2008). For the out-of-sample testing, we use a battery of
tests to assess the performance of the RMT-filtering, ranging from the ratio γ (Section 3.4.1)
and Mean Squared Error (MSE) to return measures, such as the cumulated wealth at the end
of the out-of-sample period and risk-adjusted return measures such as the Sharpe Ratios for the
different strategies.
Here we find that the RMT-filtering has the potential to produce portfolios with the lowest
realised risk and also to correctly predict it. However, consistent with the in-sample results, these
benefits are highly dependent on the ratio Q = T/N and the existence/absence of short-sale,
with the RMT-filtering performing the best for low values of Q, when short-sale is permitted.
When short-sale is not permitted, similar to Pantaleo et al. (2011), we find that the filtered
correlation matrix delivers results comparable to those of the sample correlation matrix. We
therefore recommend the use of the RMT-filtering, only for low values of Q and when short-sale
is permitted. In Section 5.5.3, we provide an analysis of the weights for the different strategies,
by using different measures of diversification in order to provide a possible explanation for this
outperformance of the RMT-filtering. In Section 5.5.4, we gauge the robustness of our findings
by splitting the sample in two different volatility periods. Finally, in Section 5.6 we provide
conclusions and recommendations.
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5.2 Illustration of Noise Filtering to Improve Portfolio Risk
Estimates
The underlying randomness contained in the “bulk” of eigenvalues seen in the previous sections
has important implications for optimal portfolio selection. In the context of a Markowitz Portfolio
Theory (MPT), the effect of noise has a strong weight on the smallest eigenvectors, which are
precisely the ones that determine the least risky portfolios. This is why the Random Matrix
Approach allows reconciling the mean-variance approach of Markowitz as a tool for providing
better risk predictions. Consider a portfolio Π(t) of stocks with prices Si. The return on Π(t) is
given by
Φ =
N∑
i=1
wiGi, (5.1)
where Gi(t) is the return on stock i and wi is the fraction of wealth invested in stock i. The
fractions wi are normalised such that
∑N
i=1 wi = 1. The risk of holding the portfolio Π(t) can
be quantified by the variance
Ω2 =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
wiCijwjσiσj , (5.2)
where σi is the standard deviation (average volatility) of Gi, and Cij are the elements of the
sample correlation matrix C. In order to find an optimal portfolio, we must minimise Ω2 under
the constraint that the return on the portfolio is some fixed value Φ. In addition, we also have
the constraint that
∑N
i=1 wi = 1. The resolution of this minimisation can be implemented by
using two Lagrange multipliers, which leads to a system of linear equations for wi, which can
then be solved. The family of optimal portfolios can therefore be represented as a plot of the
return Φ as a function of risk Ω2, which is the Efficient Frontier.
To illustrate the effect of randomness of C on the selected optimal portfolios, we carry out
our analysis for the years 2006-2007. We first calculate the correlation matrix C2006 using 260
daily returns and use the returns G2007i of the next period. We then construct a family of 100
optimal portfolios, and plot Φ as a function of the predicted risk Ω2p for 2007. For this family
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of portfolios, we also compute the realised risk Ω2r during 2007 using C
2007. We do this in order
to compare the performance of the RMT approach isolated from any additional source of noise
that could arise, for example, in case we had to make a forecast of returns.
Since the meaningful information in C is contained in the deviating eigenvectors (whose
eigenvalues are outside of the RMT bounds), we use the filtering proposed by Plerou et al.
(2002) (see, Section 3.3). We then repeat the above approach for finding the optimal portfolio
using the filtered correlation matrix, C2006f instead of the unfiltered, C
2006. We plot the efficient
frontiers for both methods, for filtered and unfiltered matrices, in Figure 5.1.
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Figure 5.1: Efficient Frontier during 2007. Top panel shows the difference between predicted and
realised risk, for the same family of optimal portfolios using the filtered correlation matrix, Cf .
Bottom panel shows the difference between predicted and realised risk, but using the unfiltered
correlation matrix, C. As it can be seen, the predicted risk is closer to the realised one when we
use the filtered correlation matrix. Short-sale permitted.
A first observation is that the filtered correlation matrix, for a given level of return, achieves
a lower realised risk than when using the unfiltered correlation matrix. A second observation is
regarding the quality of prediction. That is, how close our risk predictions are from the realised
ones. For illustrating this, we measure the relative performance of the filtered portfolios vs.
the unfiltered ones by calculating the difference between both curves with the Mean Average
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Percentage Error (MAPE), which is defined as:
MAPE =
1
n
N∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣Ω2i r − Ω2i pΩ2i p
∣∣∣∣ . (5.3)
Here the unfiltered correlation matrix underestimates realised risk by 88%, while the filtered
one only underestimates realised risk by 59%. There is certainly a sharp contrast between the
use of the filtered and unfiltered matrices, with the former performing far better than the latter
in forecasting portfolio risk.
In light of these results, an interesting question would be to assess how the filtered correlation
matrix performs relative to the unfiltered one during different volatility regimes in the stock
market. For doing this, we apply the same methodology to consecutive one-year periods from
2000-2001 to 2010-2011 in Table 5.1. In columns (1)-(2) we compare the MAPE using the filtered
and unfiltered correlation matrices, restricting “short sale”, while in columns (3)-(4) we allow for
“short sale”. Finally, in columns (5) and (6) we present the volatility of the FTSE 100 calculated
as the mean of the absolute value of returns for the year used for estimation and the VIX index
as a measure of international market volatility.
Here we observe that when “short sale” is not permitted, there are no major differences
between the portfolios built using the filtered correlation matrix and those using the unfiltered
matrix. Moreover, the overall improvement calculated as the average difference is negative. This
result could cast doubts on the effectiveness of the RMT-filtering in predicting realised risk during
periods of changing volatility.
However, these results are reversed when we allow for “short sale”. Here we observe that the
filtered correlation matrix is far superior to the unfiltered one in all cases. “Short sale” involves
selling assets that are borrowed in expectation of a fall in the asset’s price. In case the price
declines, the investor covers his position by buying an equivalent number of assets at the new
lower price and returns to the lender the assets that were borrowed. In mathematical terms,
when we allow for “short sale”, portfolio weights are allowed to be negative, and investors can
continuously sell low return assets and reinvest in higher yield assets and generate an infinite
expected return. Conversely, the investor could “short sell” a high yield asset and reinvest the
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No short sale Short sale
Unfiltered Filtered Unfiltered Filtered Vol. FTSE 100 VIX
Prediction-Realised (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2000-2001 0.227 0.242 0.407 0.099 0.902 23.3
2001-2002 0.121 0.108 0.300 0.114 1.005 25.7
2002-2003 0.024 0.035 0.485 0.151 1.233 27.2
2003-2004 0.058 0.064 0.748 0.525 0.860 21.9
2004-2005 0.166 0.213 0.385 0.346 0.490 15.4
2005-2006 0.198 0.175 0.223 0.095 0.421 12.7
2006-2007 0.161 0.142 0.883 0.588 0.580 12.7
2007-2008 0.058 0.070 0.459 0.331 0.794 17.4
2008-2009 0.042 0.040 0.988 0.579 1.582 32.5
2009-2010 0.126 0.117 0.739 0.486 1.068 31.4
2010-2011 0.092 0.083 0.362 0.254 0.788 31.4
Average 0.115 0.117 0.543 0.324 0.883 22.0
Improvement -0.012 0.403
Table 5.1: Mean Average Percentage Error (MAPE) for each year of the sample. The MAPE
reflects the difference between predicted and realised risk for a given family of optimal portfolios
along the efficient frontier. Best results are marked in bold face.
proceeds into a low yield asset, therefore achieving an infinite negative return.1 In this context,
“short selling” would seem to expand the opportunity set for investment decisions. The use of
the RMT-filtering allows to exploit these opportunities to construct portfolios that are robust to
high volatility periods.2
These results are different from those of Sandoval et al. (2012) for the Brazilian Stock Market,
who based on a number of agreement measures between predicted and realised risk, i.e., MAPE,
Mean Squared Error (MSE), the angle between risk vectors, Simple Distance and the Kullback-
Leibler distance measure, concluded that the RMT-filtering did not produce better results than
the unfiltered approach, in particular during high volatility periods. They also find that the
RMT-filtering combined with the single-index model significantly improves risk estimates for
most of the measures analysed. Our results differ from his in that when allowing for “short
sale” the RMT-filtering performs unequivocally better than when using the standard sample
correlation matrix. In fact, as pointed out by Jagannathan (2003) and DeMiguel et al. (2009),
when we impose “short sale” constraints and minimise the portfolio variance, this is equivalent
1Evidently, a rational investor will never do this and this is why only the upward sloping part of the efficient
frontier is considered.
2While short-selling may not be allowed in certain markets and during specific times in financial markets (e.g.,
crises), it is still possible to circumvent this by using derivative positions.
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to shrinking the extreme elements of the covariance matrix, which is also a way to deal with the
estimation error (noise) that arises when we estimate large covariance matrices, making the effects
of the RMT-filtering redundant. This also could be a possible reason why the RMT-filtering does
not further improve realised risk estimates when “short-sale” is not permitted.
5.3 Sensitivity of the RMT Approach to the Data Size
Q = T/N
As we mentioned in Section 2.2.3, the effects of noise are very sensitive to the ratio Q = T/N ,
where T is the length of the time-series and N is the number of assets. Based on simulated
data, Pafka and Kondor (2003) find that for small values of Q, of the order of 1.66, noise has an
important effect on risk estimates, while for large values of Q, around 5, the error due to noise
drops to acceptable levels. In this context, the large discrepancies found between predicted and
realised risk by Laloux et al. (1999, 2000) and Plerou et al. (2000a, 2002) could be attributed to
low values of Q.
They further investigate this possibility by estimating the magnitude of this effect for values
of N and T similar to the ones used in Plerou et al. (2002) and Laloux et al. (2000). In Laloux
et al. (2000) daily returns on N = 406 stocks belonging to the S&P 500 covering the period 1991-
1996 (T = 1309 daily observations) were used to calculate the correlation matrix. As pointed
out by Pafka and Kondor (2003), for this portfolio size and this length of the time-series, the risk
of the optimal portfolio in the presence of noise is about 20% larger than without. Similarly, for
Laloux et al. (2000) 30-min returns on the largest N = 1000 U.S. stocks over the two-year period
1994-1995 (T = 6448 observations for each series) were used and the ratio between the predicted
and realised risk was about 1.09, that is, the decrease in efficiency due to noise is only around
9%. These findings suggest that the impact of noise on the portfolio optimisation problem would
not seem to be as dramatic as we think.
In Pafka et al. (2004), they assess the performance of a number of covariance matrix estima-
tors by using bootstrapping techniques. For doing this, they split the sample into an estimation
period (using past information) and an evaluation period (using future information). They cal-
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culate different correlation matrix estimators (i.e. equally weighted and exponentially weighted
compared to their “filtered” and “unfiltered” versions) using the first period and then used them
to construct “optimal” portfolios. They evaluate the performance of these estimators based on
the standard deviation of the corresponding portfolio returns in the second period. In order to
reduce the error that may arise from the use of a single sample, they perform their evaluation
on a large number of bootstrapped samples from a larger dataset of daily stock returns. They
compared the performance of their estimators for different values of N and T2. The criteria used
for comparison is the ex-post volatility (i.e. the volatility in the “investment period”) of the
minimum variance portfolios constructed by using the estimators based on ex-ante return data
(i.e. before the investment period). The volatility measures were obtained by averaging over a
larger number of bootstrapped samples.
For a sample size of N = 100 and T2 (investment period of one month), they find that the
RMT-filtering performs the best for both uniform and exponential weighting. For the case of
uniform weighting, they also suggest that the best choice for the length of the time window T1 is
around 250, (i.e. one year of daily data). They also find that the parameter used for exponential
weighting commonly used by practitioners (α = 0.94) is completely inappropriate for portfolio
optimisation with a large number of assets. This approach was also used later on by Daly et al.
(2008) to assess the performance of some RMT-filters, with similar findings to those of Pafka
et al. (2004).
As we mentioned in Section 3.2, when predicting future correlations from past correlations,
one has to balance two competing effects: the width λ+− λ− = 4
√
N/T of the noise part of the
spectrum decreases when long time-series are used. This means that the longer the time-series,
the effects of noise tend to decrease. This can be illustrated in Figure 5.2, where we plot the
percentage of deviating eigenvalues as a function of T . Here we observe that as T increases
there are more eigenvalues deviating from the noise part of the spectrum of the MP distribution,
indicating that the effects of noise would tend to decrease with the sample size. This suggest that
long time-series over many years should be analysed. However, as correlations are not stable over
time, the estimation period should not be too long in order to correctly describe the dynamics
of correlations (Rosenow et al., 2003).
In the next section, we show the implications of using different sample size on portfolio risk
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Figure 5.2: Percentage of Deviating Eigenvalues as a Function of T . The larger T gets, the
smaller the noise band of the MP spectrum and the more eigenvalues deviate from the upper
edge λ+.
estimates and provide some insights on under what conditions the RMT-filtering will perform
the best for a set of stock returns of the FTSE 100.
5.4 In-Sample Analysis
As described in Section 3.4.1, the in-sample methodology consists in a boostrap approach. For
this, we use the first 500 observations of the sample, running from 04/01/00 until 30/11/01, for
77 stocks included in the FTSE 100. Here, for a given number of assets N , we randomly select a
test date t and estimate the portfolio up to t and everything afterwards is used as realised, future
information (usually, a forecast horizon of 20 days). We repeat this random selection 1000 times,
with replacement, and calculate the mean across all bootstrapped samples of the ratio γ, defined
in Section 3.4.1, which is the ratio between realised and predicted risk. The ratio γ has been
widely used in the econophysics literature (see, Pafka et al., 2004; Pafka and Kondor, 2004; Daly
et al., 2008, 2010) to assess the performance of the RMT-filtering in forecasting realised risk.
Similarly, in the econometrics literature, this ratio has also been used to assess the performance
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of multivariate volatility models (see, Engle and Sheppard, 2001; Engle, 2002).3 We estimate our
portfolios using the sample correlation estimator (henceforth, CSAMP ) and the RMT-filtering
correlation estimator, using the method of (Plerou et al., 2002) (henceforth, CSAMP−RMT1).
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Figure 5.3: Mean Bootstrapped (in-sample) for the ratio γ of realised to predicted risk, for the
filtered approach, γ¯f =
Ωfr
Ωf
, compared to the unfiltered approach, γ¯u = ΩurΩu , as a function of
Q = T/N . Notice that filtering is most effective for low values of Q. Short-sale allowed.
In Figure 5.3 we plot the mean bootstrapped results for an evaluation period of 20 days,
allowing for short-sale.4 Here we observe that the RMT-filtering has great potential to predict
realised risk for low values of Q = T/N . In particular, the forecasting ability of the filtered
correlation matrix would seem to perform the best when Q ranges between 1.6 ≤ Q ≤ 3.2.
Taking into account that we are estimating our portfolios for a fixed number of assets (N = 77),
the optimal length of the time-series used would lie between 123 ≤ T ≤ 250, that is, between 6
and 12 months (≈ 1 year of data). These results are consistent with those found by Pafka et al.
(2004) (≈ 250 days) and Daly et al. (2008) (≈ 250 days), for 100 large-cap stocks of the S&P
500.
These results are encouraging, since we find that for a given value of Q, the RMT-filtering has
3This ratio is very similar to the Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE), introduced in Section 5.2, which
measures how far the predicted risk is from the realised risk.
4When allowing for short-sale we limit our weights to be no bigger than 100% on any asset and to “go short”
on 150%.
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the potential to achieve more accurate estimates of the realised risk of minimum risk portfolios,
when compared to the unfiltered correlation matrix based on historical information. The sample
correlation matrix would seem to perform better for values of Q greater than 4 (see, inset, in
Figure 5.3). These values are similar as those suggested by Pafka and Kondor (2003) who find
that for values of Q greater 5, the effects of noise drop to acceptable levels.
In the next section we assess the out-of-sample performance of the RMT-filtering in predicting
realised portfolio risk, by using a battery of tests and different estimation windows. We also
investigate whether RMT-filtered correlations are able to deliver greater cumulated portfolio
returns at the end of the out-of-sample period than the sample correlation matrix.
5.5 Out-of-Sample Analysis
In this section we provide an out-of-sample analysis that will allow us to assess how each fore-
casting method would have performed in practice in case of being used. One of the main disad-
vantages of the bootstrapping approach is that it tends to favour models with more parameters,
since the best parameter values are assessed after testing.
For the out-of-sample testing we split the sample into two subperiods. The first subperiod,
that we used in the previous section for the in-sample analysis covers the period from 04/01/00
until 30/11/01 (≈ 500 observations), while the second subperiod is the evaluation period, which
starts in 04/12/01 until 25/09/12 (≈ 2820 observations).
As explained in Section 3.4.2, for every test date t′, we consider portfolios that were invested
before t′− tf , or on that date, where tf is the investment period (in this case, 20 business days).
That is, we estimate the portfolio variance at a given month and compare it to the realised
variance on that month, which is calculated as the sample covariance of the realised returns over
the investment horizon (tf = 20 days). Subsequent retraining is done on a monthly basis.
As we showed in the in-sample analysis and as observed by Pafka and Kondor (2003), the
effects of noise would seem to strongly depend on the ratio Q = T/N , with the RMT-filtering
performing the best for small values of Q while for larger values the effects of noise are almost
negligible. To allow for this possibility, we estimate our models using different time windows,
based on three estimation windows; 125 days (≈ 6 months), 250 days (≈ 1 year) and 500 days (≈
62
2 years). All these models use the first subperiod (01/04/00 until 12/31/02 ≈ 500 observations)
as initial training period.
In contrast to most studies in the literature, we estimate our portfolios with short-sale con-
straints. We believe this provides a more realistic setting as short-sale is not always allowed in
financial markets stemming from the increase in risk it brings to portfolios. Alternatively, we also
allow for short-sale, however, none of the estimated portfolios ever took an extreme position.5
Based on the above, we estimate our portfolios using the following correlation estimators:
• Sample Correlation Matrix: CSAMP .
• Filtered Sample Correlation Matrix Keeping the Largest Eigenvalue: CSAMP1.
• Filtered Sample Correlation Matrix - Method 1: CSAMP−RMT1 (Plerou et al., 2002).
• Filtered Sample Correlation Matrix - Method 2: CSAMP−RMT2 (Laloux et al., 2000)
Here we compare and contrast the performance of the sample correlation matrix, CSAMP ,
with their RMT-filtered versions, using both methods described in Section 3.3. We also filter
the sample correlation matrix by keeping only the largest eigenvalue, as we want to assess the
effectiveness of the RMT-filtering in selecting the optimal number of eigenvalues.
5.5.1 Realised Risk Estimates
In Table 5.2, we report our realised risk estimates, using the performance metrics defined in
Section 3.4.2 with short-sale constraints. Here we observe that there are no major improvements
of using the RMT-filtering on the sample correlation matrix. For the best of the cases, we
obtain a slightly better prediction and lower volatility of prediction, measured by the MSE.
For instance, when using an estimation window of 125, using (Plerou et al., 2002)’s method,
CSAMP−RMT1−125, delivers a γ ratio of 1.067 and MSE of 0.084, compared to 1.084 and 0.115,
respectively, when using CSAMP − 125. As we move to longer estimation windows, the benefits
of filtering become even more negligible.
5Similar to the in-sample analysis, when allowing for short-sale we limit our weights to be no bigger than 100%
on any asset and to “go short” on a 150%.
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No short-sale Short-sale
Model Ωest Ωreal MSE · 10−2 γ¯ Ωest Ωreal MSE γ¯
CSAMP − 125 0.102 0.114 0.115 1.084 0.045 0.142 0.012 2.976
CSAMP1 − 125 0.098 0.114 0.115 1.123 0.059 0.113 0.005 1.729
CSAMP−RMT1 − 125 0.102 0.113 0.084 1.067 0.066 0.102 0.002 1.452
CSAMP−RMT2 − 125 0.096 0.115 0.119 1.160 0.065 0.101 0.002 1.466
CSAMP − 250 0.106 0.112 0.068 1.019 0.063 0.108 0.003 1.625
CSAMP1 − 250 0.101 0.112 0.077 1.060 0.060 0.113 0.005 1.699
CSAMP−RMT1 − 250 0.106 0.111 0.062 1.008 0.069 0.101 0.002 1.353
CSAMP−RMT2 − 250 0.101 0.113 0.079 1.084 0.068 0.099 0.001 1.361
CSAMP − 500 0.106 0.111 0.057 0.994 0.071 0.100 0.001 1.334
CSAMP1 − 500 0.102 0.111 0.065 1.042 0.061 0.114 0.005 1.677
CSAMP−RMT1 − 500 0.107 0.110 0.053 0.983 0.073 0.100 0.001 1.287
CSAMP−RMT2 − 500 0.103 0.111 0.063 1.034 0.072 0.098 0.001 1.277
Table 5.2: Out-of-sample estimates of the variance of minimum variance portfolios. Notice that
the filtered correlation matrices provide the lowest average realised risk and the best realised risk
forecast in the absence of short-sale constraints. When these constraints are in place, results are
not conclusive.
Table 5.2 (Columns, 5-6) presents results allowing for a short-sale strategy.6 Here observe a
more substantial difference between the filtered correlation matrix and the unfiltered one. In gen-
eral, when comparing the results for different estimation windows for risk forecast, we find that
risk predictions using the RMT-filtering are significantly better for short estimation windows,
but these results worsen as we increase the length of the time-series. For instance, when using an
estimation window of 125 days, the predicted risk, using CSAMP−RMT1 − 125, underestimates
realised risk by 45.2%, while when using the sample correlation matrix, CSAMP −125, we under-
estimate realised risk by 197.6%. Under this scenario the difference in the quality of prediction is
striking. These results are robust across estimation windows, but the difference in performance
of the RMT-filtering seems to be narrowed as we increase the estimation window. Another ob-
servation is that the portfolios built using only one eigenvalue in the RMT-filtering, CSAMP1,
do not generate better predictions than the ones selecting the optimal number of eigenvalues
as predicted by the RMT to include in the filter, namely, CSAMP−RMT1 and CSAMP−RMT2.
This means that the remaining eigenvalues that deviate from the Marc˘enko-Pastur Distribution
do contain economically relevant information, which can be used to build better risk forecast
6We are aware that this may not be realistic as short-sale is not always allowed in financial markets, but we
acknowledge that reality must lie between these two extreme cases.
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of realised risk of minimum variance portfolios. In general, portfolios builts using the filtered
correlation matrices deliver lower realised risk estimates, lower volatility of prediction (measured
by their MSE) and better realised risk forecast.
5.5.2 Risk-Adjusted Returns Estimates
Another interesting question is about whether the filtered correlation matrices deliver greater
cumulated portfolio returns for a given level of risk. For this, we calculate cumulated portfolio
returns at the end of the out-of-sample period. This performance measure is calculated by
applying the different strategies (i.e. weights) and using the ex-post returns, which are calculated
as the average returns over the investment horizon. We then compute the compounded returns
until the end of the out-of-sample period, starting with an initial £1 investment.
In Figures 5.4a-5.4c-5.4e we plot cumulated returns, for different estimation windows and
strategies (i.e. using the filtered vs. unfiltered correlation matrices), with short sale constraints.
A first observation is that there are no major differences in cumulated returns between the
filtered and unfiltered correlation matrices. The filtered correlation matrix, using only the largest
eigenvalue in the filter, CSAMP1, would seem to perform better than the rest. These differences
become almost negligible as we increase the estimation window.
In contrast, when short-sale is allowed in Figures 5.4b-5.4d-5.4f, we find significant differences
in cumulated returns. For instance, when using the filtered correlation matrix with Plerou
et al. (2002)’s method, CSAMP−RMT1 − 125, we obtain £3.22, whereas when using the sample
correlation matrix we obtain £1.90. This is particularly true for short estimation windows. For
example, when using an estimation window of 6 months (≈ 125 days) we obtain the highest
cumulated portfolio return (≈ £3.22). Conversely, when using an estimation window of 2 years
(≈ 500 days), the filtered correlation matrix still delivers a higher cumulated return (£2.66-2.76
for both methods) when compared to the sample correlation matrix (£2.03) but the difference
seems to be shrunk. We also find differences between both RMT-based filtering methods, with
the filtering method of Plerou et al. (2002), CSAMP−F1, performing slightly better for shorter
estimation windows than the method of Laloux et al. (2000), CSAMP−F2, which performs better
for longer estimation windows. A similar observation can be noticed for the realised risk estimates
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Figure 5.4: Cumulated Wealth at the end of the out-of-sample period for different estimation
windows, with and without short-sale.
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of Section 5.5.1. In general, in terms of cumulated wealth, the benefits seen after filtering, amount
to 65%.
No short-sale Short-sale
Model Cum. Ret Sharpe Ratio Cum. Ret Sharpe Ratio
CSAMP − 125 2.075 0.192 1.906 0.217
CSAMP1 − 125 2.344 0.180 2.435 0.309
CSAMP−F1 − 125 2.167 0.172 3.223 0.320
CSAMP−F2 − 125 2.252 0.180 3.155 0.309
CSAMP − 250 2.119 0.185 2.356 0.229
CSAMP1 − 250 2.226 0.169 2.545 0.283
CSAMP−F1 − 250 2.115 0.170 2.898 0.283
CSAMP−F2 − 250 2.104 0.169 2.888 0.283
CSAMP − 500 2.091 0.184 2.038 0.227
CSAMP1 − 500 2.218 0.173 2.540 0.261
CSAMP−F1 − 500 2.103 0.167 2.666 0.255
CSAMP−F2 − 500 2.157 0.173 2.767 0.261
Table 5.3: Cumulated Wealth at the end of the out-of-sample period and Sharpe Ratios using
the filtered and unfiltered correlation matrices for different estimation windows. The filtered
correlation matrices provide the best end of the period return and the highest Sharpe Ratio in
most cases.
Table 6.3 provides the cumulated returns and Sharpe Ratios for the different strategies. The
Sharpe Ratio is calculated as the ratio between expected excess return of a portfolio and its
standard deviation. Excess returns are defined as the difference between the expected portfolio
returns and the risk-free asset, which in this case is the 1-month Libor. This ratio will provides
us some insights into how well the returns of the different strategies compensate investors for the
risk taken. That is, when comparing different strategies (i.e., filtered v.s unfiltered correlations
for different estimation windows), the one with the highest Sharpe Ratio provides the best return
for the same risk (or, equivalently, the same return for lower risk). Here we see that the portfolios
built using the filtered correlation matrices, not only provide the highest cumulated returns but
also the highest Sharpe Ratios. This is particularly true when short sale is permitted. Conversely,
when short sale is not permitted, portfolios built using the sample correlation matrix outperform
the RMT-filtered ones.
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5.5.3 Are RMT-Filtered Portfolios More Diversified?
Now we investigate how can be explained the success of the RMT-filtering in prividing the
best realised risk estimates of minimum variance portfolios as well as the highest cumulated
returns and Sharpe Ratios. For doing this, in Table 5.4 we look deeper into the weights for the
different strategies by using the measures introduced in Section 3.4.2, i.e., the effective portfolio
diversification, Neff (Equation 3.23), N90 (Equation 3.24) and the ratio between negative and
positive weights, w−/w+, when allowing for short-sale (Equation 3.25).
No short-sale Short-sale
Neff N90 Neff N90 w
−/w+
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CSAMP − 125 7.41 (3.47) 8.12 (3.49) 2.43 (1.09) 46.81 (2.42) 0.605
CSAMP1 − 125 8.63 (4.07) 9.54 (4.13) 10.77 (3.51) 45.37 (2.62) 0.281
CSAMP−F1 − 125 7.90 (3.68) 8.78 (3.90) 8.55 (2.94) 44.57 (2.73) 0.319
CSAMP−F2 − 125 7.50 (3.74) 8.23 (4.07) 8.45 (3.11) 44.21 (3.14) 0.296
CSAMP − 250 7.18 (3.29) 8.00 (3.23) 4.29 (1.64) 45.41 (2.67) 0.479
CSAMP1 − 250 8.18 (3.59) 9.12 (3.53) 10.11 (2.82) 45.56 (2.66) 0.290
CSAMP−F1 − 250 7.42 (3.41) 8.34 (3.29) 7.75 (2.63) 44.70 (3.03) 0.336
CSAMP−F2 − 250 7.06 (3.45) 7.82 (3.57) 7.75 (2.87) 44.29 (3.66) 0.312
CSAMP − 500 7.37 (3.35) 8.29 (3.54) 5.38 (2.27) 45.09 (2.74) 0.420
CSAMP1 − 500 8.18 (3.56) 9.31 (3.75) 9.84 (2.81) 45.72 (2.91) 0.294
CSAMP−F1 − 500 7.28 (3.39) 8.19 (3.68) 7.20 (2.56) 44.81 (2.93) 0.345
CSAMP−F2 − 500 7.12 (3.45) 7.92 (3.80) 7.41 (2.75) 44.49 (3.32) 0.322
Table 5.4: Average Effective Portfolio Diversification, Neff and N90, for different time windows,
using the filtered and unfiltered correlation matrices, with/without short-sale. Standard errors
in parentheses.
Recall from Section 3.4.2 that when short-sale is allowed, the interpretation of Neff can be
dubious, hence we should look at N90 instead of Neff . When short-sale is not permitted, we
find that there are no major differences in the level of diversification in portfolio weights. In
fact, this is consistent with the findings of the previous sections, where we did not find major
differences between the portfolios using the filtered correlation matrices and those using the
sample correlation matrix. When short-sale is allowed, in Column (4), we observe that the
sample correlation matrix produces portfolios which are, on average, slightly more diversified
than when using the filtered correlation matrix. However, the quantity Neff , in Column 3, is
also very informative, as a high Neff implies a relatively small
∑N
i w
2
i , which indicates that the
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weights produced by the filtered correlation matrices, on average, take less extreme positions
than when using the sample correlation matrix. In column (5), we also quantify the amount of
short-selling, measured as the ratio between the total sum of negative v.s positive weights and
verify that the portfolios built using the sample correlation matrix suffer from an overexposure
to short-selling. This is in line with previous studies assessing the effects of different spectral
correlation estimators (see, Pantaleo et al., 2011). However, as opposed to this study, we do
not find significant differences in effective diversification for the different correlation estimators
with/without short sale.
5.5.4 Robustness Test to the Recent Economic Crisis: Sub-sample Es-
timates
In the previous section we showed the out-of-sample benefits of using the RMT-filtering for the
whole sample. However, these results could be biased as the benefits from the RMT-filtering may
have kicked in at the beginning of the sample (which was a relatively low volatility period) and
then vanished as we approach the last 4 years of the sample (which was a high volatility period).
This is why we ask whether these results are robust to the recent and ongoing economic crisis,
which are the moments where good investment strategies are needed the most. For doing this, we
split the sample into two sub-periods; the first sub-period, namely, the pre-crisis period, starts in
November 2002 and ends in September 2006, while the second sub-period from September 2006
until July 2010, covers the start of the Subprime Crisis and the subsequent U.S. Banking Crisis,
which then spread to the rest of the world, affecting mainly European countries, included the
UK. We therefore classify this period as a high volatility period, where the VIX index, which is
a good proxy for international volatility rose from an average of 16.4 (2003-2006) to 25.4 (2007-
2010). Likewise, in the UK, stock market volatility, measured as the monthly standard deviation
of the returns of the FTSE 100 rose from 3.88% (2003-2006) to 7.06% (2007-2010).
Thus we should expect market correlations to behave differently under these two scenarios.
Specifically, we expect correlations to be stable during the first sub-period (2003-2006), whereas
we expect correlations to be higher during the second sub-period (2007-2010). This has important
implications from an asset allocation perspective, where the high co-movement between assets
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during market downturns can generate great losses to investors holding these assets in their
portfolios. Thus, the aim of this section is to examine how effective the RMT-filtering would
have been in case of being used at the beginning of these two sub-periods.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0
0.5
1
1.5
Panel (a): Pre−crisis period (2003−2006)
Eigenvalues 
D
en
si
ty
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0
0.5
1
1.5
Panel (b): Crisis period (2007−2010)
Eigenvalues
D
en
si
ty
λ2 = 4.6
λ2 = 3.4
λ3 = 3.01
λ3 = 2.88
λ4 = 2.01
λ4 = 1.98 λ1 = 23.2
λ1 = 31.4
Figure 5.5: Panel (a): Eigenvalue Distribution for the Pre-crisis Period (2003-2006). Panel (b):
Eigenvalue Distribution for the Crisis period (2007-2010). For a given value of Q = 13.54.
As we saw in Chapter 4, we can also see the difference between these two periods by inspecting
their eigenvalue distributions. Recall from Section 4.2 that the largest eigenvalue reflects the risk
of the market portfolio. Therefore, we should expect the largest eigenvalue to be greater during
the second period (2007-2010) than during the first period (2003-2006). In Figure 5.5, we plot the
eigenvalue distribution of the sample correlation matrix for both periods. In addition, we plot the
theoretical eigenvalue density (the Marc˘enko-Pastur Distribution) for a given value of Q (13.54).
A first observation is that the largest eigenvalue is bigger in magnitude during the years 2007-2010
(λ2007−20101 = 31.4) than during the years 2003-2006 (λ
2003−2006
1 = 23.2), reflecting the higher
market risk faced during the economic crisis. A second observation relates to the amount of the
total variance explained by the deviating eigenvalues. For example, during the pre-crisis period,
the percentage of the total variance explained by the deviating eigenvalues amounts to 40.6%,
whereas for the crisis period this quantity amounts to 52%. While this could be attributed to the
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increase of the largest eigenvalue, it is worth noting that the remainder deviating eigenvalues also
increase in magnitude when transitioning from one period to the other. This basically evidences
the release of new useful information from the noisy part of the Marc˘enko-Pastur spectrum,
which is incorporated in the deviating eigenvalues during the crisis period.
In order to verify whether this new information is translated into better portfolio estimates,
we proceed to re-estimate our models as we had been trading at the beginning of each of these
sub-periods. For doing this, we take the first 250 days of each sub-period in order to have enough
observations for the evaluation period. We then assess the benefits of the RMT-filtering using
the same performance measures introduced in Section 3.4.2. In Table 5.5, we show the realised
risk estimates for both sub-periods under short-sale constraints. Here we find that most results
are maintained. In particular, when short-sale is not permitted, the filtered correlation matrices
do not perform any different to those using the sample correlation matrix. In many cases, it is
preferable to use the sample correlation estimator with no filtering.
Pre-crisis: Years 2003-2006 Crisis: Years 2007-2010
Model Ωest x 10
−1 Ωreal x 10−1 MSE x 10−2 γ¯ Ωest Ωreal MSE x 10−2 γ¯
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CSAMP − 125 0.647 0.809 0.662 0.834 0.157 0.169 0.210 0.981
CSAMP1 − 125 0.627 0.802 0.663 0.817 0.149 0.172 0.320 0.906
CSAMP−F1 − 125 0.659 0.789 0.546 0.873 0.159 0.168 0.190 0.994
CSAMP−F2 − 125 0.629 0.799 0.674 0.824 0.153 0.171 0.270 0.938
CSAMP − 250 0.684 0.787 0.433 0.908 0.164 0.166 0.110 1.038
CSAMP1 − 250 0.660 0.785 0.499 0.881 0.156 0.169 0.150 0.964
CSAMP−F1 − 250 0.692 0.780 0.406 0.928 0.165 0.165 0.110 1.051
CSAMP−F2 − 250 0.662 0.793 0.490 0.869 0.160 0.167 0.140 1.009
Table 5.5: Out-of-Sample Estimates of the realised risk of minimum variance portfolios for
different estimation windows and different volatility periods. Short-sale constraints. Notice
that there are no major differences from using the filtered correlation matrices or the sample
correlation matrix.
When we permit short-sale (Table 5.5) we observe that the portfolios built using the filtered
correlation matrices deliver the best results for all performance measures analysed. Here the
effects of the RMT-filtering are strong in magnitude and therefore, more likely to be statistically
significant. In this case, both filtering methods deliver very similar results in terms of realised
risk estimates, volatility of prediction and prediction accuracy, measured by the ratio γ.
In Table 5.7, we analyse cumulated returns for both volatility period, allowing/constraining
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Pre-crisis: Years 2003-2006 Crisis: Years 2007-2010
Model Ωest x 10
−1 Ωreal x 10−1 MSE x 10−5 γ¯ Ωest x 10−1 Ωreal x 10−1 MSE x 10−2 γ¯
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CSAMP − 125 0.343 1.017 5.230 0.347 0.640 2.001 2.490 0.339
CSAMP1 − 125 0.458 0.780 1.340 0.614 0.793 1.776 1.490 0.490
CSAMP−F1 − 125 0.498 0.751 0.929 0.691 0.951 1.491 0.047 0.682
CSAMP−F2 − 125 0.493 0.741 0.906 0.691 0.952 1.492 0.046 0.677
CSAMP − 250 0.472 0.800 1.400 0.605 0.867 1.543 0.640 0.585
CSAMP1 − 250 0.477 0.782 1.200 0.632 0.814 1.797 1.450 0.499
CSAMP−F1 − 250 0.521 0.753 0.742 0.714 0.981 1.470 0.040 0.721
CSAMP−F2 − 250 0.516 0.741 0.723 0.719 0.989 1.457 0.036 0.727
Table 5.6: Out-of-Sample Estimates of the realised risk of minimum variance portfolios for
different estimation windows and different volatility periods. Short-sale permitted. Notice that
the filtered correlation matrix provides the lowest average realised risk and the best realised risk
predictions in all cases.
short-selling. Here we find that when short-sale is not permitted, the sample correlation ma-
trix outperforms the filtered correlation matrices in the low volatility period. In high volatility
periods, at least the filtered correlation matrix with the method of Laloux et al. (2000), outper-
forms the sample correlation matrix in both, cumulated returns and Sharpe ratios. When we
permit short-sale, we find that during the pre-crisis period cumulated returns and Sharpe ratios
are very similar for all correlation estimators. The main difference between filtered and sample
correlation estimators kicks in when we analyse these quantities during the crisis period. Here
we find that the portfolios built using the sample correlation matrix deliver significantly poorer
cumulated returns and Sharpe ratios when compared with the filtered correlation matrices. For
instance, CSAMP − 125, delivers cumulated returns of £1.35 and Sharpe Ratio of 0.194, whereas
CSAMP−F1 − 125 yields £1.63 and a Sharpe Ratio of 0.387. Taking into account, that these
portfolios could be worth millions of pounds, these differences are striking.
This is undoubtly a very relevant result, since we have just shown that the benefits of the
RMT-filtering come from its ability to track sudden changes in volatility, delivering the best
realised risk estimates, the highest Sharpe ratios and cumulated returns. This is particularly
true when short-sale is permitted. Only in this case, the RMT-filtering probes to be robust to
the existence of different volatility periods in financial markets.
Following the analysis of Section 5.5.3, we investigate the portfolio weights under both volatil-
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Pre-crisis: Years 2003-2006 Crisis: Years 2007-2010
No Short-sale Short-sale No Short-sale Short-sale
Model Cum. Ret Sharpe Ratio Cum. Ret Sharpe Ratio Cum. Ret Sharpe Ratio Cum. Ret Sharpe Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CSAMP − 125 1.594 0.632 1.484 0.562 1.197 0.100 1.353 0.194
CSAMP1 − 125 1.651 0.596 1.532 0.571 1.129 0.177 1.317 0.362
CSAMP−F1 − 125 1.604 0.604 1.512 0.560 1.185 0.141 1.633 0.385
CSAMP−F2 − 125 1.614 0.596 1.531 0.571 1.245 0.177 1.599 0.362
CSAMP − 250 1.562 0.630 1.335 0.573 1.215 0.116 1.639 0.194
CSAMP1 − 250 1.624 0.536 1.547 0.471 1.160 0.173 1.315 0.412
CSAMP−F1 − 250 1.529 0.546 1.391 0.435 1.202 0.148 1.769 0.471
CSAMP−F2 − 250 1.536 0.536 1.432 0.471 1.246 0.173 1.671 0.412
Table 5.7: Cumulated Wealth at the end of the out-of-sample period and Sharpe ratios using
the filtered and sample correlation matrices for different window lengths and different volatility
periods. Notice that the filtered correlation matrix provides the best end of the period return
and the highest Sharpe Ratios in most cases.
ity periods. In Table 5.8, in Columns (2) and (4), we show the measures of portfolio diversifi-
cation, N90 and the average of the absolute sum of negative/positive weights, w
−/w+. Similar
to Section 5.5.3, we observe no major differences between the degree of diversification for the
portfolios using the filtered correlation matrices and those using the sample correlation matrix.
Likewise, when analysing different volatility periods, the magnitude of these quantities does not
appear to change when transitioning from one period to the other. Therefore, the success of
the RMT-filtering does not come from the fact that invests in more stocks than the standard
correlation matrix.
Pre-crisis: Years 2003-2006 Crisis: Years 2007-2010
Model N90 w
−/w+ N90 w−/w+
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CSAMP − 125 46.10 (2.07) 0.565 46.68 (2.20) 0.643
CSAMP1 − 125 45.73 (2.39) 0.259 45.52 (2.70) 0.300
CSAMP−F1 − 125 44.65 (3.08) 0.288 44.73 (3.09) 0.372
CSAMP−F2 − 125 44.31 (3.03) 0.266 44.94 (3.47) 0.354
CSAMP − 250 45.42 (2.42) 0.437 46.02 (2.47) 0.543
CSAMP1 − 250 45.44 (2.56) 0.274 45.86 (2.59) 0.312
CSAMP−F1 − 250 45.34 (3.03) 0.306 44.68 (3.58) 0.387
CSAMP−F2 − 250 45.26 (2.94) 0.281 44.84 (3.66) 0.371
Table 5.8: Portfolio Diversification, N90, for different time windows, using the filtered and sample
correlation matrices, under different volatility periods. Standard errors in parentheses.
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The correlation estimators, however, do differ in their degree of exposure to short-selling. In
Columns (2) and (4), we find that the portfolios using the sample correlation matrix increase
their exposure to short-selling during the crisis. While a similar phenomenon happens with the
portfolios built using the filtered correlation matrices, the difference in magnitude is sizeable.
For instance, for CSAMP−F1 − 125, the ratio is w−/w+ = 0.373, when compared to 0.644, when
using CSAMP − 125. Moreover, by observing cumulated returns and Sharpe Ratios during the
crisis, we find that the portfolios built using the sample correlation matrix did not only exhibit
an overexposure to short-selling, but also made the wrong bet by investing in artificially low risk
assets and therefore dampening Sharpe ratios.
5.6 Concluding Remarks
In the present chapter we have investigated the benefits of the RMT-filtering on the sample
correlation matrix, constructed from daily data on 77 stocks contained in the FTSE 100, covering
the period 04/01/00 until 25/09/12. We estimated a number of minimum variance portfolios,
using the sample correlation matrix, and the RMT-based filtered correlation matrices, using the
methods of Plerou et al. (2002) and Laloux et al. (2000) as described in Section 3.3. These
portfolios were estimated using different estimation windows and allowing/restricting short-sale.
Our main findings can be summarised as follows:
• We find that the RMT-filtering delivers the lowest realised risk, the lowest volatility of
prediction and the best prediction accuracy when compared with the sample correlation
estimator. This is particularly true in the absence of short-sale constraints. Under these
conditions, the effects of the RMT-filtering, translated in an improvement of 65% in terms
of cumulated wealth, for the best result.
• When short-sale constraints are in place, results are ambiguous and we therefore recom-
mend the use of the sample correlation estimator.
• We also find that the RMT-filtering performs the best for short estimation windows, of the
order of 6 months to 1 year of data (e.g., 1.6 ≤ Q ≤ 3.2). This is consistent with what it
has been found in the literature (see, Pafka et al., 2004; Daly et al., 2008). For higher values
74
of Q (e.g., 3.2 < Q < 6.5) these benefits would appear to taper, as the filtered correlation
matrix converges to the sample correlation matrix, as the sample size increases.
• These results are robust to both, low and high volatility periods in financial markets. In
the former case, we find that there are no major differences between using the sample and
filtered correlation matrices. In the latter case, we find that the RMT-filtered correlation
estimators outperform the sample correlation estimator in both cumulated returns and
Sharpe Ratios.
These results are not surprising since for a given value of Q, the RMT approach selects
different numbers of eigenvalues to include in the filter, depending on the volatility period faced
during the estimation period (see, Figure 5.6). For example, from June 2007 until present (the
Crisis period), the RMT-filtering selected more often different number of eigenvalues to include
in the filter (a sudden jump from 1 to 3). This evidences the release of new information from
the noisy part of the spectrum that is incorporated in the filtered correlation matrix when facing
market downturns.
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Figure 5.6: Number of Deviating Eigenvalues included in the RMT-filtering over the out-of-
sample period. For a given value of Q, there are eigenvalues entering and exiting the Marc˘enko-
Pastur distribution.
This is in contrast to the sample correlation matrix, which treated all eigenvalues as equally
significant in both periods. We therefore stress the importance of distinguishing the noise coming
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from the use of a short time-series and the noise introduced by the nonstationarity of the data.
In the latter case, we have just shown that the RMT-filtering is also able to deal with this
problem. We therefore recommend the use of the RMT-filtering under two conditions; (i) when
using a short time window, because of its effectiveness in tracking sudden changes in volatility
and (ii) when allowing for short-sale, as it allows taking full advantage of short-selling positions
to overcome high volatility periods. In this context, short-selling can be a very powerful strategy
when using the right correlation estimator.
We also suggest a possible explanation for the success of the RMT-filtering. It would seem
that the portfolios built using the sample correlation matrix tend to take, on average, more
extreme positions and are more overexposed to short-selling than those built using the filtered
correlation matrix. These results are robust to both volatility periods.
In Pantaleo et al. (2011), the performance of nine covariance estimators was analysed, for
100 highly capitalised stocks of the NYSE. The covariance estimators were based on those aimed
to shrink the covariance matrix (Shrinkage Estimators), or by creating clusters of stocks (Ag-
glomerative Hierarchical Clustering Estimators) and others based on the spectral properties of
the correlation matrix (Random Matrix-based filtering). They assessed the performance of these
models by analysing their realised risk, for different estimation windows, with and without short
sale. They find that when short-sale is allowed, their estimators are able to produce portfolios
which are significantly less risky than those using the sample correlation matrix (i.e.unfiltered).
They also find that the portfolios using the sample correlation matrix had a greater exposure to
short-selling than those using the filtered correlation matrix. However, when short-sale is not
allowed, they find that the realised risk of the portfolios built using the sample correlation matrix
are comparable to those of the other estimators, but they are significantly less diversified. Our
results are similar in that, for short estimation periods, we find significant differences between
the portfolios built using the filtered and sample correlation matrices, which is particularly true
when short-sale is allowed. However, we do not find major differences in the degree of diver-
sification for the different correlation estimators and time windows used, except in the amount
of overexposure to short-selling, which may shed some lights about the possible causes for the
larger risk found in the portfolios built using the sample correlation matrix.
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Chapter 6
A Comparative Study: Regime
Switching Models and
RMT-Filtering
6.1 Introduction
Since the seminal work of Longin and Solnik (2001), who formally established the statistical sig-
nificance of an assymetric correlation phenomenon, large amount of research has been devoted to
the study of this asymmetric behaviour in financial markets. These studies, have been motivated
by the idea that correlations of asset returns are higher during market downturns than during
boom market conditions. An early strand of literature has made use of time-varying volatility
models, such as GARCH-M models with asymmetry to capture this phenomenon (Engle and
Kroner, 1995; Bekaert and Harvey, 1997; DeSantis et al., 1999; Bekaert and Wu, 2000), Jump
Models (Das and Uppal, 2004), where returns are drawn from a bivariate normal to produce
larger downward correlations.
A second strand of the literature on the asymmetric behaviour of correlations makes use of
Regime-Switching (RS) models (Hamilton, 1989). The first of this kind is the RS-Normal Models,
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which mix two different bivariate normal distributions allowing returns to switch between a
regime with lower conditional means, higher volatility, higher correlations and another depicting
normal market conditions of higher positive means, lower volatilities and lower asset correlations.
This model was used by Ang and Bekaert (2002) to examine international asset allocation under
higher correlations with downside moves in country returns. They estimate this model for equity
returns from the US, Germany and the UK and find that international equity returns would seem
to be characterised by two regimes: “a normal regime and a bear market regime, where stock
market returns are, on average, lower and much more volatile than in normal times. Importantly,
in the bear market regime, correlations between various returns are higher than in the normal
regime” (Ang and Bekaert, 2002). The authors find that this model captures a large part of the
asymmetric behaviour of international equity returns of developed countries. A second version of
these models is the RS-GARCH model, which combines elements of the switching behaviour of
pure RS-Normal Models with the volatility persistence of GARCH processes (Engle and Kroner,
1995; Gray, 1996).
The existence of asymmetries in financial correlations is of common knowledge for most re-
searchers and those in the financial industry. However, one of the major difficulties found by
researchers has been the inability to correctly predict sudden changes in correlations. In Ang
and Chen (2002) the performance of the aforementioned models was examined. Of these, they
find the Regime-Switching Normal Model to be the most successful in matching the magnitude
of empirical correlation asymmetries. The authors argue that while Regime-Switching Models
are quite successful in capturing asymmetries in financial correlations, there is still a signifi-
cant amount of asymmetries left unexplained. Hence, in the present study we ask whether the
RMT-filtering approach for asset correlations can improve the performance of minimum variance
portfolios based on the RS-approach introduced by Ang and Chen (2002).
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the statistical properties of regime-dependent
correlation matrices constructed from stock returns in the FTSE 100 using Random Matrix The-
ory (RMT) and analyse the implications of this for the optimal portfolio weights in standard
Markowitz’s Portfolio Theory and also for Hamilton’s two state regime sensitive portfolio opti-
misation. As we saw in the previous sections, the underlying argument behind the use of the
RMT-filtering is that when we estimate correlation matrices, we usually have too little observa-
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tions compared to the number of parameters in the correlation matrix. This results in estimation
noise, which in turn affects correlation estimates and subsequently, portfolio estimates. We ex-
pect regime-dependent correlation matrices to be aﬄicted by a similar phenomenon. In this
context, regime-dependent portfolio weights could be improved to yield better risk forecasts and
higher portfolio returns by the same reasoning.
In this chapter, we estimate filtered and unfiltered versions of regime-dependent correlation
matrices, where regimes are driven by the market index and construct a number of portfolio
metrics. We report the following findings; (i) the RMT-based filtering improves the performance
of regime-dependent correlation matrices, in terms of better realised risk estimates and risk-
adjusted measures of returns. However, the source of the improvement comes from filtering
correlations in Regime 1 (low volatility regime). This happens because there is good agreement
between the eigenvalue distribution in Regime 1 and the Marc˘enko-Pastur Distribution. This
allows us to distinguish signals from noise in the eigenvalue spectrum for Regime 1. While this
is true for correlation in Regime 1, correlations for Regime 2 (high volatility regime) are far from
normal, which means that, when contrasted with the Marc˘enko-Pastur, there is significantly more
information, which makes filtering redundant; (ii) these results hold for short estimation windows
and when short-sale is permitted; (iii) we also find that the filtered sample correlation matrix
can be as competitive as any regime-dependent estimator, in terms of realised risk estimates and
risk-adjusted measures of returns; (iv) finally, from an asset allocation perspective, we find that
the filtered regime-dependent correlation estimators deliver more diversified portfolio weights
and also place less resources on Financials than their unfiltered counterparts.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 6.2 provides a brief introduction to
Regime-Switching Models and introduce a parsimonious version of the CAPM Model with regime
shifts (Section 6.2.1) and an illustration of the model (Section 6.2.2). Section 6.3 provides an
spectral analysis of the regime-dependent correlation matrices. Section 6.4 defines the correlation
estimators used in our analysis. In Section 6.5, we report our in-sample results by constructing
realised risk forecasts for minimum variance portfolios using a bootstrap approach. Section 6.6
reports the out-of-sample results of our correlation estimators in terms of both, their ability to
correctly predict realised risk of minimum variance portfolios (Section 6.6.1) and also in their
ability to produce portfolios with the highest cumulated returns and risk-adjusted measures
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of returns (Section 6.6.2). Section 6.7 studies the implications of our analysis from an asset
allocation perspective. Finally, in Section 6.8 we provide conclusions and recommendations.
6.2 Regime-Switching Models
As we mentioned in the introduction, the existence of different “regimes” in financial markets has
great implications from an asset allocation perspective. This is so, because the optimal portfolios
during bear markets are substantially different from those of a normal market. As pointed out by
Ang and Bekaert (2002), the benefits of financial diversification dominate the costs of ignoring
the regimes, but a Regime-Switching strategy will out-perform static strategies out-of-sample.
As reported by Hess (2006), Regime-Switching provides valuable timing signals for portfolio
rebalancing. He finds that investors should apply more aggressive portfolio strategies during
market downturns, because these are precisely the moments in which there is great commonality
between assets delivering great losses to investors. This calls for a model that, on the one
hand, can be able to describe the co-movement between assets and, on the other hand, can
capture asymmetries in correlations, especially during market downturns. In Ang and Bekaert
(2002), the Regime-Switching CAPM model was introduced to model asymmetric correlations in
international portfolios. This model was found to provide portfolio decisions based on bull/bear
regimes and asymmetric correlations with inspiring investment insights. In the next section, we
introduce this specification to model regime-dependent correlations and investigate the spectral
properties of regime-dependent correlation matrices with the help of RMT tools.
6.2.1 A Parsimonious RS-Model: The Beta-CAPM
In order to illustrate how the Beta-CAPM works, we assume that the market, which is given
by the returns of the FTSE 100, is the one that switches between regimes and drives all asset
returns. In this context, market returns (in excess of the 1-month Libor rate) are defined as:
yftset = u
ftse
t + σ
ftse(st)
ftse
t , (6.1)
where uftset is the market expected return and σ
ftse(st)
ftse
t is the conditional volatility. In
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this model, these two values are allowed to change depending on the realisation of the regime,
st. The “switch” between the two regimes is governed by a transition probability matrix, char-
acterised by two transition probabilities:
P = p(st = 1/st−1 = 1), (6.2)
Q = p(st = 2/st−1 = 2). (6.3)
If the portfolio manager knows the regime, the expected excess returns for the market index
next period will be either:
eftse1 = Pu
ftse(st+1 = 1) + (1− P )uftse(st+1 = 2), (6.4)
eftse2 = (1−Q)uftse(st+1 = 1) +Quftse(st+1 = 2). (6.5)
In practice, we cannot be certain about which regime we are in and therefore we need to
infer it from the data available at each point in time. We do this by constructing the regime
probability, which is the probability that tomorrow’s regime is the first regime given current and
past information. In this simple model, the information set consists simply on the market returns
data.
The model embeds time-varying volatility for the market return, which consists of two com-
ponents. For example, if the regime today is the first regime, the conditional variance for the
market excess return is given by:
Σftse1 = P (σ
ftse(st+1))
2 + (1− P )(σftse(st+1 = 2))2+
+P (1− P )[uftse(st+1 = 2)− uftse(st+1 = 1)]2,
(6.6)
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Σftse2 = (1−Q)(σftse(st+1))2 +Q(σftse(st+1 = 2))2+
+Q(1−Q)[uftse(st+1 = 2)− uftse(st+1 = 1)]2.
(6.7)
The first component in these equations is simply a weighted average of the conditional vari-
ances in the two regimes; the second component is a jump component that arises because the
conditional mean is different across regimes. We model the individual asset excess returns, yjt+1,
using a CAPM-inspired beta model:
yjt+1 = α
i + βjuftse(st+1) + β
jσftse(st+1)
ftse
t+1 + σ¯
jjt+1 (6.8)
yjt+1 = α
j + βjyftset+1 + σ¯
jjt+1 (6.9)
In Equation 6.9, individual returns are modeled as a function of the market index and an
idiosyncratic volatility term. This model is very parsimonious and only requires the estimation of
the index market process, a constant term α, one beta and an idiosyncratic volatility per stock.
With regime switches, this simple model captures time-variation in expected returns, volatility
and correlations, all driven by the market index regime.
In order to derive the expected returns and covariance matrix for stock returns, we introduce
further notation. We first define the covariance matrix, conditional on period t, denoted by
Σi = Σ(st = i) and the vector of excess returns, ei = e(st = i). Given that the mean of
the market index switches between states, the expected excess returns of stock i are given by
αj + β
jeftsei for the current regime i, where e
ftse
i are given by Equations 6.6 and 6.7. In matrix
notation, let
α =

α1
...
αN
 and β =

β1
...
βN
.
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Hence, the expected return vector is given by:
ei = α+ βe
ftse
i , i = 1, 2. (6.10)
In Equation 6.9, expected returns differ across individual stocks only through their different
betas with respect to the market index, which is regime dependent. Regarding the regime-
dependent covariance matrix, this has three components (Equation 6.11). The first is an id-
iosyncratic part, captured by the matrix V , which is a matrix that captures variances and
covariances between the error terms for each asset. By doing this, we are assuming that there
are other sources of variation between assets, intra-industry correlations not necessarily driven
by the market index. However, systematic risk is driven by the variance of the market index and
the betas as in any factor model. As the market index next period depends on the realisation of
the regime, we have two possible covariance matrices for the unexpected returns next period:
Ωi = (ββ
′)(σftse(st+1 = i))2 + V, i = 1, 2. (6.11)
Finally, the actual covariance matrix takes into account the regime structure, in that it de-
pends on the realisation of the current regime and it adds a jump component to the conditional
covariance matrix, which arises because the conditional means transition between regimes. Con-
sequently, the conditional covariance matrices can be written as:
Σ1 = PΩ1 + (1− P )Ω2 + P (1− P )(e1 − e2)(e1 − e2)′, (6.12)
Σ2 = (1−Q)Ω1 +QΩ2 +Q(1−Q)(e1 − e2)(e1 − e2)′. (6.13)
It is straightforward to show that this model structure implies that the correlations implied
by Ω1, the normal regime, will be lower than the correlations implied by Ω2, the high volatility
regime. This model is estimated in the following steps:
1. We first estimate a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) Model for stock returns with
respect to the market excess returns and obtain the α’s, β’s coefficient and V .1 These
1The SUR model, initially proposed by Zellner (1962), is a generalisation of a linear regression model that
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coefficients are therefore not regime-dependent, as the model does not allow for asset-
specific regimes.
2. Estimate the market index equation by Maximum Likelihood (MLE) and obtain the un-
conditional parameters (eftse1 , e
ftse
2 , σ
ftse
1 , σ
ftse
2 , P,Q).
3. We plug the values obtained in (1) and (2), in the equations shown above and we obtain
the regime-dependent covariance matrices.
In what follows, we apply these steps to our data and obtain the regime-dependent covariance
matrices and analyse their properties.
6.2.2 Data Analysis: The Existence of Different Regimes in the FTSE
100 Index
We use the returns of the FTSE 100 Index, covering the period from January 2000 until October
2012. Keeping this in mind, we estimate a two-state Regime Switching Model for the market
index as described in Equation 6.1. Likewise, we estimate the SUR parameters for each individ-
ual stock of our sample and build the regime-dependent covariance matrices of Equations 6.11
and 6.12.2 The results of this exercise are presented in Table 6.1.
Regime 1 Regime 2 Transition Pbs.
µ1 σ1 µ2 σ2 P Q
Estimates 0.81 15.77 -2.02 39.75 0.99 0.98
Std. Errors (0.003) (0.000) (0.012) (0.006) (0.02) (0.01)
Table 6.1: Regime-Switching Estimation for the FTSE Index. All parameters are monthly
and expressed in percentages, except for the transition probabilities P and Q. Whole sample
estimates.
These results provide clear evidence of the existence of an asymmetric behaviour in mean (as
µ1 > µ2) and variance (as σ
2
1 < σ
2
2) for the FTSE 100 Index. All the coefficients are statistically
consists of several regression equations, each having its own dependent variable and potentially different sets of
exogenous explanatory variables. A special case of this model is when the error terms are assumed to be correlated
across equations. This is estimated by FGLS with a specific form of the variance-covariance matrix and is far
more efficient than estimating each equation separately by OLS.
2In order to make these new results comparable to those of Chapter 5, we use the same 77 stocks used in the
previous analysis.
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significant at 1%. Assuming that the behaviour of individual stocks is driven by the market index,
we should expect this to induce asymmetries in correlation matrices. The expected returns and
standard deviation in Regime 1 are 0.81% and 15.77% per month, respectively. While in Regime
2, these quantities are -2.02% and 39.75% per month. In this case, standard deviations are
signficantly higher than those found in previous studies (for example, Ang and Bekaert (2002)).
Having said this, it is worthwhile noting that these differences are not puzzling since we are
using daily instead of monthly data, hence we should expect to see higher standard deviations
when using data that is sampled more frequently. Nonetheless, this does not change the main
message: “Regime 1 is much more stable than Regime 2, with less volatility and positive returns,
in contrast to Regime 2, which is considerably more volatile and exhibits negative returns”.
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Figure 6.1: Smoothed and Filtered Probabilities for Regime 1 - Whole Sample Estimates (2000-
2012).
We can also see that the transition probabilities P and Q, show that both regimes are highly
persistent. For example, Regime 1 is more persistent than Regime 2. In this case, there is 99%
of probability that the market stays in Regime 1 next period given that it is currently in Regime
1, while there is a 98% of staying in Regime 2 next period given that the process is already in
Regime 2. While these probabilities would appear to be similar, they yield very different results
when calculating the duration of regimes. For example, for Regime 1, the expected duration
is approximately 1/(1 − P ) = 105.6 days (≈ 5 months), while the duration of Regime 2 is
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approximately 1/(1−Q) = 45.09 days (≈ 2 months).3 We also report the regime probabilities,
namely, the filtered and smoothed probabilities. The former is the probability that the regime
next period is the low volatility period regime given current information, while the latter is
the probability that the regime in the next period is the low volatility period given all of the
information available in the data sample, which is calculated backwards by using the filtered and
forecasting probabilities.
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Figure 6.2: FTSE 100 Returns and Index - Whole Sample Estimates.
In Figure 6.1, we show the probabilities of being in Regime 1. For instance, if the filtered
probability is greater than 0.50, we are in Regime 1, otherwise we are in Regime 2. From this
figure, it is easy to see that there were many times where these probabilities have dipped down
from the cut-off of 0.50, hence showing greater probability of being in Regime 2. Keeping this
in mind, by looking at the filtered probabilities, and ignoring short-lived regime changes, we
can identify approximately 4 regimes shifts during the entire sample; A more volatile regime in
2000-2003 followed by a quiet regime in 2003-2007, another volatile period in 2007-2009, which
3The expected duration of Regime 1 is calculated as:
∑∞
k=1 kp
k−1
1 (1−p1) = 1/(1−p1); (see, Hamilton, 1989).
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coincides with the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and a post-crisis period in 2010-2012.4
It is worthwhile mentioning the reason why we do not use monthly data, which is that given
the total number of stock (N = 77), we would need at least 6 years of data to estimate the models
and we would be left with very few observations to assess the performance of the models out-of-
sample. Even if we could obtain longer data, the FTSE 100 index has changed its composition
over the years, which means that our sample would be significantly reduced. Recall that we are
also interested in assessing the performance of the RMT-filter under different values of the ratio
Q = T/N . The use of daily data also leads us to make the strong assumption that daily regime
probabilities on a given day will remain constant over the evaluation period, which in our case
is 20 days. This latter would not seem to be problematic since regimes are highly persistent.
In Figure 6.2, we can see the returns of the FTSE 100 Index and below the FTSE 100 Index
prices. By comparing these quantities, with those depicted in Figure 6.1, we can see that when
the market is in Regime 2, the FTSE 100 Index returns are mostly negative. This is particularly
true, during the 3rd quarter of 2007. Conversely, large returns are associated with a more stable
regime, such as Regime 1.
Why is this important? The importance of this is that financial correlations exhibit a similar
pattern to that of the market. For example, in Figure 6.3, we plot the distribution of the sample
correlation matrix for the entire sample on a daily rolling window of 250 days. Here we observe
that, in general, correlations are faily positive and that in periods of high volatility, such as during
the Subprime Crisis and the crisis that followed, there was a shift in the distribution towards
the right, that is, higher skewness, as opposed to more tranquil times, where the distribution is
more centered and also with a lower excess of kurtosis. In the next section, we will explore the
spectral properties of the regime-dependent correlation matrices, with the help of RMT tools.
As we will show, similar conclusions can be derived from the analysis that follows.
4Recall that for our analysis we are using daily data. Therefore, we should expect that the use of daily data
will tend to bring more volatility in regime shifts. For this reason, we consider only longer periods of time for the
process to be in a certain regime.
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Figure 6.3: Distribution of the Sample Correlation matrix estimated on a daily rolling window
of length 250 days. Note that the distribution shifts to the right post year 2008.
6.3 Spectral Properties of Regime-Dependent Correlation
Matrices: Combining RMT with MRS
In this section, we analyse the spectral properties of regime-dependent correlation matrices,
constructed as described in Section 6.2.1. In Figure 6.4 we plot the eigenvalue distributions of
the regime-dependent correlation matrices against the Marc˘enko-Pastur Distribution (MP) for
our in-sample period, which uses the first 500 observations. Panel (a) presents the eigenvalue
distribution for Regime 1. Here we observe that the largest eigenvalue is of the order of λ1 = 9.8,
explaining a 12.7% of the total variance of the data. There are three large deviations from
the theoretical upper limit, λ+ = 1.33. In contrast, the eigenvalue distribution for Regime 2
(Panel (b)), exhibits one large deviation at the upper edge of the spectrum, λ1 = 24, which is
considerably larger in magnitude compared to Regime 1, capturing 31.1% of the total variance
of the data. A second observation is that there are more eigenvalues lying outside at the lower
bound of the MP distribution. This property of eigenvalues is known as “eigenvalue repulsion”.
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By eigenvalue repulsion we refer to the dynamics of the small eigenvalues are contrary to those of
the largest eigenvalue.5 For instance, a decrease in the largest eigenvalue, with a corresponding
increase in the small eigenvalues, implies a redistribution of the correlation structure across
more dimensions of the vector space spanned by the correlation matrix. Therefore, additional
eigenvalues are needed to explain the correlation structure of the data. Conversely, when the
correlation structure is dominated by a small number of factors (e.g, the “single-factor model” of
stock returns), the number of eigenvalues needed to describe the correlation structure in the data
is reduced. This means that fewer eigenvalues are needed to describe the correlation structure
of “drawdowns” than that of “draw-ups” (Conlon et al., 2009).
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Figure 6.4: Eigenvalue Distributions by Regime vs. the Marc˘enko-Pastur Distribution.
A Kolgomorov-Smirnov test cannot reject the null that the eigenvalue distribution for Regime
1 belongs to the Marc˘enko-Pastur (MP) Distribution at 10% significance. However, the test
rejects the null for the eigenvalue distribution for Regime 2.6 This means that filtering the corre-
5This is a consequence of the fact that the trace of the correlation matrix must remain constant under trans-
formations and any change in the largest eigenvalue must be reflected by a change in one or more of the other
eigenvalues.
6The Kolgomorov-Smirnov test, is a nonparametric test of the equality of continuous, one-dimensional prob-
ability distributions that can be used to compare a sample with a reference probability distribution. It basically
quantifies the distance between the empirical distribution function of the sample and the cumulative distribution
function of the reference distribution.
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lation matrix in Regime 2 would be redundant, as there is already enough information outside of
the bounds of the MP distribution. This suggests that Regime Switching correlations might be
benefited from using the RMT approach. More especifically, these benefits would come from fil-
tering correlations in Regime 1, where there is a close-form solution for the eigenvalue spectrum,
which is given by the Marc˘enko-Pastur Distribution. In what follows, we explore the impli-
cations of RMT-filtering on regime-dependent correlation matrices in a portfolio optimisation
framework.
6.4 RMT-Based Correlation Estimators
Regarding our correlation estimators, we introduce new notation and propose nine estimators:
• Sample Correlation Matrix: CSAMP .
• Filtered Sample Correlation Matrix - Method 1: CSAMP−RMT1 (Plerou et al., 2002).
• Filtered Sample Correlation Matrix - Method 2: CSAMP−RMT2 (Laloux et al., 2000)
• CAPM-based Correlation Matrix: CCAPM .
• Filtered CAPM-based Correlation Matrix - Method 1: CCAPM−RMT1.
• Filtered CAPM-based Correlation Matrix - Method 2: CCAPM−RMT2.
• Regime Switching Correlation Matrix: CRS .
• Regime Switching Correlation Matrix - Method 1: CRS−RMT1.
• Regime Switching Correlation Matrix - Method 2: CRS−RMT2.
The first three estimators are those used in Chapter 5, where we estimated the effects of
the RMT-filtering on the sample correlation matrix. The fourth and the seventh estimators
are the CAPM-based estimator and the Regime Switching estimator (MS), respectively and
their filtered versions. In a portfolio optimisation context, the RS correlation estimator works
as follows: First, we estimate the regime-dependent correlation matrices based on the model
described in Section 6.2.1. Second, we take the filtered probabilities at the end of the in-sample
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period and compare it to a cut-off point of 0.5. If the filtered probability is greater than 0.5, then
we classify next period as Regime 1, otherwise we classify it as Regime 2. From this decision rule,
we use either of the regime-dependent correlation matrices as input for portfolio optimisation.
6.5 In-Sample Analysis
For the in-sample testing, we use the first 500 observations of our sample and follow the methodol-
ogy introduced in Section 3.4.1. This analysis consisted in taking bootstrapped samples, together
with the mean across these samples. That is, for a given number of stocks, we randomly select
a test date t and estimate everything up to t and everything afterwards is regarded as realised
future information.7 We repeat this exercise 1000 times, with replacement and calculate the
mean, across all bootstrapped samples of the statistic γ, which is the ratio between the realised
portfolio risk and the predicted risk of minimum variance portfolios. This metric will gauge how
close our predictions are from the realised ones. For the purpose of this chapter, we will test the
in-sample performance of three correlation estimators; the unfiltered regime-switching correla-
tion estimator (CMS), the filtered regime-switching correlation estimator, using the method of
Plerou et al. (2002) (CRS−RMT1) and the filtered regime-switching correlation estimator, using
the method of Laloux et al. (2000) (CRS−RMT2). For these cases, the RMT-filtering is only
applied to the low volatility regime (Regime 1).8
The results of this exercise are depicted in Figure 6.5.9 A first observation is that the RMT-
filtering delivers much better realised risk estimates than its unfiltered version. This is especially
true for short estimation windows. However, in contrast to the case when the sample correlation
matrix is filtered, both the filtered and unfiltered regime-dependent correlation matrices require
in general more observations to deliver better risk estimates. This happens because longer
estimation windows allow for a better identification of regimes, whereas short estimation windows
will tend to make the wrong bet when estimating the filtered probabilities. In general, the benefits
of filtering would seem to persist over the in-sample period, for values of Q, within the interval
7For this particular case, we leave an horizon window of 20 business days.
8It is worthwhile mentioning that the present study is mainly focused on correlation modeling, therefore,
individual variances are assumed to be known and are the same across correlation estimators.
9For the present analysis, we allow for short-sale by limiting weights to be no bigger than 100% on any asset
and to “go short” on a 150%.
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Figure 6.5: Mean Bootstrapped (in-sample) for the ratio of realised to predicted risk, for the
filtered regime-dependent correlation matrices, γ¯f =
Ωfr
Ωf
, compared to the unfiltered approach,
γ¯u = ΩurΩu , as a function of Q = T/N . Notice that filtering is most effective for low values of Q.
[1.30, 5]. For values above 5, we still get some improvements, but these are not sizeable. A
second observation is that both filtering methods deliver similar realised risk estimates. While
differences are not noticeable with the naked eye, the filtering method 2 (Laloux et al., 2000)
delivers slightly better realised risk estimates.
6.6 Out-of-Sample Analysis
For the out-of-sample analysis, we follow the methodology described in Section 3.4.2. Similar
to Chapter 5, we split the sample in two subperiods. The first subperiod, that we used in the
previous section for the in-sample analysis covers the period from 04/01/00 until 30/11/01 (≈
500 observations), while the second subperiod is the evaluation period, which starts in 04/12/01
until 25/09/12 (≈ 2820 observations). As explained in Section 3.4.2, for every test date t′, we
consider portfolios that were invested before t′ − tf , or on that date, where tf is the investment
period (in this case, 20 business days). That is, we estimate the portfolio variance at a given
month and compare it to the realised variance on that month, which is calculated as the sample
covariance of the realised returns over the investment horizon (tf = 20 days).
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As we saw in Section 6.5, the optimal value of Q falls within the interval Q = T/N ∈ [1.3, 5],
with the RMT-filtering performing the best for low values of Q, whereas for larger values, these
benefits would tend to taper. An estimation window of 250 days, given a fixed number of
assets, N = 77, is consistent with a value of Q = 3.24, which is exactly in the middle of the
aforementioned interval, while an estimation window of 500 days is consistent with Q = 6.49,
well outside this interval. We expect the model to favour short over long estimation windows.
As opposed to most studies in the literature, we estimate our models with short-sale constraints.
We think that this provides a more realistic setting as short-sale is not always allowed in financial
markets stemming from the increase in risk that brings to portfolios. Alternatively, we also allow
for short-sale, however, none of the estimated portfolios ever took an extreme position.10 All
these models use the first subperiod (01/04/00 until 12/31/02 ≈ 500 observations) as initial
training period. Subsequent retraining is done on a monthly basis.
6.6.1 Realised Risk Estimates
In Table 6.2, we report our realised risk estimates, using the performance metrics defined in
Section 3.4.2 with short-sale constraints (Columns 2-5). Here we observe that there are no
major improvements in realised risk estimates by using the RMT-filtering on regime-dependent
correlation matrices. In most cases, estimates are only slightly better when applying the RMT-
filter. This is consistent with the findings of Chapter 5, where we reported that there were no
significant gains from filtering the sample correlation matrix when short-sale constraints are in
place.
When short-sale is allowed (Columns 6-9) we observe that there are great improvements in
realised risk estimates. In general, the filtered regime-dependent correlation matrices deliver the
best realised risk estimates, the lowest volatility of prediction (MSE) and also the best prediction
accuracy. For instance, when using CRS−F1−250, we obtain a ratio γ¯ = 1.44 and MSE of 0.21,
when compared to the unfiltered regime-dependent correlation matrix, CRS−250, which yields
γ¯ = 1.64 and MSE of 0.27. Similar to the case of the sample correlation matrix, as we increase
the estimation window to 500, the benefits of filtering become less evident. An interesting
10We refer to extreme positions to those portfolios that place all the weight on one or very few stocks. Also,
similar to the in-sample analysis, when allowing for short-sale we limit our weights to be no bigger than 100% on
any asset and to “go short” on a 150%.
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No short-sale Short-sale
Model Ωest Ωreal MSE x 10
−2 γ¯ Ωest Ωreal MSE x 10−2 γ¯
CSAMP−250 0.106 0.112 0.068 1.055 0.063 0.108 0.310 1.689
CSAMP−F1−250 0.106 0.111 0.062 1.042 0.069 0.101 0.200 1.407
CSAMP−F2−250 0.101 0.113 0.079 1.121 0.068 0.099 0.190 1.408
CCAPM−250 0.106 0.112 0.068 1.054 0.063 0.108 0.310 1.690
CCAPM−F1−250 0.106 0.111 0.061 1.042 0.069 0.101 0.200 1.408
CCAPM−F2−250 0.109 0.112 0.068 1.016 0.085 0.098 0.069 1.131
CRS−250 0.106 0.112 0.055 1.069 0.064 0.106 0.270 1.640
CRS−F1−250 0.107 0.111 0.050 1.052 0.069 0.101 0.210 1.441
CRS−F2−250 0.104 0.112 0.060 1.100 0.068 0.100 0.200 1.446
CSAMP−500 0.106 0.111 0.057 1.028 0.071 0.100 0.150 1.390
CSAMP−F1−500 0.107 0.110 0.053 1.016 0.073 0.100 0.160 1.339
CSAMP−F2−500 0.103 0.111 0.063 1.070 0.072 0.098 0.140 1.324
CCAPM−500 0.106 0.111 0.057 1.028 0.071 0.100 0.150 1.390
CCAPM−F1−500 0.108 0.110 0.052 1.016 0.073 0.100 0.160 1.339
CCAPM−F2−500 0.111 0.111 0.060 0.989 0.088 0.097 0.058 1.090
CRS−500 0.105 0.110 0.052 1.063 0.071 0.099 0.150 1.369
CRS−F1−500 0.106 0.110 0.490 1.049 0.073 0.097 0.130 1.309
CRS−F2−500 0.104 0.110 0.567 1.081 0.072 0.097 0.130 1.309
Table 6.2: Out-of-sample Estimates of the realised risk of minimum variance portfolios. Notice
that the filtered correlation matrices provide the lowest average realised risk and the best realised
risk forecast in all cases, when short-sale is allowed.
observation is that the filtered versions of the sample and CAPM-based correlation estimators
can be as competitive as the filtered RS-based correlation estimators. An example of this, is that
CSAMP−RMT1−250 delivers a ratio γ¯ = 1.40 very close to 1.44, delivered by CRS−RMT1−250.
This suggests that the benefits of the RMT-filtering are larger for the sample correlation matrix
than for the regime-dependent correlation estimators.
6.6.2 Risk-Adjusted Returns Estimates
In Table 6.3 we report results on the out-of-sample performance of the models in terms of their
cumulated wealth and risk-adjusted measures. These portfolio strategies are associated to the risk
performance measures calculated above. Here we observe that, when short-sale is not permitted,
the filtered regime-dependent correlation estimators deliver relatively similar cumulated returns
and only slightly better risk adjusted measures than their unfiltered counterparts.
In contrast, when we allow for short-sale we observe that the filtered RS-based correlation
estimators deliver the highest cumulated returns (£3.32-£3.31) and the highest Sharpe ratio
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No short-sale Short-sale
Model Cum.Ret Sharpe Sortino Omega Cum.Ret Sharpe Sortino Omega
CSAMP − 250 2.119 0.172 0.147 1.333 2.356 0.209 0.211 1.439
CSAMP−RMT1 − 250 2.115 0.170 0.143 1.335 2.899 0.285 0.327 1.716
CSAMP−RMT2 − 250 2.104 0.169 0.144 1.335 2.888 0.283 0.320 1.715
CCAPM − 250 2.118 0.172 0.147 1.333 2.356 0.209 0.211 1.439
CCAPM−RMT1 − 250 2.115 0.170 0.143 1.335 2.905 0.286 0.328 1.719
CCAPM−RMT2 − 250 2.170 0.180 0.154 1.358 2.775 0.275 0.296 1.671
CRS − 250 2.054 0.163 0.132 1.314 2.546 0.230 0.238 1.512
CRS−RMT1 − 250 2.078 0.166 0.136 1.322 3.321 0.319 0.401 1.882
CRS−RMT2 − 250 2.041 0.163 0.131 1.311 3.317 0.320 0.396 1.881
CSAMP − 500 2.091 0.171 0.144 1.323 2.038 0.185 0.161 1.332
CSAMP−RMT1 − 500 2.103 0.167 0.140 1.327 2.666 0.255 0.276 1.604
CSAMP−RMT2 − 500 2.157 0.173 0.150 1.344 2.767 0.261 0.288 1.634
CCAPM − 500 2.090 0.171 0.144 1.323 2.038 0.185 0.161 1.332
CCAPM−RMT1 − 500 2.103 0.167 0.140 1.327 2.666 0.255 0.276 1.604
CCAPM−RMT2 − 500 2.214 0.182 0.159 1.366 2.763 0.265 0.283 1.638
CRS − 500 2.023 0.161 0.129 1.297 2.135 0.194 0.174 1.369
CRS−RMT1 − 500 2.038 0.162 0.132 1.304 2.559 0.252 0.271 1.569
CRS−RMT2 − 500 2.031 0.162 0.130 1.300 2.630 0.259 0.280 1.597
Table 6.3: Cumulated Wealth at the end of the out-of-sample period and Sharpe Ratios using
the filtered and unfiltered correlation matrices for different window lengths. We estimate the
filtered versions of the sample correlation matrix, the CAPM-Based correlation matrix and the
Regime Switching versions for Minimum Variance Portfolios.
95
(0.310-0.320), when compared to any of the other strategy. This represents an improvement of
30% in total cumulated wealth, for the RS-based correlation estimator and 23%-17.7% for the
sample and CAPM-based correlation estimators, respectively. Taking into account that these
portfolios could be worth millions of pounds, these improvements are sizeable. We also find that
the filtered portfolios, in general, exhibit lower downside volatility (e.g., less “bad volatility”,
higher Sortino Ratio) and most of this volatility is in the upside (e.g., more “good volatility”,
higher Omega Ratio). In this case, the filtered RS-based correlation estimator is the clear winner
by delivering strategies with the lowest downside volatility, measured by its Sortino ratio. These
results are robust across correlation estimators and different filtering methods. In particular, the
models filtered using the method of Plerou et al. (2002) (Method 2), tend to perform better than
the method used in Laloux et al. (2000) (Method 1).
In Figure 6.6, we plot the cumulated wealth delivered by our correlation models. Here we
can see that the filtered RS-based correlation estimators deliver the highest cumulated wealth
compared to any other unfiltered strategy.
6.7 Implications for Asset Allocation
As we have shown so far, the filtered correlation estimators deliver the highest cumulated returns
and risk-adjusted measures. In this section, we ask what are the industry sectors privileged by
our correlation estimators. This is with no doubts a very important question, since we are mainly
interested in understanding how the previous analysis can be translated into an asset allocation
context. For doing this, we group portfolio weights delivered in each optimisation round by
industry sectors; Basic Materials (BM), Industrials (IND), Financials (FIN), Consumer Goods
(C.G), Consumer Services (C.SS), Health (HE), Oil & Gas (O&G), Telecommunications (TEL)
and Technology (TECH).11
In Table 6.4, we provide the average weights delivered by our correlation estimators over
the out-of-sample period (from 01/02/03 until 10/16/12), using an estimation window of 250
11We use the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB), which is an industry classification taxonomy launched
by Dow Jones and FTSE in 2005 and now owned solely by FTSE International. It is used to segregate markets
into sectors within the macroeconomy. The ICB uses a system of 10 industries, partitioned into 19 supersectors,
which are further divided into 41 sectors, which then contain 114 subsectors. In the present analysis, we use the
most general, which comprises 10 industries.
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Figure 6.6: Cumulated Wealth at the end of the out-of-sample period for different estimation
windows, with and without short-sale.
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Model BM IND FIN C.G C.SS HE O&G UT TEL TECH
CSAMP 0.019 0.189 0.164 0.095 0.261 0.071 0.059 0.111 0.025 0.006
CSAMP−RMT1 0.006 0.198 0.077 0.115 0.298 0.082 0.073 0.128 0.012 0.011
CSAMP−RMT2 0.016 0.201 0.059 0.118 0.316 0.091 0.060 0.122 0.010 0.009
CCAPM 0.019 0.189 0.164 0.095 0.261 0.071 0.059 0.111 0.025 0.006
CCAPM−RMT1 0.006 0.197 0.077 0.116 0.298 0.082 0.073 0.129 0.012 0.011
CCAPM−RMT2 0.012 0.182 0.059 0.129 0.308 0.092 0.057 0.140 0.013 0.008
CRS 0.021 0.188 0.168 0.092 0.263 0.068 0.056 0.113 0.025 0.006
CRS1 0.024 0.183 0.158 0.101 0.268 0.076 0.057 0.108 0.021 0.004
CRS2 0.015 0.198 0.191 0.073 0.251 0.050 0.053 0.125 0.034 0.012
CRS−RMT1 0.015 0.190 0.126 0.097 0.275 0.076 0.070 0.119 0.019 0.012
CRS1−RMT1 0.016 0.186 0.098 0.108 0.285 0.088 0.077 0.116 0.012 0.013
CRS−RMT2 0.020 0.192 0.115 0.100 0.288 0.082 0.061 0.115 0.018 0.010
CRS1−RMT2 0.022 0.189 0.081 0.112 0.305 0.096 0.064 0.110 0.012 0.009
Table 6.4: Average Composition of minimum variance portfolios for all correlation estimators,
using an estimation window of length 250. Short-sale allowed.
days (short-sale permitted). Here we observe that portfolios weights are relatively similar across
estimators. In general, portfolios weights are mainly concentrated in Consumer Services (C.SS),
followed by Industrial (IND) and Financials (FIN). Regarding the filtered correlation estimators,
these tend to place less emphasis on financials and distribute more evenly the weights across
industries. In the same line, the filtered sample correlation matrix would seem to apply a similar
strategy to the regime-dependent correlation matrices, by investing less in Financials and placing
more resources on Utilities and Consumer Goods.
6.8 Concluding Remarks
In the present study, we apply Random Matrix Theory-based filtering to regime-dependent cor-
relation estimators as of Ang and Bekaert (2004), for a large dimensional system, using daily
records of 77 stocks of the FTSE 100, covering the period 2000-2012. To these models, we ap-
plied the RMT-filtering using two methods, the one of Plerou et al. (2002) (Method 1) and the
one of Laloux et al. (2000) (Method 2) and then built minimum variance portfolios in the spirit
of Markowitz Portfolio Theory (MPT). We also assess the performance of these models based
on the cumulated wealth at the end of the period and risk-adjusted measures of returns. Our
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findings can be summarised as follows:
• In terms of applicability of the filter in a Regime Switching context, we find that the
spectrum in Regime 1 (low volatility regime), can be fitted relatively well by the Marc˘enko-
Pastur Distribution, which allows us to distinguish signals from noise in the correlation
matrix for Regime 1. In this context, filtering is only applied to the correlation matrix of
Regime 1. Recall that the Marc˘enko-Pastur Distribution is based on the assumption of
normality of returns. While this may be true for Regime 1, returns for Regime 2 are far
from being normal.
• In terms of cumulated returns, we find that the RMT-filtering enhances the performance
of portfolio returns in 30% for the regime-dependent correlations and 23%-17.7%, for the
CAPM-based and sample correlation estimators, respectively. In addition, the filtered
regime-dependent correlation estimators are able to deal better with downside risk than
their unfiltered version, with more volatility in the upside than in the downside.
• We also find that the RMT-based filtering works best for short estimation windows and
when short-sale is permitted.
• These results are robust to both filtering methods. In particular, the method of Plerou
et al. (2002) (Method 1) delivers better cumulated returns than the method of Laloux et al.
(2000) (Method 2) across estimators.
• Finally, from an asset allocation perspective, we find that the success of the filtered regime-
dependent correlation estimators comes from their ability to deliver more diversified port-
folios and also by placing less resources on Financials. This finding is common to all filtered
correlation estimators.
To conclude, the present study puts in evidence the importance of filtering methods in bring-
ing greater stability in the eigenvalue spectrum for the case of regime-dependent correlation
models. We have shown that even when we use estimated correlation matrices, rather than
historical correlation matrices, the RMT-filtering can still enhance the performance of our port-
folios.
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Chapter 7
An Application of RMT to an
Emerging Market Published as: “Separating the Wheat
from the Chaff: Understanding Portfolio Returns in an Emerging Market”(2013) (With
Dalibor S. Eterovic). Emerging Markets Review, vol. 16, issue C, pages 145-169.
7.1 Introduction
The present chapter applies some results of Random Matrix Theory (RMT) to the Chilean Stock
Market. Two questions frame our investigation. First, we ask if all the return correlations across
the Chilean stock market are equally statistically significant. Second, we ask which are the main
macroeconomic drivers affecting the Chilean stock market returns. To answer these questions,
we use Random Matrix Theory (RMT) to study the daily returns of 83 Chilean stocks that are
part of the IPSA and IGPA indices from January 2000 to January 2011. The RMT helps us to
separate the wheat from the chaff in the correlation matrix. Using Markowitz’s Portfolio Theory
(MPT), we compare the efficiency of portfolios constructed under RMT with others constructed
under the standard approach which considers all covariances in the correlation matrix equally
significant. Finally, we use a Vector Autorregresion approach (VAR) to determine the impact
of a set of macroeconomic and financial variables on the optimal portfolios derived from our
significant eigenvalues.
We focus on the Chilean stock market as we think provides a good case study for other
emerging markets due to a number of reasons. First, the Chilean equity market is one of the most
developed within the emerging market world with a market capitalisation of 120% of its GDP.
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Other markets such as the Brazilian one have much lower market capitalisations as percentage
of their GDP (58%) while Mexico has a market capitalisation of 39% of GDP. Second, Chile
is a small open economy with almost no restrictions to the access of international investors.
Therefore, both idiosyncratic and global factors are likely to be important determinants of the
stock market returns. Assessing the relative importance of domestic versus international factors
in explaining domestic market volatility is key for developing public policy and market regulation
in other emerging economies that are following the path of financial liberalisation.
Our main findings can be summarised as follows: First, applying Random Matrix Theory
to a portfolio composed of Chilean equities improves its efficiency compared to a portfolio con-
structed using a standard MPT approach by at least 48%.1 Second, using VAR analysis, we
identify global risk aversion as the main macroeconomic determinant of the Chilean equity mar-
ket returns, followed in importance by shocks to the monthly rate of inflation and the country’s
monetary policy rate. Third, it is possible to diversify away some of the market portfolio risk
by adding positions on the portfolios constructed by the second and third largest eigenvalues.
Fourth, the three smallest eigenvalues produce portfolio returns that are mostly uncorrelated
with macroeconomic shocks. These portfolios are also uncorrelated with the market portfolio.
Finally, we show that the insights provided by the RMT approach can help us to improve some
existing models of the MV-GARCH literature, with significant improvements in realised risk
predictions.
This chapter contributes to the academic literature in two important ways. First, by applying
RMT to the Chilean stock market we provide further evidence of the benefits of using this
technique in building efficient portfolios. Second, to the best of our knowledge we are one
of the first to explore the relationship between macroeconomic variables and portfolio returns
constructed using statistically significant correlations. The rest of the chapter is organised as
follows. In Section 7.2, we provide an eigenvalue analysis of the Chilean Stock Market, while
in Section 7.3, we apply the RMT notions in a Markowitz’s portfolios framework to improve
portfolio risk estimates. In Section 7.4, we look for the macroeconomic and financial drivers of
stock returns. Finally, in Section 7.5, we conclude and propose lines for future research.
1Throughout this chapter, efficiency is measured by the Mean Percentage Error, which measures how close the
risk of our portfolios are from the “true” realised risk. This is an average result over the sample analysed in the
most restrictive scenario, that is, without allowing for a “short-sale” strategy.
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7.2 Eigenvalue Analysis for the Chilean Stock Market
Here we apply the same analysis of Chapter 4 to 83 records of Chilean stocks, using daily data
for the year 2005.2 We therefore have T = 260 and N = 83, which implies Q = T/N = 3.132.
We then construct the correlation matrix C2005 based on the average time-series returns
and normalised variance equal to 1. Using Equation 3.7 from Chapter 3, we obtain the upper
and lower bounds of the theoretical Marc˘enko-Pastur (MP) distribution. In this case, we have
λ+ = 2.4492 and λ− = 0.1892.
Similarly, we generate a Wishart correlation matrix R composed by cross-correlations of
mutually independent returns. We then plot the Marc˘enko-Pastur density of the eigenvalues for
10000 trials and compare it with the eigenvalue density of the sample correlation matrix C2005.
The results of this exercise are presented in figure 7.1.
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Figure 7.1: Eigenvalue Distribution of the Sample Correlation Matrix vs. The Marc˘enko-Pastur
Distribution. Year 2005
As expected, the majority of the eigenvalues lie within the bounds of the MP distribution.
However, there are obvious deviations from the RMT predictions. The largest eigenvalue is well
above the maximum predicted by the RMT (λ+ = 2.4492). This value as well as the remaining
deviating eigenvalues, are the ones that are expected to carry economically relevant information,
2Thoughout the chapter, we will be using these 83 stocks for every year of the sample (2000-2010). The
selection of these stocks was based on two criteria: (i) their availability over the entire sample, which allows to
make reliable comparisons and (ii) were the most frequently traded.
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while those within the distribution bounds can be considered just noise.
For 2005, there are two large deviations from the upper bound predicted by the RMT, λ1 =
7.4196 and λ2 = 2.5942. We also find three clear deviations in the lower bound of the MP
distribution, λ83 = 0.1419, λ82 = 0.1543 and λ81 = 0.1572. As we mentioned in Section 4.2, from
a portfolio management perspective, the list of eigenvalues can be seen as different levels of risk
of a certain portfolio. Likewise, the eigenvector components associated to each eigenvalues can
be regarded as the weights of the different stocks in a certain portfolio. In figure 7.2 (panel (a)
and (b)), we plot the components corresponding to the eigenvector 1 and 2 from the two largest
eigenvalues.
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Figure 7.2: Eigenvector Components of the Two Largest Eigenvalues: Year 2005.
In figure 7.2 we observe that most of these components are positive and contribute in a
similar way to the eigenvectors. This suggests a strong collective behaviour of stocks. From a
portfolio perspective, eigenvector components can be seen as the weights of the different stocks in
a certain portfolio, where some stocks are long while others are short. In this line, the eigenvalue
λ1 represents the risk of the market portfolio. In general, large eigenvalues correspond to a mix
of risky assets.
In stock markets, the largest eigenvalue corresponds to the risk of a portfolio whose weights
are the same for each assets. There is no diversification on this portfolio: the only bet is whether
the market as a whole goes up or down, this is why the risk is large. Conversely, if two stocks move
very tightly together (e.g., Coca-Cola and Pepsi), then buying one and selling the other leads to
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a portfolio that hardly moves, being only sensitive to events that strongly differentiate the two
companies (Bouchaud and Potters, 2009). In order to prove this latter point, we construct a time-
series using the weights contained in the largest eigenvector u1 using Equation 4.1, G1t ,
3 which
defines the principal components associated to the largest eigenvalue. This principal component
is then normalised and we run an OLS regression against the normalised returns of the market
index Gipsat , represented by the Indice de Precios Selectivo de Acciones (IPSA), which is the
market index that measures the price variations of the 40 most traded stocks.4
We plot the results of this regression in figure 7.2 (panel (c)). We observe that there is a
clear linear and positive relationship between the returns G1t and G
ipsa
t , with a strong correlation
coefficient< Gipsat G
1
t >= 0.8977. From this, we can therefore conclude that the largest eigenvalue
corresponds to the risk of the market mode. We repeat the same exercise for the smallest
eigenvector u83. We plot the correlation coefficients in figure 7.3.
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Figure 7.3: Eigenvector Components of the Two Smallest Eigenvalues: Year 2005.
From a portfolio perspective, the smallest eigenvalue determines the least risky portfolio one
can build. This can be corroborated by the nearly zero beta coefficient of the regression against
the market index. This in turn implies that the portfolio constructed from the smallest eigen-
values is almost totally immune to the systematic risk emanating from the collective behaviour
of stocks represented by the largest eigenvalue.
Figure 7.3 plots the eigenvector components corresponding to the smallest eigenvalues, λ83
3G1t =
∑n
j=1 u
1
jGj(t).
4Due to their high correlation, using the IGPA would not change the results.
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and λ82. Here we can see that the eigenvector corresponding to the smallest eigenvalue exhibits
clear preference for some pairs of stocks with the highest correlations. Finally, we plot the
eigenvector components of two eigenvalues inside the bounds of the MP distribution in figure 7.4.
As we mentioned above, the eigenvalues inside of the bulk of the MP distribution are assumed
to be random and therefore should carry no economically relevant information. This appears to
be the case, as the eigenvector components for both cases, do not seem to show major preferences
for any stocks. Overall, our results are in line with the findings of most of the existing literature
on the subject (Laloux et al., 1999, 2000; Plerou et al., 1999, 2000a,b; Gopikrishnan et al., 2001;
Plerou et al., 2001, 2002; Bouchaud and Potters, 2009). In the next section, we look deeper into
the significant eigenvalues and identify the individual stocks that participate in each of them.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
u
16
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
u
17
Figure 7.4: Eigenvector Components of Two Eigenvalues Inside of the Bulk: Year 2005.
The Number of Significant Components in the Deviating Eigenvectors
As in Chapter 4, we quantify the number of components that participate significantly in each
eigenvector by using the Inverse Participation Ratio (IPR), which quantifies the reciprocal of
the number of eigenvector components that contribute significantly (see, Section 7.2).
In this case, we have that the eigenvector associated to the largest eigenvalue has a IPR1 =
0.0287, which implies that we have PR1 = 34.86 ≈ 35 significant stocks in the largest eigenvector.
This is a very important result, which together with the high correlation of the first principal
component with the market returns of IPSA index, is basically telling us that most of the
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volatility of the IPSA-IGPA index is driven by these 35 stocks. The significant firms in the
largest eigenvector are presented in Table B in Appendix B of this chapter. By inspecting the
largest eigenvector we can see that it has very strong components in the mining sector, with
companies such as SQM-A, Oro Blanco and CalicheraA; energy sector, in companies such as
Enersis and Endesa, as well as in the retail sector represented by Falabella. Also very important
is the contribution of the food and beverage industry, represented by firms such as Andina A
and B, CCU, San Pedro and Conchatoro. In general, the largest eigenvector appears to include
most sectors of the Chilean stock market.
Regarding the rest of the deviating eigenvectors, the interpretation of their meaning is not
as straightforward as in the former case. This is so because the largest eigenvalue is of order
of magnitude larger than the others, hence constraining the remaining N − 1 since TrC = N .
Therefore, in order to avoid the effect of the largest eigenvalue, we first need to remove it
from the rest. For doing this, we regress, G1(t), calculated in Section 7.2, against each return
and compute the residuals i(t). Then, we calculate again the correlation matrix using i(t)
and compute the eigenvectors uk of C. The number of significant participants in the second
largest eigenvector for the year 2005, can be found in Table B.2b. In this case we have PR2 ≈
15 significant components with strong emphasis in the mining sector with companies such as
CalicheraA, Oro Blanco and SQM-A/B, in the energy and combustibles sector, with companies
like ECL, Colbun and COPEC as well as in the forest and agro-industrial sector with companies
like CMPC, IANSA and Campos. Also, the removal of the first component allowed to identify
a third deviating eigenvalue in the upper bound, with PR3 ≈ 28, with again strong weights on
the mining, energy and banking and investment sectors.
Finally, the smallest eigenvectors, each has PR83 ≈ 24 and PR82 ≈ 24 significant partici-
pants. Recall that these eigenvectors determine the least risky portfolios of stocks one can build
when using the Markowitz Portfolio Theory (MPT). Typically, it has been found in the literature
that the components in the smallest eigenvectors represent a very small number of stocks with
large correlations.5 As we can see in Table B.2b, this is not the case for the Chilean stock market.
For the smallest eigenvector, u83, although, we do find strong negative correlations between some
5See, Laloux et al. (1999, 2000); Plerou et al. (2000a); Gopikrishnan et al. (2001); Plerou et al. (2002); Bouchaud
and Potters (2009).
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pairs of stocks, instead of finding a small portfolio we rather find a quite diversified portfolio of
stocks composed by a mix of sectors, with strong preferences for stocks in the food and beverage
industry, metal-mechanic industry, investment and real estate and to a lower extent mining. The
portfolio composed by these stocks has a correlation with the IPSA, < G200583 G
ipsa >= −0.0081.
Regarding the second smallest eigenvalue (not shown), u82, we notice it has strong weights again
in the food and beverage, mining, energy sectors and to a lower extend on public services and
private pension funds (AFPs). Therefore, the results for the Chilean equity market are differ-
ent to what has been found in the literature for the U.S, where the portfolios defined by the
smallest eigenvector contain very few stocks with very large negative correlations. A similar phe-
nomenon has nonetheless been found in recent literature on emerging markets (Pan and Sinha,
2007), where there is a tendency for relatively weak intra-sector interactions between stocks. In
this context, the emergence of an internal structure of multiple groups of strongly correlated
components would be sign of market development.
7.3 Portfolio Analysis for the Chilean Stock Market
The underlying randomness contained in the “bulk” of eigenvalues seen in Section 7.2 has im-
portant implications in optimal portfolio selection. In the context of a Markowitz’s optimal
portfolio theory, the effect of noise has a strong weight on the smallest eigenvalues, which are
precisely those that determine the least risky portfolios. This is why the Random Matrix Ap-
proach allows reconciling the mean-variance approach of Markowitz as a tool for providing better
risk predictions.
7.3.1 Noise Filtering Using the Sample Correlation Matrix
To find the effect of randomness of C on the selected optimal portfolio, we carry out our analysis
for the years 2005-2006. We first calculate the sample correlation matrix C2005 and using the
returns Gi for 2006, we construct a family of 100 optimal portfolios, and plot Φ as a function of
the predicted risk Ω2p for 2006. For this family of portfolios, we also compute the realised risk Ω
2
r
during 2006 using C2006. We do this in order to compare the performance of the RMT approach
isolated from any additional source of noise that could arise, for example, in case we had to make
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a forecast of returns.
Since the meaningful information in C is contained in the deviating eigenvectors (whose
eigenvalues are outside of the RMT bounds), we use the filtering approach carried out in the
study of Plerou et al. (2002). They construct the filtered matrix Cf , by retaining only the
deviating eigenvectors, using the eigenvector decomposition C = V ΛV −1, where V contains
the eigenvectors and Λ is a diagonal matrix containing the eigenvalues. Plerou et al. (2002)
construct the filtered matrix Cf , by setting a new diagonal matrix Λf , with elements Λfii =
(0, .., 0, 0, ., 0, λ2, λ1). Then they transform Λ
f back to the basis of C, resulting in the filtered
sample correlation matrix Cf .6. In addition, they set the diagonal elements Cfii = 1, to preserve
Tr(C) = Tr(Cf ) = N . We use this filtering technique and we repeat the above approach for
finding the optimal portfolio using Cf instead of C. We plot the efficient frontiers for both
approaches, for the filtered and unfiltered matrices, in figure 7.5.7
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Figure 7.5: Efficient Frontier during 2006.
6The reason why the smallest deviating eigenvalues are not considered in these filters is that while large
eigenvalues are clearly separated from the RMT bounds, the same does not always applies for the smallest
deviating eigenvalues. In general, small eigenvalues can be found outside of the lower edge of the spectrum, which
is consistent with the fact that the length of the time-series T and the number of assets N are finite. In addition
to this, by simple inspection of the eigenvectors associated to the largest eigenvalues, clear non-randomness, and
stability over time has been verified, while this has not been verified in the eigenvectors associated to the smallest
deviating eigenvalues.
7For this example, we also allow for “short-sale”. Although, “short-selling” is not always possible as increases
the risk of the portfolio.
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In order to measure the relative performance of the filtered portfolios vs. the unfiltered ones,
we calculate the difference between both curves by using the Mean Average Percentage Error
(MAPE), defined as:
MAPE =
1
n
N∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣Ω2i r − Ω2i pΩ2i p
∣∣∣∣ (7.1)
In this case, we have that the unfiltered approach, which uses the sample correlation matrix,
underestimates realised risk in 28%, while when using the RMT approach it only underestimates
realised risk in 16%. There is certainly a sharp contrast between the use of the filtered and
unfiltered matrices, with the filtered matrix performing far better than the unfiltered matrix for
forecasting portfolio risk.
In this context, also an interesting question would be to assess how the filtered approach
performs relative to the unfiltered one, during different volatility regimes in the stock market.
To do this, we apply the methodologies presented in Chapter 5, Section 5.2 to consecutive one-
year periods from 2000-2001 to 2009-2010 in Table 7.1. In columns (1)-(2) we compare the MAPE
using the filtered and sample correlation matrix, not allowing for “short sale”, while in columns
(3)-(4) we compare again both approaches, but this time allowing for “short-sale”. Finally, in
columns (5) and (6) we present the volatility of the IPSA calculated as the mean of the absolute
value of returns for the predicted year and the VIX index as a measure of international market
volatility.
By comparing columns (1) and (2) we observe that in most cases, the filtered correlation
matrix delivers better realised risk estimates, with only one exception; when using the correlation
matrix of 2007 to predict the realised risk of 2008. During 2007 the burst of the housing bubble
in the U.S led to the start of a crisis whose zenith was reached in 2008. Notice that “short-sale”
constraints are a very extreme assumption. The reason for this is that “short-sale” constraints
can be easily circumvented with the use of derivative positions, allowing better flexibility.
The results for 2007-2008 are reversed when we allow for “short- sale”. From columns (3) and
(4), we can see that the filtered approach delivers better realised risk estimates in all cases. Under
this setting, “short-selling” would seem to provide more flexibility to overcome high volatility
periods in financial markets, which are precisely the times where good investment decisions are
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No short sale Short sale
Unfiltered Filtered Unfiltered Filtered Vol. IPSA VIX
Previous-Predicted (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2000-2001 0.307 0.100 0.345 0.066 0.745 23.3
2001-2002 0.029 0.027 0.344 0.096 0.615 25.7
2002-2003 0.238 0.189 0.458 0.206 0.708 27.2
2003-2004 0.255 0.220 0.735 0.375 0.695 21.9
2004-2005 0.058 0.019 0.428 0.108 0.567 15.4
2005-2006 0.288 0.163 0.412 0.179 0.581 12.7
2006-2007 0.333 0.276 0.487 0.169 0.545 12.7
2007-2008 0.073 0.130 0.367 0.173 0.888 17.4
2008-2009 0.127 0.041 0.367 0.192 1.168 32.5
2009-2010 0.052 0.023 0.379 0.186 0.754 31.4
Average 0.176 0.119 0.439 0.175 0.727 22.07
Improvement 0.481 3.71
Table 7.1: Mean Average Percentage Error for each year of the sample.
needed the most.
Our results are different from those of Sandoval et al. (2012) for the Brazilian stock market,
who based on a number of agreement measures between predicted and realised risk, i.e., MAPE,
Mean Squared Error (MSE), the angle between risk vectors, Simple Distance and the Kullback-
Leibler distance measure, conclude that the RMT-filtering did not produce better results than
the unfiltered approach, in particular during high volatility periods. They also find that the
RMT-filtering combined with the single-index model significantly improves risk estimates for
most of the measures analysed. We only find this phenomenon in one case in our sample; when
using the correlation matrix of 2007 to predict the one of 2008, with “short-sale” constraints.
Conversely, when “short-sale” is allowed, the filtered approach outperforms the unfiltered one in
all cases.
In the next section, we will try to separate out diversifiable from non-diversifiable risk with
the use of a simple one-factor model, to extract the market effect and assess the performance of
the RMT approach for the filtered and sample correlation matrices.
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7.3.2 Improving our Results by Getting Rid of the Non-diversifiable
Risk
Now we extend our previous results by removing the effect of the market portfolio from our
time-series returns and verify how the RMT-filtering performs under this new scenario. In the
previous analysis we were not able to fully distinguish between diversifiable and non-diversifiable
risk. Diversifiable risk is directly related to correlations between stocks. While non-diversifiable
risk is mainly driven by market momentum and/or breaking news that may affect all stocks
at the same time and inducing new correlations that could not be distinguished from the real
correlations between stocks. This is particularly true, during drawdowns. To remove the market
effect, we run an OLS regression of the form Gi(t) = αi + βiG(t)
IPSA + i(t), where Gi(t) are
the individual returns and G(t)IPSA are the returns of the IPSA index, retrieve the residuals
ei,t = Gi,t − βGIPSAt of that regression and build again our correlation matrix. This new
correlation matrix would be to some extent immune from the market effect. Recent emerging
markets literature has made use of this approach to distinguish between co-movements in financial
assets from “pure contagion” (Bunda et al., 2009).8
In figure 7.6, we plot the volatility of the IPSA index, measured as the absolute value of
its returns, together with the volatility of a Telecommunication Company (ENTEL), while in
the third plot we include the volatility of ENTEL after removing the IPSA index. We can see
that most peaks in the time-series are now smoother after removing the effects of the market.
Table 7.2 presents the performance of the RMT approach, for each year of the sample when
the market effect is removed. As we can see by observing columns (7) and (8), the filtered
approach outperforms the unfiltered one in every year with the exception of 2007-2008. As in
the case without removing the non-diversifiable risk, when we allow for “short-sale”, the filtered
approach performs unequivocally better than the unfiltered one. It would seem that the removal
of the market mode allow us to improve our risk estimates compared to the risk estimates of
the previous section. Overall, these results are encouraging since it tells us that we can use the
RMT approach also during periods of high volatility, when good investment strategies are most
needed.
8Alternatively, we could have used the time-series built from the largest eigenvector, with similar results given
the high correlation between the largest eigenvector returns and the IPSA-IGPA indices.
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Figure 7.6: Volatility After Removing the Market Mode.
No short sale Short sale
Unfiltered Filtered Unfiltered Filtered Vol. IPSA VIX
Previous-Predicted (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2000-2001 0.319 0.083 0.347 0.076 0.745 23.3
2001-2002 0.031 0.012 0.364 0.089 0.615 25.7
2002-2003 0.229 0.145 0.454 0.201 0.708 27.2
2003-2004 0.240 0.219 0.706 0.391 0.695 21.9
2004-2005 0.049 0.026 0.422 0.131 0.567 15.4
2005-2006 0.308 0.090 0.450 0.154 0.581 12.7
2006-2007 0.420 0.241 0.527 0.210 0.545 12.7
2007-2008 0.105 0.184 0.443 0.227 0.888 17.4
2008-2009 0.109 0.061 0.377 0.040 1.168 32.5
2009-2010 0.091 0.017 0.418 0.139 0.754 31.4
Average 0.190 0.108 0.451 0.166 0.727 22.07
Improvement 0.763 3.71
Table 7.2: Mean Average Percentage Error for each year of the sample without the market mode.
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This is particularly true, when investors can exploit a full opportunity set, giving room
for a “short-sale” strategy. However, “short-sale” is not always possible in financial markets.
Despite this potential constraint, the use of the RMT approach could be used for medium/long
term investment decisions, as oppose to active strategies that try to “beat the market” second
by second, implying greater chances of large losses. This is quite evident when observing the
outstanding performance of the strategy suggested by the RMT approach in horizons greater
than one year.
7.3.3 Improving Standard Correlation Models with RMT Tools
As we have shown so far, the RMT-filtering can be very useful to improve the prediction of
the realised risk of a family of efficient portfolios. The aim of this section is to introduce some
existing models of the MV-GARCH literature and verify whether these models can be improved
with the use of RMT-filtering. In this context, the use of Random Matrix Theory can be useful
to overcome the so-called “curse of dimensionality”, a problem which is very common in high
dimensional systems.
We propose two MV-GARCH models, which combine elements of the MV-GARCH literature
with the possibility of using an optimal number p of principal components or factors predicted
by the RMT analysis of the correlation matrix. The first model is the Conditional Constant
Correlation (CCC) model of Bollerslev (1990). In this model only the parameters of the N
univariate GARCH processes have to be estimated simultaneously, whereas the time-constant
correlation matrix is the unconditional correlation matrix of GARCH residuals. The covariance
matrix in the CCC models is described by
∑
ij,t = Ci,jσi,tσj,t. The second model is the Dynamic
Conditional Correlation (DCC) model of Engle (2002). This model is similar to the CCC model
but allows the correlation matrix to be time-varying. To the best of our knowledge only the
CCC model has been tested in a RMT context with significant improvements in realised risk
predictions (Varga-Haszonits and Kondor, 2007; Rosenow, 2008).
To estimate conditional correlations and show the benefits of noise filtering, we estimate the
realised risk minimum variance portfolios, according to four different specifications:
1. Model I: CCC(p) model, using p = pRMT , N principal components, where pRMT is the
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number of principal components predicted by the RMT and N is the full set of principal
components.
2. Model II: DCC(p)-w model, using p = pRMT , N principal components, where pRMT is the
number of principal components predicted by the RMT and N is the full set of principal
components.
3. Model III: Factor-GARCH model, using p = 1, 2 principal components.9
4. Model IV: RiskMetrics covariance estimator of (Zangari, 1996), Ht = 0.06t
′
t + 0.94Ht−1.
In both, the CCC model and the DCC model, the RMT filter is carried out over the stan-
dardised covariance matrix of GARCH residuals at every time step.
We use the same daily data set covering the period 2000-2011 to estimate these models. In
order to make sure a MV-GARCH model is the correct specification we perform the ARCH test
of Engle (1982) on individual time-series and we end up with a subsample of 40 firms for our
analysis. Unlike the previous analysis, we rather focus on predicting the realised risk of minimum
variance portfolios than on the portfolios along the efficient frontier. In order to compare and
contrast the performance of the models out-of-sample we use forward validation. This method
considers every test date t′ and for each one uses data prior to the test date (t = t′−F ) to optimise
any model parameter. This enables the comparison between filtered and unfiltered models and
also provides some insights of their stability over time, as well as for model selection (Hjorth and
Hjort, 1982). This approach has also been used in the Econophysics literature to evaluate the
performance of different filtering approaches (Daly et al., 2008, 2010). In order to capture the
time-varying nature of correlations, the DCC model is estimated over a daily rolling window of
length 2-years, while the rest of the models are estimated on a rolling window of length 1-year.10
The forward validation is performed over a period of 2547 days (covering the period 2002-
2011), 520 (years 2000-2001) days of which were used as the initial trading period. Subsequent
9This model is similar to the O-GARCH model proposed by Alexander (2002). However, it differs from the
former in that we keep residual variances and therefore will tend to work well for weakly correlated time-series,
as stocks, where the O-GARCH may suffer from identification problems.
10The difference in the window length in the DCC model stems from the fact that over relatively short horizons,
correlations will tend to be more stable, in whose case, the DCC model will tend to be very similar to the CCC
model. This is why we estimate the DCC model using a wider window in order to capture some of this time-
variation in correlations. In either case, we verified that the benefits of the RMT-filtering remain robust in both
cases.
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trading was done daily. This approach has the appeal of simulating a real trading environment
giving some insights on how the model would have performed in the past in case of being used.
In this context, for each test date t′ the predicted volatility of minimum variance portfolios
will be given by
Ω2t,predicted =
N∑
i,j=1
wi,twj,tHij,t (7.2)
where Hij,t is the predicted covariance matrix estimated under the aforementioned models
and {wi}Ni=1 are the weights of the minimum variance portfolio. On the other hand, the realised
risk of the minimum variance portfolio is defined by
Ω2t,realised =
N∑
i,j=1
wi,twj,t(< gi,tgi,t > − < gi,t >< gj,t >), (7.3)
where the expectation values are taken over F = 60 daily returns preceding the test date
t′.11 Although we do not impose “short-sale” constraints, none of the portfolio weights ever took
an extreme position over the sample. We calculate the average predicted portfolio variance, the
average realised variance, the mean square error (MSE) of the prediction and the MAPE. The
results of the estimation of these models can be found in table 7.3.
Model Ω2est x 10
−4 Ω2real x 10
−4 MSE x 10−8 MAPE
CCC − (pRMT ) 0.103 0.295 0.114 0.522
CCC − (N) 0.097 0.323 0.139 0.578
DCC − (pRMT ) 0.129 0.279 0.086 0.532
DCC − (N) 0.125 0.290 0.118 0.581
Factor −GARCH(1) 0.043 0.450 0.401 0.830
Factor −GARCH(2) 0.043 0.459 0.426 0.838
RiskMetrics 0.025 0.559 0.757 0.931
Table 7.3: Estimation of the Realised Risk of Minimum Variance Portfolios with MV-GARCH
Models.
We assess the performance of minimum variance portfolios first based on their ability to
produce portfolios with a low average realised variance and second and more importantly, by
11This is because on day t′, we do not fully know the outcome of investments made after t = t′ − F , since
conceptually they are still being invested.
115
their ability to correctly predict this variance. Regarding the first criterium of assessment we
find that by far the best results are obtained by the CCC − (pRMT ) and the DCC − (pRMT )
models. Their realised variance is significantly smaller compared to their Factor − GARCH
versions and also smaller than their unfiltered counterparts. The models using the RMT-filtering
also produced portfolios with the lowest mean squared error (MSE) and mean average percentage
error between 52% and 54%. These results also stress the shortcomings of using the Exponentially
Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) models, which, despite their simplicity, can lead to a serious
underestimation of the underlying risks of minimum variance portfolios.
Overall we find two main tendencies: for good covariance prediction, it is necessary to de-
scribe the time dependence of the correlation strength correctly, which can be done by choosing a
relatively short estimation period for correlations. Second, a short estimation period for correla-
tions induces noise, which needs to be removed by filtering. The clear winner of the comparison
are the CCC − (pRMT ) and the DCC − (pRMT ) models. These two models have an excellent
prediction accuracy for minimum variance portfolios. These results are encouraging since we
have just shown that the use of RMT-filtering can be very helpful to improve some existing
models of the MV-GARCH literature.
7.4 Macroeconomic Determinants of the Chilean Stock Mar-
ket Returns
In the previous section, we applied the RMT-filtering to the Chilean stock market and obtained
optimal portfolios. These portfolios showed improved efficiency compared to a benchmark of
standard Markowitz portfolios. Now we turn to the macroeconomic and financial determinants
of the Chilean stock market returns. The question we try to answer here is which are the main
macroeconomic and financial factors affecting the Chilean stock market returns? To answer this
question we rely on Vector Autorregresion analysis (VAR). Our main dependent variables are
the monthly returns of optimal portfolios constructed using the 3 largest and the 3 smallest
statistically significant eigenvalues with as predicted by the RMT for the whole sample.12 We
12Monthly portfolio returns are constructed based on the same analysis of Section 7.2, but using the significant
eigenvectors calculated for the whole sample. This results in 6 deviating eigenvalues; 3 deviating on the upper
116
denominate the portfolio returns as G1t , G
2
t and G
3
t for the returns of the portfolios constructed
using the first, second and third largest eigenvalues and G81t , G
82
t and G
83
t for the returns of the
portfolios constructed using the first, second and third smallest eigenvalues.
To account for macroeconomic factors affecting the returns, we include 3 domestic macroe-
conomic variables in our estimations: the seasonally adjusted monthly change of industrial pro-
duction (xIMACECt ), the seasonally adjusted monthly inflation (pit) and the monetary policy rate
(rt).
13 Representing more than 60% of Chilean exports, copper prices are likely to be one of
the main channels through which international shocks translate to the Chilean economy. We
include a variable with the monthly change of the price of copper (P coppert ) to account for this
effect. Finally, to account for international financial factors we include the V IX. This variable
is commonly used as a gauge for international stock market volatility and investors risk aversion.
We estimate an unrestricted VAR with the following structure:
V AR(L) :
(
V IX,P coppert , x
IMACEC
t , pit, rt, G
1
t , G
2
t , G
3
t , G
81
t , G
82
t , G
83
t
)
(7.4)
Producing impulse responses from this econometric model requires an identification strategy.
To deal with this issue, we follow Pesaran and Shin (1998) and use a generalised impulse response
function for an unrestricted VAR. This identification method has the advantage over the Choleski
decomposition in that it produces impulse responses, which are invariant to the ordering of the
variables in the system.
We run a battery of tests to get the optimal number of lags for our VAR (Table 7.4). The
majority of the tests recommend the use of 1 lag in the regressions.
Since we are mainly interested in the effects of macroeconomic and financial variables on
the returns of our portfolios we focus on this set of impulse responses. Figure 7.7 presents the
impulse responses for the VAR(1).
The impulse response functions suggest that shocks to the macroeconomic variables have
important and varied effects on the portfolio returns:
• V IX: A positive shock to the V IX (an increase of the international volatility) has a
edge and 3 deviating eigenvalues on the lower edge of the spectrum. We constructed returns based on their
corresponding eigenvectors.
13We treated the seasonality of time-series using the X12 methodology for seasonally adjusted time-series.
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Figure 7.7: Generalized Impulse Responses
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Lag LR-test LR-Mod FPE AIC SC HQ
0 -641.522 NA 1.94e-09 11.154 11.413 11.259
1 -265.279 675.309 2.49e-11* 6.791* 9.907* 8.056*
2 -177.902 140.400 4.64e-11 7.365 13.338 9.790
3 -69.583 153.682* 6.58e-11 7.582 16.412 11.167
4 28.544 120.773 1.27e-10 7.973 19.659 12.718
5 150.565 127.235 2.02e-10 7.956 22.498 13.860
6 296.965 125.128 2.90e-10 7.521 24.921 14.585
Table 7.4: VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria Notes: *indicates lag order selected by the criterion; LR:
sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level); FPE: Final prediction error; FPE: Final
prediction error; AIC: Akaike information criterion; SC: Schwarz information criterion; HQ: Hannan-
Quinn information criterion; Endogenous variables: G1t , G
2
t , G
3
t , G
83
t , G
82
t , G
81
t , x
IMACEC
t , pit, rt, P
copper
t
and V IX. Sample: 2000M10 2011M1.
transitory negative effect on the returns of the portfolio constructed using the first largest
eigenvalue and a transitory positive effect on the returns of the portfolio constructed with
the second largest eigenvalue. The negative impact on returns happens during the first and
second months for G1t . The positive effects on G
1
t also happen during the first and second
months. On the other hand, unexpected shocks to the VIX have no effects on the portfolio
returns constructed with the smallest eigenvalues.
• P coppert : A shock to the monthly change of the price of copper has a positive effect on G1t
but no effect on the remaining portfolios.
• xIMACECt : A positive shock to the economic dynamism measured as the monthly change
of xIMACECt , does not have any impact on the returns of the portfolios constructed with
the 3 largest eigenvalues nor the returns of the portfolio constructed with the third smallest
eigenvalue. However, it has a transitory negative impact on the returns of the portfolios
constructed with the first and second smallest eigenvalues. These effects occur during the
1st month of the shock.
• pit: A positive shock on the seasonally adjusted monthly inflation has a transitory nega-
tive impact on the returns of the portfolio constructed with the largest eigenvalue and a
transitory positive one on the returns of the portfolio constructed with the third largest
eigenvalue. On the other hand, inflation shocks would not seem to have an impact on G81t ,
G82t and G
83
t .
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• rt: A positive shock to the monetary policy rate (an unexpected increase of the rt) has
a transitory negative impact on the returns of the portfolio constructed with the largest
eigenvalue and a transitory positive one on the returns of the portfolio constructed with
the third largest and the second smallest eigenvalues.
To better understand the relative importance of each macroeconomic shock on the portfolio
returns we carry out a Variance Decomposition Analysis. To do this, we need a different iden-
tification strategy for the residuals. We opted for the Choleski decomposition with the ordering
presented in Equation 7.4. The international volatility (V IX) is the most exogenous variable,
followed by the copper price (P coppert ). Then, we included the domestic macroeconomic variables
beginning with the xIMACECt , pit and rt. Finally, we include our monthly portfolio returns or-
dered from the one constructed by largest eigenvalue to the portfolio return constructed by the
smallest eigenvalue. Table 7.5 presents the results of this exercise.
Our results have important implications for risk diversification across Chilean equities. First,
the main macroeconomic determinant of the market portfolio volatility (G1t ) is the international
volatility (V IX). This variable explains more than 20% of the market portfolio returns variance
after 12 months. Domestic inflation followed by the monetary policy rate (rt) are also important
macroeconomic determinants explaining 6.3% and 2.5% of the market portfolio returns variance
after 12 months, respectively. Second, it would be possible to diversify away some of the market
portfolio risk by adding positions on the portfolios constructed with the second and third largest
eigenvalues. The V IX explains 10% of the returns variance of G2t and 5.7% of the return
variance of G3t . But, the impact is of different sign than for the market portfolio returns. Third,
as expected, the three smallest eigenvalues produce portfolio returns that are mostly uncorrelated
with macroeconomic shocks. These portfolios are also uncorrelated with the market portfolio.14
In sum, the market portfolio (which is very close to the IPSA-IPGA indices) is mostly af-
fected by international shocks and therefore should be used by investors willing to increase their
14It should be noted, however, that the use of these portfolios might be problematic for at least two reasons.
First, since they are very close to the bounds of the MP distribution, in whose case they may not be significant
and their existence may be due to the fact that N and T are finite in practice. Second, if eigenvalues are very
close to zero (as it would be the case if they were affected by noise), the covariance will be almost singular which
means that its invertibility will be at stake distorting portfolio weights and consequently, risk estimates. This is
why, in practice, we rather focus on the eigenvalues that clearly deviate from the MP distribution, that is, we
focus on the largest ones. The main results of the VAR analysis are robust to the exclusion of the three smallest
eigenvalues from the specification.
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exposure to global risks or when they are expecting a decrease in international volatility. The
portfolios constructed with the second and third largest eigenvalues, on the other hand, could be
used by investors to increase exposure to global risks but when they are expecting an increase
on global volatility (due to their positive correlation with the V IX). Finally, as theoretically
expected, the portfolios constructed using the smallest eigenvalues are uncorrelated to macroe-
conomic variables and global risk aversion.
7.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter we apply Random Matrix Theory (RMT) to study the correlations of 83 Chilean
stocks that are part of the IPSA and IGPA indices during the period 2000 to 2011. We find
that using RMT to identify statistically significant correlations within our sample of stocks
significantly improves the efficiency of a family of Markowitz Portfolios.
Moreover, by using Vector Autoregressive analysis we identify the global risk aversion as
the main driver of the market returns followed in importance by shocks to the monthly rate of
inflation and the country’s monetary policy rate. Using the statistically significant eigenvalues
we can construct portfolios, which are uncorrelated to macroeconomic and financial factors such
as global risk aversion.
Despite the recent success of RMT in financial applications, challenges remain. Recent evi-
dence has suggested that meaningful correlations can be measured in the bulk of the MP eigen-
value spectrum (Burda et al., 2004; Burda and Jurkiewicz, 2004; Malevergne and Sornette, 2004;
Kwapie`n et al., 2006). One possible reason for this is the fact that we are assuming that our
returns are normally distributed and under this premise we carry out our comparisons with the
sample correlation matrix. In reality, returns in financial markets are not normally distributed
and exhibit a number of features, such as fat tails, volatility clustering and non-stationarity.
Recent literature has been improving these matters by developing extensions of the MP dis-
tribution to account for these phenomena (Potters et al., 2005; Bouchaud and Potters, 2009).
However, still one of the main difficulties has been to generate predictions during critical periods,
where there is a high collectivity between stocks, especially during drawdowns. In this context,
an interesting line of future research is to extend this approach focusing on turbulent periods
122
in financial markets. In the present chapter, we have tried to deal with this by combining the
RMT approach with some standard models of the MV-GARCH literature in order to capture
to some extent the short run dynamics of financial correlations with significant improvements in
correlation estimates. Another interesting line of future research would be extending our analysis
to regional stocks such as the MILA or the MSCI LATAM. Also, it would be interesting to apply
RMT to cross assets within the Chilean financial market including the return of equities, fixed
income and currencies. This would give us a more complete picture of the factors that account
for the volatility of the Chilean financial market.
All in all, the results obtained for the Chilean case provide important evidence of the broad
applicability of the RMT approach to equity returns in emerging markets portfolios. The Chilean
Stock Market is characterised by the existence of large institutional investors such as private
pension funds that maintain important structural positions on this market. Applying RMT to
their portfolio optimisation could be useful in diversifying some of the systematic risk of the
Chilean market.
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Chapter 8
Early Warning and Systemic Risk
in Core Global Banking:
Financial Network and Market
Price-based Methods
8.1 Introduction
Having started in the US as the bursting of a housing bubble, the 2007 Global Financial Crisis
(GFC) that spread globally has underscored the importance of banking system stability in terms
of cross-border propagation of contagion. The role of cross-border exposures in the dynamics
of the GFC with European banks having a surprisingly large exposure to US securitized assets
(Allen et al., 2011), which led to a 50% equity capital loss (valued at $1.6 trillion), has led
many to conclude that global financial interconnectedness is a major vehicle for systemic risk
and macroeconomic instability (Sorama¨ki et al., 2007; Degryse et al., 2010; Castre´n and Rancan,
2014). The tax payer bailout of the financial systems of the US, UK and of some Euro-zone
countries in 2007-9 period of the GFC costing over $14 trillion, Alessandri and Haldane (2009),
124
has intensified efforts by regulators and academics to identify, avert and manage the large-scale
breakdown of financial intermediation due to the domino effects of insolvency and illiquidity.
While there is no universally agreed definition, systemic risk is defined as the “disruption to
the flow of financial services that is caused by the impairment of all or parts of the financial
system and has the potential to have serious negative spillovers to the real economy”.1 This
motivates a second question, which is how can we quantify systemic risk and identify those
financial institutions that are systemically important by posing a major threat to the financial
system?2
The development of systemic risk indices (henceforth, SRIs) has taken two main approaches.
These are market price oriented statistical SRIs and the financial network approach championed
by Haldane (2009) based on the interconnectedness of assets and liabilities of individual economic
agents or sectors. Due to the ease of publicly available market price data on FIs, and the
popularity of generalizing from the Basel II individual risk measures such as Value at Risk and
Expected Shortfall to a portfolio approach, the majority of SRI analytics have taken this route.
Of particular interest here are the purely market price-based SRI, namely, the Marginal Expected
Shortfall (MES) of Acharya et al. (2010), the ∆CoVaR of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) and
an hybrid SRISK developed by Acharya et al. (2012) and Brownlees and Engle (2012), which
combines balance-sheet data on leverage and equity with market price-based data.
However, these market price-based SRIs have not been free from criticism. One of the main
problems is the absence of any early warning signals and they tend to be “coincident” or “near-
coincident” indicators of financial instability (Arsov et al., 2013). This happens because most
mainstream risk management models suffer from the so-called “paradox of volatility”, a term
coined by Borio and Drehmann (2011) and adopted by others (Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2015).
That is, volatility of asset returns, which is a key measure of risk tends to be underestimated
during asset price booms when systemic risk from leverage is building up on the balance sheets
of banks and non-bank sectors.3 This was presaged by Minsky (1986) who claimed that asset
1IMF-BIS-FSB (2009) and IMF (2011).
2By SIFIs, we refer to those financial institutions whose distress or disorderly failure, stemming from their
size, complexity and systemic interconnectedness, would lead to a massive disruption to the rest of the financial
system and, ultimately, the economic activity (Financial Stability Board, 2011).
3The volatility paradox can be seen in publicly available volatility indexes, such as the VIX and the V-FTSE in
that they are extremely low during asset price booms and are at a local minimum just before the market crashes
(see Markose, 2013).
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bubbles mask the growing financial system fragility as the enhanced market values for assets
and the perception of low risk from volatility measures encourage procyclical excessive growth of
leverage of banking systems with a commensurate growth of both their exposures and liabilities
within interbank and with non-bank sectors. Sooner or later, this may result in system collapse.4
Borio et al. (2001) give an extensive discussion on the general problem of procyclicality and
underestimation of market price-based SRIs. Benoit et al. (2013) find that some market price-
based SRIs represent systematic risk rather than systemic risk and tend to covary with the
market index, which makes them highly procyclical. They also find that the ∆CoVaR can be
explained by its own VaR in the time-series domain, which means that forecasting systemic risk,
using ∆CoVaR is not different from forecasting VaR of an individual institution. SRISK, though
well determined in the cross-section by the leverage of individual banks or of national banking
systems, it loses information when aggregated into an index form. This calls for new methods for
systemic risk estimation that can capture the growing risk from chains of indebtedness between
FIs and also other economic sectors, both nationally and in a cross-border setting.
In the context of highly integrated international financial markets, the cross-border exposure
of banks has become one of the major catalysts for the global financial crisis (Haldane, 2009;
Allen et al., 2011; Minoiu and Reyes, 2013; Castre´n and Rancan, 2014). As pointed out by
Degryse et al. (2010), shocks that impact the proper functioning of this densely interconnected
network of activities involving cross-border banking may affect not only banks themselves but
also the economies they operate in. This is why, it is vital to investigate the topological structure
of global banking and its vulnerability to liabilities of debtor countries.
Following Minsky (1986), we hold the view that bilateral balance sheet-based interlinkages
are essential to assess the fragility of the financial system. The important point about the Minsky
thesis of financial busts from leverage (see, Schularick and Taylor, 2012) is that the growth of
leverage and ensuing financial fragility of the system does not happen overnight. In view of
this and the above discussion, some have recognized the pitfalls of relying on market price based
SRIs that underestimate the build up of systemic risk of failure from growing bilateral obligations
relative to the buffers of their counterparties. Hence, it is sensible to include early warning of
4The idea of procyclicality of leverage is now acknowledged to be a major source of systemic risk and is well
articulated in Adrian and Shin (2010, 2011a).
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impending financial crisis as an important component of SRIs in order that regulators are not
blindsided by low volatility measures in asset returns.5 Regulatory authorities mandating the
reporting of bilateral financial obligations of relevant financial agents may become de riguer,
Markose (2013), to directly to assess the instability of the financial system. Alternatively, as in
Brunnermeier and Cheridito (2013) two stage reduced form macro-models which will explicitly
work to overcome the volatility paradox in their new Syst Risk index or some other model that
inverts the low volatility in asset returns to proxy leverage (see, Bruno and Shin, 2015b,a) have
been proposed. As bilateral balance sheet information is typically not publicly available, the
BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics is an exception in a cross-border setting between debtor
countries and exposed banking systems.
The objective of this chapter is to compare and contrast the market price-based SRIs for the
global banking system with a network based SRI. For the latter, we follow the eigen-pair method
developed by Markose (2012) and Markose et al. (2012). We estimate a SRI based on a spectral
measure of stability of financial networks constructed from a matrix of cross-border exposures
of national banking systems. As the spectral approach describes the stability of dynamical
systems, we give an appropriate dynamical characterization of the rates of failure of national
banking systems when losses exceed a given regulatory capital threshold. The network based
SRI is the maximum eigenvalue of this stability matrix and tipping points are identified when the
latter is greater than a prespecified capital loss threshold. We also use the associated right and
left eigenvectors of this matrix of national banking system exposures relative to equity capital, to
gauge systemic importance and vulnerability of debtor countries and national banking systems,
respectively. For this analysis, we use data from the Consolidated Banking Statistics reported
by the BIS and banks’ equity capital from Bankscope for the period 2005Q4-2013Q4 for 18 core
country banking systems. Note that only the equity capital of banks with cross-border exposures
in each reporting country is taken from Bankscope.
For the market price-based SRIs, namely, the DCC-MES, DCC-∆CoVaR and SRISK, we use
the MSCI Financials corresponding with the 18 BIS reporting national banking systems and the
MSCI World as proxy for the market index. This chapter is amongst the first comprehensive
5However, interestingly, early warning has not been included in the list of desirable properties of so called
theoretical multivariate measures of risk that involve several interconnected components (see, Armenti et al.,
2015).
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applications of these measures in a cross-border setting.
Our findings covering the period 2005Q4-2013Q4 can be summarised as follows: First, we
find that the SRI based on the maximum eigenvalue constructed from cross-border financial
network exposures peaks way before the start of the financial crisis in September 2007. Our
eigen-pair SRI remarkably estimates the 60% loss of equity capital that was realised in 2009 for
the global banking system from the most systemically important debtor country identified as the
US. Second, we are also able to identify the increasing vulnerability of the Belgian (2008Q3) and
Portuguese (2013Q4) banking systems before the bankruptcies of their major banks.6 Third,
we find that market price-based SRIs tend to be highly contemporaneous with standard market
risk measures, such as the VIX/VSTOXX, making them inversely related to asset price booms.
That is, market price-based SRIs are found to peak with the crisis or even after it. Finally, we
corroborate the Benoit et al. (2013) findings that the market price-based SRIs, namely, DCC-
MES, ∆CoVaR and SRISK, are determined by systematic risk measures. While the eigenpair
SRI uses a capital loss threhold to identify tipping points, the lack of similar thresholds in the
market price-based SRIs is found to be the add to the difficulty of monitoring the onset of
potential crises.
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 8.2 briefly describes the eigen-pair method devel-
oped by Markose (2012) and Markose et al. (2012). We also derive the market price-based SRIs
in a cross-border setting. Section 8.3 describes the data and estimation methodology used in
our analysis. In Section 8.4 we provide a network analysis of cross-border exposures in the core
global banking network. Section 8.5 gives the results on cross-border banking network stability,
contrasted with market price-based SRIs. Section 8.6 analyses rankings of systemic importance
and vulnerability over time for different groups of countries using both methods. Finally, in
Section 8.7 we report conclusions and future work.
8.2 Systemic Risk Indices (SRIs) in a Cross-Border Setting
In this section we provide a brief review of the eigen-pair method of Markose (2012), which was
further developed in Section 3.5. We also review some popular SRIs based on publicly available
6The Greek case and a fuller discussion of the Eurozone Crisis is given in Markose et al. (2015).
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market price-based data. As pointed out by Benoit et al. (2013), these measures are constantly
monitored by many central banks around the world.
8.2.1 Eigen-Pair Method based on Network Analysis
As we described in Section 3.5, the eigen-pair method of Markose (2012, 2013) is based on the
spectral analysis of cross-border exposures of national banking systems relative to their equity
capital. Here the main focus is the Core of the Global Banking System Network (CGBSN) (18
BIS reporting countries), which is a directed weighted network, where the direction of a link
represents obligations that all sectors of a country at the start of an arrow have towards the
banking system of another country at the end of the arrow. These obligations are then netted
and divided by their respective equity capital to yield the stability matrix Θ:
Θ =

0 (x12−x21)
+
C20
· · · 0 · · · (x1N−xN1)+CN0
0 0 · · · (x2j−xj2)+Cj0 · · ·
(x2N−xN2)+
CN0
...
... 0 · · · · · · · · ·
(xi1−x1i)+
C10
... · · · 0 · · · (xiN−xNi)+CN0
...
... · · · · · · 0 ...
0 (xN2−x2N )
+
C20
· · · (xNj−xjN )+Cj0 · · · 0

, (8.1)
As we mentioned in Section 3.5, Markose (2012), based on the work of May (1974, 1972)
shows that the stability of the network system is determined by the maximum eigenvalue of the
stability matrix:
λmax(Θ) < ρ. (8.2)
Where ρ is the homogeneous capital loss threshold. The threshold ρ can be regarded as a
percentage of banking system equity capital to buffer losses. If this condition is violated, then
any negative shock, in the absence of outside interventions, can propagate through the networked
system as a whole and potentially cause capital losses proportionate to λmax(Θ).
In addition, Θ has two sets of eigenvectors: right (V R) and left (V L) eigenvector. The right
eigenvector V R gives the rank order of systemic importance, while the left eigenvector V L gives
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the rank order of the countries that are vulnerable. These rank orders of systemically important
financial systems, will be compared to those using market price-based data as described below.
8.2.2 Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES)
In our cross-border setting, the MES represents the marginal contribution of the financial system
of country i to global systemic risk, measured by the Expected Shortfall (ES) of the global system,
proxied by the MSCI World Index. The MES was initially proposed by Acharya et al. (2010) and
later on extended in a dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) version by Brownlees and Engle
(2012). The Expected Shortfall (ES) at the α% level is the expected return in the worst α% of
the cases. This could be extended to the general case, where returns exceed a given threshold
C. In formal terms, denoting the MSCI World returns at time t by rm,t and the country MSCI
Financial returns by ri,t, the conditional ES of the system can be defined as:
ESmt(C) = Et−1(rm|rmt < C) =
N∑
i=1
witEt−1(rit|rit < C). (8.3)
Here, wi,t are the weights of the country MSCI Financials. In this context, the MES corre-
sponds to the partial derivative of the system ES with respect to the weight of country i in the
global financial system:
MESit(C) =
∂ESmt(C)
∂wit
= Et−1(rit|rit < C). (8.4)
The higher a country’s MES, the higher the individual contribution of the country to the risk
of the global system. In general, when modelling the distribution of financial returns, the critical
issues are dynamic volatility and the modelling of asymmetries. It is well documented that asset
return distributions are skewed and fat-tailed. Moreover, the volatility of asset returns is not
constant, it is mean-reverting and tends to cluster. Another important stylised fact of asset
returns volatility is that a large negative price shock increases volatility by much more than a
positive price shock of the same magnitude, which is also known as “leverage-effect”. To address
at least the dynamics of volatility, we follow Brownlees and Engle (2012) and Benoit et al. (2013)
and assume that the returns of the world market and national banking system i at time t, follow
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a bivariate GARCH(1,1) process for the demeaned returns:
Rt = H
1/2
t Vt. (8.5)
Here R′t = (rmt, rit) denotes a return vector of the world market and the MSCI Financials,
respectively. The random vector V ′t = (mt, ξit) are the associated standardised innovations
and are assumed to be i.i.d with the following first moments: E(Vt) = 0 and E(VtV
′
t ) = I2,
a two-dimensional identity matrix. The Ht matrix denotes the conditional variance-covariance
matrix:
Ht =
 σ2mt σitσmtρit
σitσmtρit σ
2
it
 . (8.6)
Here σit and σmt, denote the conditional standard deviations and ρit the conditional corre-
lation between the world market and the country financial returns. Based on Equations 8.5 and
8.6, Brownlees and Engle (2012) show that the MES can be expressed as:
MESit(C) = σitρitEt−1
(
mt|mt < C
σmt
)
+ σit
√
1− ρ2itEt−1
(
ξmt|mt < C
σmt
)
. (8.7)
Then, the MES can be expressed as a function of the country’s return volatility, its correlation
with the global index return, and the comovement of the tail distribution. As demonstrated by
Benoit et al. (2013), the i.i.d assumption on ξi,t and m,t implies that the conditional expectation
Et−1
(
ξmt|mt < Cσmt
)
is null. It is worthwhile mentioning that the assumption that ξi,t and m,t
are i.i.d is a very strong assumption. In fact, there are a number of reasons to believe that
extreme values of these disturbances could occur at the same time for systemically risky national
banking systems. That is, when the world market is in its tail, the national banking system’s
disturbances may be even further in the tail if there is serious risk of default. 7 Thus, the MES
7While there are many ways to model this dependence between the disturbance terms, many studies have
relied on the use of Kernel functions where additional assumptions are needed, making results highly dependent
on these assumptions. Faced to these potential shortcomings, we limit our analysis to the most simplistic case.
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can be expressed as:
MESit(α) = βitESmt(α). (8.8)
Under these assumptions, ranking systemically important financial systems is equivalent to
sorting financial systems based on their betas (Benoit et al., 2013). This SRI is estimated using
daily data using the Dynamic Conditional Correlation Model of Engle and Sheppard (2001), from
which the time-varying beta is obtained (Equations (8.5) and (8.6)). In order to compare the
MES with the network-based SRI based on λmax, we calculate the quarterly MES by averaging
the daily MES within each quarter. To obtain our broad measure of MES, quarterly MES are
averaged across countries, as done by Acharya and Stefen (2012) to calculate country MES.8
8.2.3 SRISK
The SRISK measure was developed by Acharya et al. (2012) and Brownlees and Engle (2012).
It is an extension of the MES by considering both the liabilities and the size of the financial
system. In a cross-country setting, the SRISK corresponds to the expected shortfall of the
financial returns of a given country, conditional on a crisis affecting the global market (e.g., the
MSCI World). The country with the largest shortfall is assumed to be the largest contributor to
the crisis and can be, therefore, regarded as the most systemically important. Following Acharya
et al. (2012), the SRISK is defined as:
SRISKi,t = MAX [0;φ(Di,t + (1 − LRMESi,t)Wi,t) − (1 − LRMESi,t)Wit] . (8.9)
Here φ is the prudential capital ratio, which is assumed to be 8%, Dit is the book value of
total liabilities of country i’s banking system, and Wit is the market capitalisation or market
value of equity of the national banking system. The LRMESi,t is the long-run marginal expected
shortfall of country i. It measures the sensitivity of the country’s equity return to the downturn of
the world market in the case of a financial crash. Acharya et al. (2012) and Brownlees and Engle
(2012) define a market crash as a hypothetical 40% semiannual world market decline. LRMES
is particularly difficult to estimate because it corresponds to an extremely rare event. In fact,
8Alternatively, we could have used the maximum within each quarter, although our main results do not change.
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there have been only three episodes of this magnitude over the last century (1929, 2000 and
2008). In addition, the LRMES is typically not available in closed form for this class of dynamic
models. We follow Brownlees and Engle (2012) and implement a simulation based procedure to
obtain exact LRMES predictions. This procedure consists of simulating a random sample of the
h-period country and market (arithmetic) returns conditional on the information set available on
day T . The LRMES for day T is then calculated using the Monte Carlo average of the simulated
returns,
LRMESi,T =
∑S
s=1Ri,T+1:T+hI{Rm,T+1:T+h < C}∑S
s=1 I{Rm,T+1:T+h < C}
, (8.10)
where C is the semiannual 40% drawdown and S is the number of runs of simulations, which in
this case is S = 50, 000. Ri,T+1:T+h are cumulated returns over a six months period. The details
of the simulation algorithm are provided in C.2. If we define leverage as Li,t = (Di,t+Wi,t)/Wi,t,
SRISK becomes:
SRISKi,t = MAX [0; (φLi,t − 1 + (1− φ)LRMESi,t)Wi,t] . (8.11)
Notice that the SRISK is a weighted average of leverage-1 and the LRMES. In order to allow
comparison with the rest of the SRIs, we scale the SRISK by the country’s equity. Hence,
throughout the analysis, we use:
SRISK#i,t =
SRISKi,t
Wi,t
. (8.12)
In order to compare and contrast the SRISK# with λmax, we perform this simulation proce-
dure for each quarter using data for that particular quarter and construct the quarterly SRISK#i,t
measure for every country i. To calculate the overall index, we follow Acharya et al. (2010) and
we take the average of the quarterly SRISK# across countries.
8.2.4 ∆CoVaR
This measure was developed by (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2011) and is based on the concept
of Value-at-Risk, denoted as VaR(α), which is the maximum loss within the α%-confidence
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interval. Then, the CoVaR corresponds to the V aR of the MSCI World Index returns obtained
conditionally on some event C(rit) observed for country i:
Pr
(
rmt ≤ CoV aRm|C(rit)t |C(rit)
)
= α (8.13)
The ∆CoVaR of country i is then defined as the difference between the VaR of the MSCI
World returns conditional on this country’s financial system being in distress and the VaR of the
MSCI World returns conditional on the financial system of country i being in its median state9:
∆CoV aRit(α) = CoV aR
m|rit=V aRit(α)
t − CoV aRm|rit=Median(rit)t . (8.14)
We follow Benoit et al. (2013) and derive the DCC variant of ∆CoVaR as a function of the
conditional correlations, volatilities, and VaR:
∆CoV aRit(α) = γit[V aRit(α)− V aRit(0.5)]. (8.15)
Here γit = ρitσmt/σit with ρi,t denoting the conditional correlation between the returns of
the MSCI Financial returns of country i and the MSCI World returns. If we assume that the
marginal distribution of the returns is symmetric around zero, ∆CoVaR is strictly proportional
to VaR10:
∆CoV aRit(α) = γitV aRit(α). (8.16)
This means that while ∆CoVaR-based rankings and VaR-based rankings of systemic risk may
differ in the cross-section (that is, at a given point in time t), in the time-series, that is, for a
given financial system i, ∆CoVaR is proportional to VaR. As a consequence, as noted by Benoit
et al. (2013), forecasting the future evolution of the contribution of a country’s financial system
i to global systemic risk is equivalent to forecast its risk in isolation. We compute the quarterly
∆CoVaR by taking the average within each quarter. In a similar fashion, the overall index is
calculated by taking the average of the quarterly ∆CoVaR across countries.
9Following Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011), we focus on the event of ri,t = V aR
i
α.
10A similar exercise carried out without assuming that the marginal distribution of returns is symmetric and
results do not change the main conclusions of the chapter
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8.3 Data Description
In this section we describe the data used to construct the network-based SRI and also the
aggregated financial indices used to construct the market price-based SRIs.
8.3.1 BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics and Bankscope Data
The Core Global Banking System Network (CGBSN) is based on Consolidated Banking Statistics,
Table 9D of the BIS, which gives foreign claims of reporting banks on an ultima risk basis. The
information on banking system equity for each country is taken from Bankscope database.
The sample of BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics consists of 18 reporting countries and
spans quarterly from 4th quarter of 2005 until 4th quarter 2013.11 This data provides information
on positions of reporting countries’ banking systems via-a-vis counterparts located outside of the
reporting countries (BIS, 2013). We consider only the core counterparts that correspond to the
same reporting countries.
The second ingredient needed to construct the CGBS network is information about the
amount of equity, which serves as a buffer for losses incurred by banks, is reported by Bankscope.12
Total bank equity should be understood in terms of a balance sheet equation as total assets less
total liabilities. As data comes disaggregated for individual institutions, the total equity for
given country’s banking system is calculated as a sum of cross-border banks headquartered in
the country (excluding central banks). This is treated as a proxy for the amount of equity capital
in the banking system of the country.
Bankscope data on total bank equity is reported on a annual basis, so data is taken for the
end of the year, that is, for the fourth quarter of a given year. In order to obtain data for every
quarter over the sample, the missing quarters are filled with the help of linear interpolation.13 A
similar approach is followed for the data on national banking system liabilities used to compute
11The countries in the sample are Australia, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, India, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States.
12Data for “Total equity” is defined as the sum of ’Common equity + Non-controlling interest + Securities
revaluation reserves + Foreign Exchange Revaluation Reserves + Other Revaluation reserves”. As quoted from
the user guide of Bankscope available at: https://bankscope.bvdinfo.com. Total equity has the code 11840 in the
Bankscope database.
13This was the method preferred to interpolate the value of equity as polynomial interpolation tends to generate
extremes when the degree of the polynomial is large. We also interpolated the value of equity using cubic spline
and results are very similar.
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the SRISK measure of systemic risk.
8.3.2 MSCI Financials Data
In order to estimate the DCC-MES, DCC-∆CoVaR and SRISK SRIs, we use the individual
MSCI Financials for the 18 countries and the MSCI World as a proxy for the market return that
is faced by the financial system of each country in the sample. The MSCI World Financial Index
captures large and mid cap representation across 23 Developed Markets (DM).14 We use daily
returns of MSCI Financials for each country during the period 03/10/2005 until 31/12/2013.
This data has been retrieved from Bloomberg and it has been adjusted for bank holidays.15
8.4 Network Analysis of the Core Global Banking System
Based on the methodology introduced in Section 3.5, we explore the evolution of the network
topology of the core global banking system. For this analysis, we have chosen three specific
periods: Figure 8.1 (Panel (a)) represents the pre-crisis period; Panel (b) depicts the midst of
the crisis, while Panel (c), shows the network topology after the crisis (2013Q1). These figures
represent the banking systems of 18 countries, with net cross-border exposures. The size of the
node is proportional to the total netted position. Blue nodes are net lenders, while red nodes
are net borrowers. The links are weighted and the thicker the edge, the larger the cross-border
claim of a node at the end of an arrow on the originating node.
Before the crisis the US is followed by Italy and UK in net payables, strongly borrowing from
Switzerland, the UK, Germany and Japan. After the crisis, Italy and the UK are no longer
among the top net borrowers and are overtaken by Belgium, followed by Ireland, India and
Turkey. As we can see, Belgium started as a net lender and after the Eurozone crisis became a
net borrower. In fact, the Belgian banking system suffered huge losses during 2008 when Fortis
group was sold to BNP Paribas and in 2011 Dexia group was dismantled.
14DM countries include: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Hong kong, Ire-
land, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United States and United Kingdom.
15We reckon the fact that the MSCI Financials also includes non-bank financial institutions. Nonethess, the
banking sector comprises nearly 45% of the index and it can be therefore considered as a good proxy for the
performance of the banking sector.
136
Figure 8.1: CGBS Network Topology. Direction of arrows goes from borrowing country to lending
banking system.
(a) (2006Q1) (b) (2009Q1)
(c) (2013Q1)
Note: Net payables are coded in red. Net receivables are coded in blue. Authors calculations.
During 2006Q1, the largest net lender is Switzerland followed by Germany and the Nether-
lands. During the crisis France becomes the most exposed to foreign debt, while Switzerland,
Japan and Germany occupy the second, third and fourth position, respectively. In 2013, the
largest net lender is Japan, followed by Switzerland, France and Germany. Also Canada be-
comes one of the top net lenders.
Among the GIIPS the largest borrower is always Italy. Spain is the only banking system
from GIIPS countries that started as a net lender, became a borrower during the crisis and
then returned to a net lender position in 2013Q1 (with net receivables even higher than the
Netherlands). Ireland started as a net lender and became gradually more indebted in 2013. On
the other hand, Greece held net debt of $156bn before the crisis, in 2009 its debt increased
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significantly to $228bn, but during 2013 became a small net lender with $13n in net receivables.
An interesting observation is that the GIIPS countries did not increase their overall borrowing
from 2006Q1 to 2009Q1, but instead they changed the composition of their lenders. In fact,
during 2009Q1, GIIPS countries strongly borrowed from Non-GIIPS Eurozone countries, as in
the case of the strong borrowing of Italy from France and Spain and Ireland from Germany. This
effect vanishes as we approach 2013Q1, where the non-GIIPS Eurozone countries decreased their
overall lending and their exposure to GIIPS countries. Finally, the US is the largest borrower in
all three periods. It owes a huge amount payable to Switzerland and the UK. During the financial
crisis, the American banking system increased its debt to Japan and France, but during 2013Q1
it decreased its borrowing from European economies and Canada and Japan became their main
lenders.
The tiered layout in these graphs is constructed according to the gross borrowing of the
country. The range of gross borrowing of all countries is taken as a ratio of each country’s gross
payables divided by that of the country with the highest borrowing. Countries that are ranked
in the top 70 percentile of this ratio constitute the inner core. The mid-core is constructed
from countries between the 70 and 30 percentile and the out-core between 30 and 10 percentile.
Countries with the lowest ratio belong to the periphery. The links are colour coded based on
their tier membership of the originating node.
The only country in the inner tier is always the US. We can see that it owes huge amount
payable to Switzerland and the UK. With the rise of the GFC the American banking system
increased its debts to Japan and France, but in 2013 the exposures of European economies
become smaller and increase in Japanese and Canadian exposure can be observed.
The mid-core tier is populated initially only by the United Kingdom, joined by Germany just
during the crisis in 2009. The highest weight of the British out-degree has a link between the
UK and Germany equal to $551.6bn in 2006 and gradually becoming lower ($312.9bn in 2009
and $218.7bn in 2013), eventually being overtaken by the debt to Spain in 2013 ($304.4bn). The
outer-core banking systems are mostly France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands and from the
GIIPS: Italy and Spain. One can observe that during the GFC (2009) and after the Eurozone
Crisis (2013) Italy holds a significant debt towards France. All remaining countries belong to
the periphery of the Core Global Banking System network.
138
It can be seen that the network topology becomes more tiered during the financial crisis
and after the crisis when more banking systems move towards periphery. Nevertheless, every
banking system within the Core Global Banking System can be of a potential threat due to the
highly interconnected structure of the network, as the sovereign crisis started in a peripheral
country and created waves throughout the system (Kalbaska and Gatkowski, 2012; Arghyrou
and Kontonikas, 2012).
8.5 Spectral and Market Price-Based SRIs
The level of instability of the Core Global Banking System Network (CGBSN), reflected by the
maximum eigenvalue (λmax) of matrix Θ is depicted in Figure 8.2 as a dark grey line (right axis).
In order to capture the effects of failure of net debtor banking systems on a net creditor banking
systems, we rescale the index by the proportion of bank-to-bank cross-border flows over the total
amount of cross-border flows (i.e., bank-to-bank plus bank-to-nonbank), as reported by Bruno
and Shin (2015a). As we can see, λmax(Θ) (right axis), jumps from a value of 0.28 in 2006Q4
to over 0.57 in 2007Q1 and approaching 0.6 in 2008Q4, reflecting the unsustainable liabilities
of debtor countries relative to capital in the exposed national banking systems. This suggests
that λmax provides a reasonable early warning for the crisis that was about to come, with the
collapse of two Bear Stearns hedge funds followed by the collapse of two BNP Paribas hedge
funds in 2007Q3 that were highly exposed to Subprime Mortgage Backed Securities. What is
remarkable is the estimation of a 57% loss of capital in the system as indicated by λmax(Θ) by
2007Q1 that occurs during the course of the crisis (see Allen et al., 2011). After the financial
crisis unraveled, λmax falls in 2009 to 0.49 and remains at a high level, between 0.49 and 0.54,
until the end of 2011. If we assume that a maximum eigenvalue of over 30%, exceeds the capital
equity ratio that banks consider as desirable, system instability is still a persistent problem even
until the last quarter of 2013.16 The index also exhibits some spikes during the first Greek
bailout in 2010Q2 and the US Debt Ceiling crisis in 2011Q3, which caused huge uncertainty in
the financial markets.
16Markose (Reserve Bank of India, 2011) finds that the Basel III capital ratio 6% for risk weighted assets
typically implies capital ratio of 30% for total assets. Thus, a value of ρ = 0.3 can be considered a proxy for
capital adequacy ratios of banking systems.
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Maximum Eigenvalue (λmax(Θ)) of the CGBSN vs. DCC-∆CoVaR, DCC-MES and SRISK during the
period (2005Q4-2013Q4).
Figure 8.2: Note: For quarters between 2011Q4-2012Q4 the Maximum Eigenvalue, λmax (right
axis), is calculated for CGBS network without Greece, when it was virtually bankrupt with
negative equity capital in banking system.
We compare the above results with market price-based SRIs, i.e., the DCC-MES, DCC-
∆CoVaR and the SRISK, which are calculated for every quarter, using data for that particular
quarter. The country indices have been averaged to obtain the aggregated index for the whole
financial system (left axis). Here we can see that while SRISK starts picking up in 2007Q2, the
DCC-MES and the ∆CoVaR exhibit at large increase with the Lehman collapse during 2008Q3.
During 2008Q4, the indices increase even further as the credit crunch hits Europe’s banking
sector as the European banking and insurance giant Fortis is partly nationalised to ensure its
survival in the Netherlands during the last four months of 2008, causing a daily downturn of
129% (of log returns or 72% of ordinary returns) in the Dutch banking index the 14th October
2008. These measures also seem to coincide with subsequent event in financial markets, such
as the Sovereign Greek Debt Crisis (2010Q2) and the US Debt Ceiling Crisis (2011Q3). The
SRISK, which is an hybrid SRI by combining leverage together with market price data, does
not provide any early warning for the sample analysed. A possible explanation for this is given
by Benoit et al. (2013), who argue that the SRISK tends to depend on leverage during calm
periods, while during crisis periods tends to depend on the beta of the country, as correlations
inscrease and equity drops. In this particular case, the beta effect would seem to predominate
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over the leverage effect. Therefore, for the sample analysed, the SRISK mainly behaves as a
purely market price-based SRI. For further analysis, see the Appendix of this chapter.
We explore the degree of procyclicality of these indices by computing the R2’s from a regres-
sion of the VIX index against the systemic risk measures at different time lags to gauge their
explanatory power.17 As documented by Adrian and Shin (2011b), standard risk management
risk measures, such as the VaR of financial equity returns, fluctuate procyclically with measures
of risk such as the implied volatility of options on banks’ traded shares. This means, that finan-
cial intermediaries are shedding risks and withdrawing credit precisely when the financial system
is under stress, serving to amplify the downturn. In Table 8.1, we report contemporaneous and
lagged regression R2 coefficients (for up to 2 lags) between the different systemic risk measures
and the VIX (Column 1). In addition, taking into account that most countries in our sample
are European, we also report the R2’s with the VSTOXX (Column 2).18 Finally, in Column 3,
we report the R2’s of a regression of the TED spread on the systemic risk measures. The TED
spread is the difference between the 3-month T-bill and the rate at which banks lend to each
other on a 3-month period (measured by the Libor) and it is often used as a good proxy for
interbank credit risk and perceived health of the banking system.19
We calculate the R2’s based on 50,000 bootstrapped samples. We report the standard errors
in parentheses. The results of this exercise are presented in Table 8.1. Here we can see that the
market price-based SRIs are contemporaneous with the VIX/VSTOXX, with R2’s of over 70%
at time t, which tends to decrease as the number of lags increases. The maximum eigenvalue
exhibits the lowest contemporaneous explanatory power (40%), which then increases slightly and
remains statistically significant after two lags. Market price-based SRIs tend to decrease their
explanatory power with time lags and in some cases, they even lose significance, as the case of
the DCC-∆CoVaR. Another interesting finding can be seen in Column 3, where λmax exhibits
a low but significant explanatory power with respect to the TED spread, thus reflecting the
17The VIX is the symbol for the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index. Often used as a good proxy
for international risk aversion. A high value of the VIX corresponds to a more volatile market.
18Which is the European counterpart of the VIX, based on the EURO STOXX 50 realtime options prices and
is designed to reflect the market expectations of near-term up to long-term volatility.
19When the Ted spread goes up, the interbank default risk is considered to be higher and when the spread
decreases, the interbank default risk is considered to be lower. When there is a downturn in the economy, banks
suspect that some banks may encounter problems. However, they do not know which banks, so they restrict
interbank lending, resulting in higher Ted spreads and lower liquidity in the interbank market, which ultimately
produces lower credit availability for consumers and corporates.
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VIX VSTOXX TED Spread
Systemic Risk Measures (1) (2) (3)
λmaxt 0.401*** 0.338*** 0.265***
(0.126) (0.121) (0.095)
λmaxt−1 0.444*** 0.343*** 0.288***
(0.118) (0.132) (0.101)
λmaxt−2 0.436*** 0.373*** 0.245**
(0.124) (0.139) (0.112)
DCC −MESt 0.820*** 0.828*** 0.273*
(0.060) (0.056) (0.184)
DCC −MESt−1 0.370*** 0.333* 0.036
(0.194) (0.193) (0.060)
DCC −MESt−2 0.147* 0.147* 0.033
(0.136) (0.129) (0.049)
DCC − ∆CoV aRt 0.784*** 0.720*** 0.152*
(0.063) (0.078) (0.091)
DCC − ∆CoV aRt−1 0.294** 0.265** 0.026
(0.162) (0.147) (0.044)
DCC − ∆CoV aRt−2 0.058 0.074 0.025
(0.060) (0.067) (0.030)
SRISKt 0.716*** 0.807*** 0.147*
(0.1031) (0.064) (0.097)
SRISKt−1 0.274** 0.290** 0.023
(0.149) (0.155) (0.038)
SRISKt−2 0.061 0.082 0.042
(0.069) (0.086) (0.051)
Table 8.1: Bootstrapped R2’s from a regression of the VIX, VSTOXX and TED spread (taken as
the last day of every quarter) on the SRIs. DCC-MES, DCC-∆CoVaR and SRISK are calculated
at a 5% tail. Standard Errors in Parentheses. * Significance at 10%; ** Significance at 5% and
*** Significance at 1%. Own Calculations.
potential tightening of credit conditions in the interbank market with some time in advance.
Market price-based SRIs are not able to reflect this phenomenon, not even contemporaneously.
8.6 Systemic Risk Importance and Vulnerability in the
Global Banking System
As we mentioned above, the eigen-pair method introduced by Markose (2012) not only delivers
an index for systemic stability, based on the maximum eigenvalue (λmax) of the stability matrix
(Θ), but also delivers simultaneously its associated right (VR) and left (VL) eigenvectors. The
right eigenvector centrality delivers the rank order of the systemically important countries whose
default on their obligations can cause damage to banking systems that are exposed to them. The
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left eigenvector delivers the rank order of those banking systems that are vulnerable to contagion.
It has been found that the rank order based on the right eigenvector centrality (VR) is a good
proxy for the countries that will bring about the largest losses by their default to creditor banking
systems, whereas the left eigenvector centrality (VL) ranks order those banking systems which
are vulnerable to default by debtor countries.
Figure 8.3: Rankings of Systemic Importance for Core Europe, the US, the UK, Japan, Switzer-
land and average for other countries (2005Q4-2013Q4)
(a) RIGHT EIGENVECTOR CENTRALITY (VR) (b) DCC-MES
(c) DCC-∆CoVaR (d) SRISK
Note: Estimations based on Right Eigenvector Centrality (VR), DCC-MES, DCC-CoVaR and
SRISK. For quarters (2011Q4-2012Q4) Greece is removed due to negative equity; GIIPS: Por-
tugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, Spain; Eurozone non-GIIPS: Germany, France, the Netherlands,
Belgium, Austria; Other: Australia, Canada, India, Sweden.
The Right Eigenvector Centrality (VR) for the major economies and blocks in our sample is
depicted in Figure 8.3 (Panel (a)). Here we verify the large systemic threat posed by the US. In
fact, this can be verified in the whole Core Global Banking System Network which is populated
by American liabilities. Thus, it should not be surprising that the failure of Bear Stearns in 2007
and Lehman Brothers collapse in 2008 triggered contagion waves throughout the global financial
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system. The Right Eigenvector Centrality (VR) at that time was at levels above 0.9. The index
fell to around 0.8 during the Eurozone Sovereign Crisis, with a visible tweak due to the Greek
bankruptcy and bailout, but returned to almost 0.9 in 2013Q4. The United Kingdom is ranked
as the second most important country. The British index increased twofold in the aftermath of
the Subprime Financial Crisis and due to its closeness to the Eurozone, but did not return to its
pre-crisis levels.
The rest of the countries, including non-GIIPS Eurozone countries (Germany and France),
are of marginal systemic importance when compared with the aforementioned financial systems,
which can give us some insights into how much damage would be caused, in case of financial
default of the US or the UK. These two financial systems are a clear example of the “too
interconnected to fail” phenomenon proposed by Markose et al. (2012).
An interesting point, regarding the GIIPS countries, is that their systemic importance was
higher than that of the non-GIIPS Eurozone countries until the last quarter of 2011. A possible
explanation for this phenomenon is that most outstanding debt of the GIIPS were restructured
after the Eurozone Sovereign Crisis and the main burden was taken by the rest of the Eurozone,
leading to an increase in the systemic threat posed by the non-GIIPS Eurozone countries. It is
also noteworthy that Japan and Switzerland are the main lenders in the CGBSN and are ranked
the lowest when it comes to systemic importance.
Regarding the market price-based rankings of systemic importance (Panels (b,c,d)), these
tend to indicate the systemic importance of the US at the start of the crisis. The DCC-MES
(Panel (b)) ranks the US as most systemically important at the start of the crisis in 2007Q3,
but then is overtaken by Switzerland and Japan, during 2008Q1 and 2008Q2, respectively. Then
picks up again during 2008Q3, with the Lehman collapse, to fall again during 2009Q1, when the
crisis was already set in Europe. Here aside the four main systemic contributors, namely, the US,
Switzerland, the UK and Japan, the GIIPS systemic importance start picking up during 2008Q3,
when Ireland falls into recession, but then is overtaken by the non-GIIPS Eurozone countries in
2008Q4, when most of their banks start facing difficulties.
A point that is worthwhile noting here is that most country groups reach their first peak
in 2008Q3, which coincides with the Lehman Brothers collapse in the US. In Switzerland, UBS
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having troubles due to Subprime-related investments20 and the credit crunch reaching the UK,
with housing prices falling more than a 10%. The only exception is Japan, which attains its
highest in 2008Q4, which coincides with the effects of the crisis spreading into Asia.21
The DCC-∆CoVaR (Figure 8.3, Panel (c)) reports a similar story. Here we observe that all
groups of countries reach their highest point during 2008Q4. During this quarter, the non-GIIPS
Eurozone countries rank as third, after the US and Switzerland, reflecting the fact that the crisis
mainly affected the European Core countries and then spread to the periphery. The US ranks first
until 2009Q3, but then is overtaken by the GIIPS and non-GIIPS Eurozone countries. Finally
the SRISK (Panel (d)) mainly ranks the UK as the most systemically important country, followed
by Japan, non-GIIPS countries, Switzerland and the US for the period 2008Q4. An interesting
observation here is that the importance of the non-GIIPS Eurozone countries is always above
of that of the GIIPS, except during the period 2011Q3-2013Q1. Here Greece, reports negative,
therefore driving the average of GIIPS countries. This period also comprehends the second Greek
bailout in 2012Q1.
While the market price-based SRIs can give us some insights on what are the potential
losses coming from one country to the rest of the system, only ∆CoVaR give us a ranking for
the countries that are most susceptible to suffer from these potential losses. We allow for this
possibility in Figure 8.4, where we plot the Left Eigenvector Centrality (VL, Panel (a)), while
in Panel (b), we plot the vulnerability rankings delivered by the DCC-∆CoVaR for the same
group of countries.22 In Figure 8.4, Panel (a), we can see a different story as the one shown by
Figure 8.3. Now Switzerland is the most systemically vulnerable financial system in the CGBSN.
Japan was ranked the third most vulnerable financial system, after non-GIIPS Eurozone block,
but then surprisingly, after 2012 increased its vulnerability to 0.28 and moved to the second
position in the ranking.
In terms of vulnerability, the non-GIIPS Eurozone countries are the second most fragile in
the CGBSN, slightly surpassed by Japan in 2012-2013. At the same time, the evolution of the
GIIPS’s Left Eigenvector Centrality reveals how their financial systems were damaged during the
20UBS eventually received a capital injection from the government in October 2008.
21In October 2008, Japan’s stock index, the Nikkei, fell 10%, its biggest drop in 20 years.
22Vulnerability, in a ∆CoVaR context, is defined as the VaR of the country, conditional on the VaR of the
market (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2011).
145
crisis. Starting with a relatively low value, the index experienced a jump in 2007Q1 and then
again in 2010Q2 when the Sovereign Crisis hit the Eurozone. The high vulnerability of the non-
GIIPS Eurozone countries is the result of high lending of these banking systems, especially to
the GIIPS, which became more vulnerable with the equity capital eroded by the losses incurred
during the Eurozone crisis.
Figure 8.4: Rankings of Systemic Vulnerability for the US, the UK, Japan, Switzerland and
averages for GIIPS, non-GIIPS Eurozone and other countries (2005Q4-2013Q4)
(a) LEFT EIGENVECTOR CENTRALITY (VL) (b) DCC-∆CoVaR
Note: For quarters (2011Q4-2012Q4) Greece is removed due to negative equity.
The impact of the Sovereign Crisis in the Eurozone can also be seen in the case of the United
Kingdom. Its vulnerability increased considerably between 2010Q1 and 2011Q4, when it reached
its maximum. A possible explanation for this could be the UK acting as an intermediary for
refinancing the GIIPS financial systems, borrowing money from financial systems outside of the
Eurozone and lending them to the GIIPS. The British Left Eigenvector Centrality only improved
in the last quarter of 2013. Finally, the US’s Left Eigenvector Centrality is extremely low at all
times, while the CGBSN is only able to capture the cross-border banking exposures, there are
other possible contagion channels, with which the American financial system would probably be
more vulnerable. This latter, underlines the need of more granular mapping of current financial
interconnections to analyse the propagation of contagion in financial systems (Markose, 2013).
The DCC-∆CoVaR ranks the US as the most vulnerable, followed by Switzerland and the
non-GIIPS Eurozone countries during 2008Q4. The UK picks up during 2009Q1 but then its
vulnerability decreases. After 2009Q3, the highest rank of vulnerability is mainly dominated by
the non-GIIPS Eurozone countries and the GIIPS.
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8.6.1 Systemic Importance and Vulnerability of Core Eurozone Coun-
tries
While we have made the distinction that a systemically important financial system is not nec-
essarily the most vulnerable, a very dangerous situation could arise when a country of high
systemic importance is at the same time, increasingly vulnerable. In this context, a small per-
turbation can harm the financial system, which in turn can cause a huge damage to the global
network. A clear example of this instability was the rise of the UK’s vulnerability (the second
most systemically important country based on the CGBSN). In Figure 8.5, we plot the SRIs
of the non-GIIPS Eurozone countries. We are particularly interested in the largest economies
of the Eurozone: France and Germany. Panel (a) shows the evolution of the Right Eigenvector
Centrality (VR) for these economies. Here we can see that the systemic importance of all these
countries was minimal before the crisis unraveled. The Right Eigenvector Centrality for these
countries experienced an early increase in 2007Q1, especially in the case of Germany and Austria.
The importance of these two financial systems increased steadily throughout and even after the
US financial crisis, whereas the Dutch and Belgian indices grew just before the European Crisis.
French potential to trigger contagion losses increased considerably in the midst of the Sovereign
Crisis. This trend seems to be disrupted between 2011Q4 and 2012Q4.23 Furthermore, France
became the most vulnerable banking system of the non-GIIPS Eurozone countries after 2009,
only surpassed by the Netherlands in the last quarter of 2013. By 2013, Germany was the most
systemically important country of the group, while France and the Netherlands posed the least
threat of triggering significant contagion in the CGBSN.
The DCC-MES and DCC-∆CoVaR based rankings remain relatively low and homogeneous
during the US Financial crisis and all countries start picking up during 2008Q2, reaching their
maximum during 2008Q4, with the exception of Belgium, which peaks in 2008Q3. After that,
they only react in the face of critical market event, such as the Greek bailout during 2010Q2, the
growing uncertainty over Greece staying in the Eurozone (2011Q4) and the second Greek bailout
(2012Q1). Here the Netherlands is ranked as first from 2008Q3 and then remains mostly in that
position until 2011Q4, overtaken by France, only during 2011Q4 (Panel (b)). This highest peak
23This is not due to the removal of bankrupted Greece from the sample, as experiments conducted without
Greece in the whole period exhibit no change in the French systemic importance index.
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Figure 8.5: Rankings of Systemic Importance for Core Eurozone Countries (2005Q4-2013Q4)
(a) RIGHT EIGENVECTOR CENTRALITY (VR) (b) DCC-MES
(c) DCC-∆CoVaR (d) SRISK
For quarters (2011Q4-2012Q4) Greece is removed due to negative equity.
during 2008Q4 coincides with the Dutch government providing a capital injection of EUR 10
billion to ING Group during October 2008. The SRISK ranks Germany as the most systemically
important until 2008Q2, overtaken by the Netherlands in 2008Q3, which leads for most of the
sample. Then, France takes the lead in the last two quarters.
Indeed, the recent financial crisis reached its peak in the Netherlands in the last four months of
2008. During this period, two financial companies, Fortis NV and ABN AMRO, were experiencing
great difficulties. In fact, prior to its collapse in 2008, Fortis was the largest financial services
company in Belgium, named as Fortis SA/NV, and in the Netherlands, named as Fortis NV. As
it can seen from Figure 8.6 (Panel (a)), the Belgian banking system was the most vulnerable
before 2008Q3. On the 13th of October 2008, the Belgian government designed and approved
a mechanism to compensate certain categories of Fortis shareholders. In the same month, the
Dutch government became involved and bailed-out the bank.
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Figure 8.6: Rankings of Systemic Vulnerability for Core Eurozone Countries (2005Q4-2013Q4)
(a) LEFT EIGENVECTOR CENTRALITY (VL) (b) DCC-∆CoVaR
Note: For quarters (2011Q4-2012Q4) Greece is removed due to negative equity. Source: Own
calculations.
In fact, this event is reflected in Panel (a), where the Left Eigenvector Centrality of Belgium
drops almost to the half (from 0.73 to 0.41), while the Dutch index more than doubles (from 0.14
to 041, if we also add the capital injection granted to ING over the same month).24 A similar
phenomenon is observed for the DCC-MES in Figure 8.5b, Panel (b). Finally, on December
2008, the Belgian government announces that will proceed with the sale of Fortis assets to BNP
Paribas SA, which in turn had an effect on French vulnerability during 2009. As it can be
seen in Figure 8.6, Panel (a), when the Left Eigenvector Centrality Index for Belgium falls, it
increases for France. While, the DCC-∆CoVaR-based ranking is able to identify the vulnerability
of Belgium and Netherlands during 2008Q4, they are unable to capture the growing instability
of the Belgian banking system, whereas the Left Eigenvector Centrality does so way before the
crisis.
8.6.2 Systemic Importance and Vulnerability of Eurozone Periphery
Countries
As we showed in the previous section, the rise of systemic importance coupled with an increase
in systemic vulnerabilities of non-GIIPS Eurozone countries during the financial crisis of 2008
24Another Dutch bank which was involved with changes in the management, ownership, and financial conditions
was the ABN AMRO. This bank was acquired by a banking consortium consisting of the Royal Bank of Scotland
(RBS) Group, Santander Group and Fortis. On the 13th of October 2008, the British government declared a
bail-out package for the financial system. This resulted in a total state ownership in RBS of 58%. Following the
collapse of Fortis and nationalization of RBS, the ABN AMRO Bank was nationalized by the Dutch government.
Consequently, the Dutch banking index return declines extremely on the 14th of October 2008.
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and the Sovereign Crisis, provides evidence of the building-up of instability in the high-income
Eurozone countries at that time. Figure 8.7 illustrates the SRIs for the GIIPS. In Panel (a)
we plot the Right Eigenvector Centrality (VR), which shows that, on average, the systemic
importance of the GIIPS was higher than that of the non-GIIPS Eurozone countries. If in
addition to this, we look at the Left Eigenvector Centrality (VL) of Figure 8.8 (Panel (a)), we
can see precisely the opposite. In this context, the GIIPS posed more systemic threat and were
less vulnerable than non-GIIPS Eurozone countries.
Figure 8.7: Rankings of Systemic Importance for Eurozone Periphery Countries (2005Q4-
2013Q4)
(a) RIGHT EIGENVECTOR CENTRALITY (VR) (b) DCC-MES
(c) DCC-∆CoVaR (d) SRISK
Note: For quarters (2011Q4-2012Q4) Greece is removed due to negative equity. Source: Own
calculations.
As we showed in Section 8.4, GIIPS were heavily indebted to the Eurozone countries before
the Sovereign Crisis. The strong cross-border flows between the GIIPS and non-GIIPS Eurozone
countries could have been the channel of systemic risk spread, which led to the creation of the
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) after the e110 bn bailout of Greece in May 2010,
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help from the EFSF for Ireland (November 2010), Portugal (May 2011) and again Greece in
February 2012 (Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2012).
With more than 400% growth of cross-border banking claims of countries such as Ireland or
Spain between 2003 and 2008 (Bruno and Shin, 2014), it is not surprising the increase in the Right
Eigenvector Centrality of GIIPS countries until the second half of 2009 as depicted in Figure 8.7
(Panel (a)). Before the Sovereign Crisis in 2010, the most systemically important country of
the GIIPS was Italy followed closely by Spain and Greece. By 2010Q2, all GIIPS countries
but Ireland, had a higher systemic importance ranking than Germany. The Right Eigenvector
Centrality Index rose sharply for Ireland by the end of 2011 and during 2012, when it started
raising money from financial markets. By the end of 2013, the most systemically important
countries were Ireland, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece. Market price-based SRIs tend to
agree that Ireland is the most systemically important before and during the crisis, followed by
Greece and Spain. Notice that the SRISK for Greece jumps sharply between 2012Q2 and 2013Q1,
reflecting the increasing instability of the Greek banking system.25
Figure 8.8: Rankings of Systemic Vulnerability for Eurozone Periphery Countries (2005Q4-
2013Q4)
(a) LEFT EIGENVECTOR CENTRALITY (VL) (b) DCC-∆CoVaR
Note: For quarters (2011Q4-2012Q4) Greece is removed due to negative equity. Source: Own
calculations.
When we analyse the systemic vulnerability of GIIPS in Figure 8.8 (Panel (a)) it can be
noticed that Ireland became very vulnerable before the financial crisis of 2008 but with the
bailout in the last quarter of 2010 its Left Eigenvector Centrality fell to very low levels. In fact,
25It is worthwhile noting that this sharp increase is due to the fact that Greece reports negative equity during
this period, which we have assumed to be slightly positive.
151
this event can also be seen in market price-based SRIs in Figure 8.7, where Ireland ranks as
one of the most systemically important of all the GIIPS, as well as one of the most vulnerable
in Figure 8.8 (Panel (b)). Spain became the most vulnerable country among the GIIPS due
to the Sovereign Crisis. Italian vulnerability increased already in 2007 and remain in a steady
rise until the end of 2012. Something that is worthwhile noting is the recent vulnerability of
the Portuguese banking system during the second half of 2013 (Figure 8.8, Panel (b)). This
eventually led to the collapse of the major Portuguese Banco Espirito Santo in August 2014,
generating fears of a second round of contagion in the Eurozone. The eigen-pair method shows
that Portugal is becoming the most vulnerable banking system among the GIIPS, event which
is neither anticipated by any of the other SRIs presented above.
8.6.3 What Explains Market Price-Based SRIs?
In this section we ask what are the possible reasons for the divergence in rankings of systemically
important banking systems. For answering this question, we follow Benoit et al. (2013) and
calculate the R2’s from a time-series and cross-sectional regression of the SRIs presented above
and some of the ingredients used to construct them, namely, the beta of the country’s banking
system, total book value liabilities, value of equity and Value at Risk.26 As pointed out by
Benoit et al. (2013), under certain conditions, the DCC-MES and beta tend to identify the same
systemically important financial institutions. This latter begs the question of why not rank
institutions/countries by the betas in the first place? Another concern, is that it leads to the
confusion between systemic and systematic risk.27 In addition, as we have shown throughout
this chapter, most of these market price-based SRIs tend to increase during market downturns,
which makes them to be highly procyclical. Indeed, this can be seen in Table 8.2, where the
R2’s shows an almost perfect cross-sectional correlation between the DCC-MES and beta, where
we can confirm this finding. That is, rankings of SIFIs with DCC-MES are equivalent to rank
countries with the highest betas.
Although the SRISK is a function of beta, it does not seem to be much sensitive to beta, in
26When we estimate cross-sectional regressions, we regress cross-country SRIs against cross-country betas at
each t. In contrast, in the time-series domain, we regress individual country SRIs against individual country beta
for that particular country. In both cases, the R2s are retrieved and subsequently averaged.
27Systematic risk is already accounted for in the banking regulation since the 1996 Amendment of the Basel
Accord as regulatory capital depends on the banks’s market risk VaR.
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Time-Series Cross-Section
MES EQ LTQ LVG BETA VaR EQ LTQ LVG BETA VaR
avg 0.039 0.082 0.181 0.631 0.508 0.037 0.036 0.018 1.000 0.387
std 0.045 0.113 0.152 0.350 0.274 0.047 0.048 0.018 0.000 0.266
max 0.183 0.479 0.491 1.000 0.874 0.183 0.201 0.588 1.000 0.852
min 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.107 0.035 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
∆CoVaR EQ LTQ LVG BETA VaR EQ LTQ LVG BETA VaR
avg 0.023 0.048 0.190 0.064 0.802 0.031 0.026 0.167 0.859 0.341
std 0.022 0.089 0.159 0.088 0.247 0.043 0.035 0.169 0.077 0.228
max 0.085 0.483 0.468 0.319 0.985 0.195 0.154 0.578 0.966 0.869
min 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.057 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.597 0.011
SRISK EQ LTQ LVG BETA VaR EQ LTQ LVG BETA VaR
avg 0.197 0.196 0.589 0.202 0.588 0.029 0.081 0.791 0.191 0.366
std 0.170 0.175 0.235 0.145 0.225 0.032 0.080 0.214 0.195 0.322
max 0.641 0.735 0.992 0.572 0.873 0.171 0.308 0.996 0.556 0.980
min 0.012 0.002 0.075 0.010 0.012 0.000 0.001 0.065 0.001 0.001
Table 8.2: R2 statistics (average, minimum, maximum and standard deviation) obtained from a re-
gression of a systemic risk measure (MES, ∆CoVaR and SRISK, on firm characteristics, namely, equity
capital (EQ), liabilities (LTQ), leverage (LVG), beta and VaR. We report two types of regressions:
time-series regressions for each of the 18 countries and cross-sectional regressions for the 33 data points
available (2005Q4-2013Q4). Bold figures indicate the explanatory variable with the highest R2’s. Au-
thors calculations.
b
both the cross-section and time-series, with an R2 of 0.191 and 0.201, respectively. However, the
SRISK would seem to be explained by leverage (LVG), with a cross-sectional R2 of 0.791. Cross-
sectional correlations are very important in this case, as these are the ones that provides with
the rankings at a given point in time. For this particular case, we have that ranking countries
based on SRISK would tend to coincide with ranking countries based on their total leverage.
We find that the DCC-∆CoVaR is explained in a 80% in the time-series by its VaR. A high
correlation in the time-series domain means that while rankings may differ, for a given country,
DCC-∆CoVaR is proportional to its VaR. This means that forecasting the future evolution of
the contribution of a country to systemic risk is equivalent to forecast its risk in isolation.This
provides evidence that most SRIs can be summarised by using standard risk measures. While we
have made use of a very limited sample, our findings are in line with those studies using larger
samples (Benoit et al., 2013).
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8.7 Concluding Remarks
The present study illustrates the use of financial network approach as an important tool for
assessing the stability of financial systems. Using Consolidated cross-border banking data from
the BIS and aggregated equity data from Bankscope for 18 countries, we apply the eigen-pair
method developed by Markose (2012) and Markose et al. (2012) to estimate systemic risk and
identify systemically important countries and countries with vulnerable banking systems.
The main contribution of this research is that it is one of the first to provide a cross-border
comparison of systemic risk indices based on market price-based data and the network approach
to cross-border liabilities. As opposed to most of SRIs in the literature, the eigen-pair method
based on bilateral netted exposures relative to equity capital of cross-border banks in national
banking systems, makes a clear distinction between systemic importance and systemic vulnera-
bility. Standard market price-based SRIs lack any threshold above which one can identify early
turning points in system stability. In contrast, the eigen-pair method provides a close-form metric
through the condition λmax(Θ) < ρ, where ρ is the regulatory capital buffer, obtained at length
in Appendix C.4. In particular, the use of this metric in a network setting has been proved to
have valuable early warning capabilities. In fact, the maximum eigenvalue of the stability matrix
Θ, peaks way before the Subprime crisis started. While we are aware of the fact there is some
statistical uncertainty due to the short sample length used in our analysis, λmax(Θ) seems to
indicates the 60% loss in equity capital witnessed during the 2007 Crisis (see, Figure 8.2 and
Appendix C.4). Moreover, the Left Eigenvector Centrality was able to highlight the increasing
vulnerability of the Portuguese banking system more than half a year before the collapse of one
of its major banks and also indicate problems in the Belgian banking system way before its major
financial group had to be bailed out.
The above results are compared with standard market price-based SRIs, namely, the DCC-
MES of Acharya et al. (2010), the SRISK of Acharya et al. (2012) and the DCC-∆CoVaR of
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011), using data on the MSCI Financials for the 18 countries of
our sample. These models have been deliberately estimated in their simplest form, avoiding
state variables as in the case of DCC-∆CoVaR and without estimating their predicted values.28
28Indeed, many of these authors have used bank balance sheet characteristics such as book leverage, profitability
(ROA), non-performing loans, whole-sale funding and mortgage loans as regressors to obtain forward measures
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All this with the idea to assess whether these indicators are able to reflect any risk build up
before a crisis unravels.29 Our main finding is that these measures exhibit an extremely high
contemporaneous correlation with market sentiment measures such as the VIX/VSTOXX, which
makes them highly procyclical, with little early warning capabilities. Likewise, most of them tend
to match perfectly market events and only during those times are able to identify systemically
important financial systems. In this context, these measure are useful only in the cross-sectional
domain, that is, to identify systemically important financial systems at a point in time. In
general, rankings based on these measures tend to agree on the dominance of the US and the UK
at the start of the crisis and also are able to reflect the interplay between Non-GIIPS Eurozone
and GIIPS countries. They also reflect the systemic importance of Ireland at the start of the
crisis, as well as the Netherlands during 2008Q4. However, they are not able to pick up the
increasing vulnerability of the Belgian banking system before the crisis nor the vulnerability of
the Portuguese banking system at the end of 2013. Surprisingly, the SRISK, which combines
leverage with market price-based data is not able to capture the increasing instability of the
countries’ banking system. A possible explanation for this, is that while leverage is increasing
in the run up of the crisis, the reliance on the market through the LRMES nullifies this effect,
preventing the SRISK to provide any early warning.
Following Benoit et al. (2013), we assess whether market price-based SRIs can be rationalised
by standard risk measures, such as beta, VaR and liabilities. First, we find that the DCC-MES
can be well explained by country betas in the cross-section, which is not any different to ranking
countries by their betas. Second, we find that the ∆CoVaR can be well explained by its VaR
in the time-series domain, which means that forecasting ∆CoVaR is not any different than
forecasting the risk of the country’s banking system in isolation with its VaR. Finally, we find
that the SRISK is highly explained by leverage. These findings are in line with those using larger
samples of financial institutions (Benoit et al., 2013).
The present study outlines the importance of the informational content of cross-border bal-
ance sheet data in a network setting for assessing global financial stability. Future research
of systemic risk (Idier et al., 2013).
29This is what Paul McCulley famously coined the term often known as the “Minsky Moment”, after Hyman
Minsky, to describe the point at which markets lose confidence in the sustainability of a process of ever greater
amounts of leverage provided against increasingly over-valued collateral. See McCulley (2008).
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should widen the scope of this methodology by including exposures of sectors within countries
and between sectors from different countries, as in the Castre´n and Rancan (2014) framework.
This would require the use of more sectoral data on cross-border exposures of banking systems.
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Chapter 9
Conclusions and Future Work
9.1 Goals of the Thesis
In this section, we summarise the goals of this thesis:
• We showed the benefits of using the RMT approach to financial correlations of stocks for
the FTSE 100. We tested the performance of the different filters used in the literature
and determine under which conditions the RMT-filtering will be more beneficial, using a
wide range of different tests, in terms of realised risk reduction, prediction accuracy and
risk-adjusted measures of portfolio returns.
• We extended the RMT-filtering to other correlation estimators, which may also be aﬄicted
by noise. Examples of these estimators are the Constant Conditional Correlation model
(CCC) of Bollerslev (1990), the Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) model of Engle
(2002) and the Regime-Switching Beta-CAPM correlation estimator, based on Ang and
Bekaert (2004). At least for the last two estimators, we were the first to apply the RMT-
filtering to large correlation matrices, with great improvements in realised risk estimates.
• We were the first to combine the RMT approach with a Vector Autoregressive approach
(VAR) to explore the macroeconomic determinants of the Chilean stock market. Here
the main goal was to build portfolios with different degrees of exposure to the systematic
risk embedded in the market portfolio with the help of RMT tools and then explore their
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macroeconomic determinants, by making a clear distinction between macroeconomic factors
that are local from those that are external.
• We used some RMT results for the stability of financial networks and assessed the dynamic
stability of a global banking network built from bilateral exposures of country banking
systems to debtor countries. Here we applied the eigen-pair method of Markose (2012), who
based on the work of May (1972, 1974) for random networks, develops an stability condition
based on the maximum eigenvalue λmax of a matrix of net bilateral exposures relative to
equity capital. Here we provided further evidence of the early warning capabilities of λmax,
when this surpasses a prespecified threshold. We also used the right and left associated
eigenvectors as a gauge for systemic importance and systemic vulnerability, respectively.
These metrics were then contrasted with recent systemic risk indices (SRIs) based on
market price-based data, namely, the DCC-MES of Acharya et al. (2010), the SRISK of
Acharya et al. (2012) and the DCC-∆CoVaR of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) in terms
of their early warning capabilities. We also provided a thorough analysis for these metrics,
in terms of their significance and their main determinants.
9.2 Concluding Remarks
In this section we review the main conclusions of this thesis from the point of view of an in-
stitutional investor considering implementing the RMT-filtering to clean noise from correlation
matrices and also from a central banker’s perspective seeking to monitor financial institutions
based on a network approach.
9.2.1 Sample Correlation Matrix
In this thesis we examined the application of two RMT filters to build portfolios of stocks in
the FTSE 100 and also the Chilean stock market. We studied the effect on realised risk forecast
of minimum variance portfolios using both, an in-sample and an out-of-sample analysis. Our
results are in good agreement with previous studies (Pafka et al., 2004; Daly et al., 2008, 2010)
in that the RMT-filtering is able to improve the forecast of the realised risk of minimum variance
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portfolios.
When filtering the sample correlation matrix we find that the RMT-filtering delivers the
lowest realised risk, the lowest volatility of prediction and the best prediction accuracy when
compared to the sample correlation estimator. This is particularly true in the absence of short-
sale constraints. We also find that the RMT-filtering performs the best for short estimation
windows, of the order of 6 months to 1 year of data (e.g., 1.6 ≤ Q ≤ 3.2). This is consistent with
what it has been found in the literature (see, Pafka et al., 2004; Daly et al., 2008). For higher
values of Q (e.g., 3.2 < Q < 6.5) these benefits would seem to be diminished, as the filtered
correlation matrix converges to the sample correlation matrix, when the sample size increases.
These results are robust to both, low and high volatility periods in financial markets. In the
former case, we find that there are no major differences between using the sample and filtered
correlation matrices. In the latter case, we find that the RMT-filtered correlation estimators
outperform the sample correlation estimator in both cumulated returns and Sharpe Ratios. We
also suggest a possible explanation for the success of the RMT-filtering. It would seem that
the portfolios built using the sample correlation matrix tend to take, on average, more extreme
positions and are more overexposed to short-selling than those built using the filtered correlation
matrix. These results are robust to both volatility periods.
9.2.2 Other Correlation Estimators
In terms of applicability of the RMT-filtering in a Regime Switching context, we find that the
spectrum in Regime 1 (low volatility regime), can be fitted relatively well by the Marc˘enko-
Pastur Distribution, which allows us to distinguish signals from noise in the correlation matrix
for Regime 1. In this context, filtering is only applied to the correlation matrix of Regime 1.
Recall that the Marc˘enko-Pastur Distribution is based on the assumption of normality of returns.
While this may be true for Regime 1, returns for Regime 2 are far from being normal. In terms
of cumulated returns, we find that the RMT-filtering enhances the performance of portfolio
returns in 30% for the regime-dependent correlations and 23%-17.7%, for the CAPM-based and
sample correlation estimators, respectively. In addition, the filtered regime-dependent correlation
estimators are able to deal better with downside risk than their unfiltered version, with more
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volatility in the upside than in the downside. We also find that the RMT-based filtering works
better for short estimation windows and when short-sale is permitted. These results are robust
to both filtering methods. In particular, the method of Plerou et al. (2002) (Method 1) delivers
better cumulated returns than the method of Laloux et al. (2000) (Method 2) across estimators.
Finally, from an asset allocation perspective, we find that the success of the filtered regime-
dependent correlation estimators comes from their ability to deliver more diversified portfolios
and also by placing less resources on Financials. This finding is common to all filtered correlation
estimators.
Regarding the conditional correlation estimators, we find that by far the best results are
obtained by the filtered versions CCC − (pRMT ) and the DCC − (pRMT ) models. Their realised
variance is significantly smaller compared to their Factor −GARCH versions and also smaller
than their unfiltered counterparts. The models using the RMT-filtering also produced portfolios
with the lowest mean squared error (MSE) and mean average percentage error between 52% and
54%. These results also stress the shortcomings of using the Exponentially Weighted Moving
Average (EWMA) models, which, despite their simplicity, can lead to a serious underestimation
of the underlying risks of minimum variance portfolios.
9.2.3 Combining RMT with VAR Analysis
In our study for the Chilean Stock Market. We use the statistically significant principal compo-
nents as predicted by the RMT approach and we are able to construct portfolios with different
degrees of exposure to the market portfolio. By contrasting this to a number of local and ex-
ternal macroeconomic variables, we compute impulse responses that allow us to identify the
global risk aversion as the main driver of the market returns, followed in importance by shocks
to the monthly rate of inflation and the country’s monetary policy rate. With the use of statis-
tically significant eigenvalues we are also able to construct portfolios, which are uncorrelated to
macroeconomic shocks.
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9.2.4 Systemic Risk in a Cross-Border Setting and the Role of Finan-
cial Networks
In this study we provide a cross-border comparison of systemic risk indices based on market price-
based data and the network approach to cross-border liabilities. As opposed to most of SRIs in
the literature, the eigen-pair method based on bilateral netted exposures relative to equity capital
of national banking systems, makes a clear distinction between systemic importance and systemic
vulnerability. Standard market price-based SRIs lack any threshold above which one can identify
early turning points in system stability as a whole. In contrast, the eigen-pair method provides
a close-form metric through the condition λmax(Θ) < ρ, where ρ is the regulatory capital buffer.
In particular, the use of this metric in a network setting has been proved to have valuable early
warning capabilities. In fact, the maximum eigenvalue of the stability matrix Θ, peaks way
before the Subprime crisis started. A remarkable finding is that λmax(Θ) for the networked
system indicates the 60% loss in equity capital witnessed during the 2007 Crisis. Moreover, the
Left Eigenvector Centrality was able to highlight the increasing vulnerability of the Portuguese
banking system more than half a year before the collapse of one of its major banks and indicate
problems in the Belgian banking system way before its major financial group had to be bailed
out.
9.3 Summary
In the majority of portfolio metrics analysed in this thesis, we have shown the benefits of the
RMT-filtering in producing portfolios with the lowest realised risk and also to correctly predicted
it. In the same vein, the associated portfolios were also found to deliver more diversified portfolios,
with greater cumulated returns and Sharpe Ratios. These portfolios were also found to deal better
with downside risk.
We also showed that the RMT-filtering can also be used to improve the performance of
estimated correlation matrices, as the case of the Constant Conditional Correlation (CCC) model
of Bollerslev (1990), the Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) models of Engle (2002) and
the Regime-Switching Beta-CAPM correlation estimator, based on Ang and Bekaert (2004).
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These results hold in the absence of short-sale constraints and when using relatively short
estimation windows (usually, 6 months to 1 year of data), as in this case the RMT-filtering
performs the best.
Finally, we showed how the stability condition seminally derived in May (1972, 1974) for
random networks and later on extended by Markose (2012) can be used to build a systemic
risk index with great early warning on the growing instability of cross-border banking flows.
As opposed to market price-based SRIs, the eigen-pair method delivers a threshold for which
the stability of the networked system can be assessed. This outlines the importance of the
informational content of cross-border balance sheet data in a network setting for assessing global
financial stability.
9.4 Future Work
A number of interesting areas of research came along with the development of this thesis. From
a theoretical perspective, for example, recent evidence suggests that meaningful correlations
can be measured in the bulk of the MP eigenvalue spectrum (Burda et al., 2004; Burda and
Jurkiewicz, 2004; Malevergne and Sornette, 2004; Kwapie`n et al., 2006). This happens because
we are assuming that returns are normally distributed, which is not the case in real life. Indeed,
returns in financial markets are not normally distributed and exhibit a number of features, such
as fat tails, volatility clustering and non-stationarity. Recent literature has been improving these
matters by developing extensions of the MP distribution to account for these phenomena (Potters
et al., 2005; Bouchaud and Potters, 2009). In this context, an interesting line of future research
could be focused on extending the RMT approach to more fat-tailed distributions.
In a more practical setting, it would be interesting to study the correspondence between the
stocks privileged by the RMT-filtering with those of a Fama and French (1992) factor model.
To see whether these correspond to low price to earnings stocks (value stocks), high market
capitalisation stocks (size stocks) and high divident stocks (growth stocks). This would provide
us with some insights into how noisy correlations are in these different segments.
Finally, it would be an interesting line of research the analysis of correlation-based networks
in the spirit of Song et al. (2011). For example, centrality measures based on these networks
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could be used to identify stocks that are less central in the network to design optimal trading
strategies (Pozzi et al., 2013).
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Appendix A
Tables & Figures from Chapter 5
164
Company Abbreviation Classification Sign
PRU LN Equity PRU Life Insurance +
OML LN Equity OML Life Insurance +
ADN LN Equity ADN Financial Services +
SDRC LN Equity SDRC Financial Services +
LGEN LN Equity LGEN Life Insurance +
AV/ LN Equity AV Life Insurance +
LLOY LN Equity LLOY Banks +
SDR LN Equity SDR Financial Services +
EMG LN Equity EMG Financial Services +
CSCG LN Equity CSCG Real Estate Investments Trusts +
BLT LN Equity BLT Mining +
HSBA LN Equity HSBA Banks +
RSA LN Equity RSA Nonlife Insurance +
STAN LN Equity STAN Banks +
BARC LN Equity BARC Banks +
WPP LN Equity WPP Media +
IAG LN Equity IAG Travel and Leisure +
RBS LN Equity RBS Banks +
ANTO LN Equity ANTO Mining +
LAND LN Equity LAND Real Estate Investments Trusts +
AAL LN Equity AAL Mining +
WOS LN Equity WOS Support Services +
BLND LN Equity BLND Real Estate Investments Trusts +
SAB LN Equity SAB Beverages +
UU/ LN Equity UU Gas, Water and Multiutilities +
HMSO LN Equity HMSO Real Estate Investments Trusts +
NXT LN Equity NXT General Retailers +
DGE LN Equity DGE Beverages +
REX LN Equity REX General Industrials +
PSON LN Equity PSON Media +
RR/ LN Equity RR Aerospace and Defense +
CPI LN Equity CPI Support Services +
SVT LN Equity SVT Gas, Water and Multiutilities +
IMI LN Equity IMI Industrial Engineering +
WTB LN Equity WTB Travel & Leisure +
MGGT LN Equity MGGT Aerospace and Defense +
WEIR LN Equity WEIR Industrial Engineering +
IAP LN Equity IAP Financial Services +
TSCO LN Equity TSCO Food & Drug Retailers +
BT/A LN Equity BTA Fixed Line Telecommunications +
MKS LN Equity MKS General Retailers +
BNZL LN Equity BNZL Support Services +
REL LN Equity REL Media +
AGK LN Equity AGK Support Services +
AZN LN Equity AZN Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology +
SMIN LN Equity SMIN General Industrials +
MRW LN Equity MRW Food and Drug Retailers +
ARM LN Equity ARM Technology Hardware and Equipment +
JMAT LN Equity JMAT Chemicals +
BP/ LN Equity BP Oil & Gas Producers +
ABF LN Equity ABF Food Producers +
SHP LN Equity SHP Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology +
BA/ LN Equity BA Aerospace and Defense +
CRH LN Equity CRH Construction and Materials +
SRP LN Equity SRP Support Services +
SGE LN Equity SGE Software & Computer Services +
SSE LN Equity SSE Electricity +
VOD LN Equity VOD Mobile Telecommunications +
RDSB LN Equity RDSB Oil & Gas Producers +
AMEC LN Equity AMEC Oil Equipment & Services +
CRDA LN Equity CRDA Chemicals +
KGF LN Equity KGF General Retailers +
RIO LN Equity RIO Mining +
GKN LN Equity GKN Automobile & Parts +
SN/ LN Equity SN Health Care Equipment and Services +
BATS LN Equity BATS Tobacco +
CNA LN Equity CNA Gas, Water & Multiutilities +
NG/ LN Equity NG Gas, Water & Multiutilities +
ULVR LN Equity ULVR Food Producers +
BG/ LN Equity BG Oil & Gas Producers +
BSY LN Equity BSY Media +
(a) Largest Eigenvector Components - Year 2007.
Company Abbreviation Classification Sign
CSCG LN Equity CSCG Real Estate Investments Trusts +
LAND LN Equity LAND Real Estate Investments Trusts +
LLOY LN Equity LLOY Banks +
HMSO LN Equity HMSO Real Estate Investments Trusts +
RBS LN Equity RBS Banks +
BLND LN Equity BLND Real Estate Investments Trusts +
AV/ LN Equity AV Life Insurance +
BARC LN Equity BARC Banks +
IAG LN Equity IAG Travel & Leisure +
PRU LN Equity PRU Life Insurance +
LGEN LN Equity LGEN Life Insurance +
OML LN Equity OML Life Insurance +
WOS LN Equity WOS Support Services +
NXT LN Equity NXT General Retailers +
KGF LN Equity KGF General Retailers +
ABF LN Equity ABF Food Producers +
TSCO LN Equity TSCO Food & Drug Retailers +
SHP LN Equity SHP Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology +
ADN LN Equity ADN Financial Services +
MKS LN Equity MKS General Retailers +
EMG LN Equity EMG Financial Services +
RSA LN Equity RSA Nonlife Insurance +
CRDA LN Equity CRDA Chemicals +
AZN LN Equity AZN Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology +
RRS LN Equity RRS Mining -
ANTO LN Equity ANTO Mining -
BLT LN Equity BLT Mining -
AAL LN Equity AAL Mining -
RIO LN Equity RIO Mining -
BP/ LN Equity BP Oil & Gas Producers -
BG/ LN Equity BG Oil & Gas Producers -
RDSB LN Equity RDSB Oil & Gas Producers -
(b) Second Largest Eigenvector Components -
Year 2007.
Company Abbreviation Classification Sign
BARC LN Equity BARC Banks +
RBS LN Equity RBS Banks +
HSBA LN Equity HSBA Banks +
GSK LN Equity GSK Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology +
AZN LN Equity AZN Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology +
LLOY LN Equity LLOY Banks +
BATS LN Equity BATS Tobacco +
KGF LN Equity KGF General Retailers -
SMIN LN Equity SMIN General Industrials -
JMAT LN Equity JMAT Chemicals -
ARM LN Equity ARM Technology Hardware & Equipment -
CPI LN Equity CPI Support Services -
NXT LN Equity NXT General Retailers -
CRDA LN Equity CRDA Chemicals -
WTB LN Equity WTB Travel & Leisure -
BA/ LN Equity BA Aerospace and Defense -
IAP LN Equity IAP Financial Services -
TLW LN Equity TLW Oil & Gas Producers -
REX LN Equity REX General Industrials -
BNZL LN Equity BNZL Support Services -
AGK LN Equity AGK Support Services -
RRS LN Equity RRS Mining -
BLT LN Equity BLT Mining -
ADN LN Equity ADN Financial Services -
MGGT LN Equity MGGT Aerospace and Defense -
RIO LN Equity RIO Mining -
SRP LN Equity SRP Support Services -
IMI LN Equity IMI Industrial Engineering -
AMEC LN Equity AMEC Oil Equipment & Services -
SDRC LN Equity SDRC Financial Services -
WEIR LN Equity WEIR Industrial Engineering -
ANTO LN Equity ANTO Mining -
SDR LN Equity SDR Financial Services -
AAL LN Equity AAL Mining -
(c) Third Largest Eigenvector Components -
Year 2007.
Company Abbreviation Classification Sign
ANTO LN Equity ANTO Mining +
AAL LN Equity AAL Mining +
BLT LN Equity BLT Mining +
RBS LN Equity RBS Banks +
RIO LN Equity RIO Mining +
BARC LN Equity BARC Banks +
CRH LN Equity CRH Construction & Materials +
NXT LN Equity NXT General Retailers +
LGEN LN Equity LGEN Life Insurance +
KGF LN Equity KGF General Retailers +
LLOY LN Equity LLOY Banks +
GKN LN Equity GKN Automobile & Parts +
WOS LN Equity WOS Support Services +
ABF LN Equity ABF Food Producers -
GSK LN Equity GSK Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology -
SAB LN Equity SAB Beverages -
SN/ LN Equity SN Health Care Equipment and Services -
CNA LN Equity CNA Gas, Water & Multiutilities -
IAP LN Equity IAP Financial Services -
AZN LN Equity AZN Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology -
MGGT LN Equity MGGT Aerospace and Defense -
TSCO LN Equity TSCO Food & Drug Retailers -
BT/A LN Equity BT/A Fixed Line Telecommunications -
BA/ LN Equity BA Aerospace and Defense -
UU/ LN Equity UU Gas, Water & Multiutilities -
MRW LN Equity MRW Food & Drug Retailers -
ULVR LN Equity ULVR Food Producers -
RB/ LN Equity RB Household Goods & Home Construction -
VOD LN Equity VOD Mobile Telecommunications -
IMT LN Equity IMT Tobacco -
SVT LN Equity SVT Gas, Water & Multiutilities -
DGE LN Equity DGE Beverages -
SSE LN Equity SSE Electricity -
BATS LN Equity BATS Tobacco -
NG/ LN Equity NG Gas, Water & Multiutilities -
(d) Fourth Largest Eigenvector Components -
Year 2007.
Company Abbreviation Classification Sign
SDRC LN Equity SDRC Financial Services +
VOD LN Equity VOD Mobile Telecommunications +
SDR LN Equity SDR Financial Services -
(e) Smallest Eigenvector Components - Year
2007.
Company Abbreviation Classification Sign
AAL LN Equity AAL Mining +
RDSB LN Equity RDSB Oil & Gas Producers +
VOD LN Equity VOD Mobile Telecommunications +
RIO LN Equity RIO Mining +
RBS LN Equity RBS Banks +
GSK LN Equity GSK Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology +
BARC LN Equity BARC Banks +
HSBA LN Equity HSBA Banks +
BP/ LN Equity BP Oil & Gas Producers +
SDR LN Equity SDR Financial Services +
BG/ LN Equity BG Oil & Gas Producers +
TSCO LN Equity TSCO Food & Drug Retailers +
BLT LN Equity BLT Mining +
SDRC LN Equity SDRC Financial Services -
HMSO LN Equity HMSO Real Estate Investments Trusts -
(f) Second Smallest Eigenvector Components -
Year 2007.
Table A.1: Significant Participating Firms in Each Eigenvector for 2007.
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Appendix B
Tables & Figures from Chapter 7
V IX P coppert x
IMACEC
t pit rt G
1
t G
2
t G
3
t G
81
t G
82
t G
83
t
Mean 22.028 1.512 0.526 0.258 3.803 0.110 -0.053 -0.015 -0.005 0.005 -0.009
Median 21.090 0.558 0.651 0.220 3.500 0.090 -0.031 0.004 -0.003 0.006 -0.005
Maximum 59.890 35.424 7.215 1.110 8.250 1.212 0.698 0.674 0.109 0.102 0.089
Minimum 10.420 -36.471 -5.830 -1.029 0.500 -0.864 -0.770 -0.674 -0.138 -0.114 -0.151
Std. Dev. 9.139 8.954 1.587 0.383 2.004 0.325 0.210 0.182 0.046 0.045 0.038
Skewness 1.415 -0.158 -0.197 -1.029 0.185 0.082 -0.353 0.341 -0.185 -0.283 -0.519
Kurtosis 5.772 5.883 7.176 3.587 2.329 4.159 5.425 5.866 3.321 2.657 4.346
Jarque-Bera 80.447 46.275 90.184 2.863 3.010 7.021 32.687 44.472 1.233 2.243 14.795
Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.238 0.222 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.540 0.326 0.001
Sum 2709 199.665 64.674 34.388 467.750 13.476 -6.499 -1.796 -0.623 0.581 -1.061
Sum Sq. Dev. 10190 10502.89 307.350 19.399 489.907 12.904 5.370 4.050 0.253 0.243 0.180
Observations 123 123 123 123 123 123 123 123 123 123 123
Table B.1: Descriptive statistics of Variables used in the VAR estimation. Note: Sample period
from 2000M11 to 2011M01. Authors calculations.
1. V IX: Is the Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index. Source: Bloomberg.
2. PCoppert : Is the seasonally adjusted monthly change of the London Metal Exchange copper
price. Source: Bloomberg.
3. xIMACECt : Is the monthly change of the IMACEC (monthly indicator of economic activity
which cover 90% of goods and services included in the GDP). Source: Chilean Central
Bank.
4. rt: Is the Chilean Central Bank Monetary Policy Rate. Source: Chilean Central Bank.
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Company Business Sector
SQM A Mining
ENERSIS Energy
ANDINA B Food and beverage
FALABELLA Commerce and retail
VAPORES Shipping
ENDESA Energy
ORO BLANCO Mining
CAP Metalmechanics
CALICHERA A Mining
ANDINA A Food and beverage
CMPC Forest products, cellulose
CCU Food and beverage
COPEC Energy and natural resources
ENTEL Telecommunications
MADECO Metalmechanics
BCI Banking and Financial Services
LAN Airline and cargo
COLBUN Energy
SAN PEDRO Food and beverage
QUINENCO Conglomerate
CINTAC Metalmechanics
ALMENDRAL Various investments
BSANTANDER Banking and Financial Services
CONCHATORO Food and beverage
SMCHILE B Banking and Financial Services
GASCO Energy and natural resources
INFORSA Forest products, cellulose
PARAUCO Commerce and retail
AGUASA Water resources
CRISTALES Plastics and glasses
CHILE Banking and Financial Services
CEMENTOS Construction
IANSA Food and beverage
CGE Energy
(a) Largest Eigenvector
Company Business Sector
CALICHERAA Mining
ORO BLANCO Mining
SQM A Mining
NORTEGRAN Investments and Real Estate
SQM B Mining
ANDINA A Food and Beverage
ANDINA B Food and Beverage
CMPC Forest Products related
IANSA Agro-Industrial products
ECL Energy
COLBUN Energy
CAMPOS Agro-Industrial products
CINTAC Metalmechanics
INFORSA Forest Products related
COPEC Energy and Natural Resources
(b) Second Largest Eigenvector
Company Business Sector
CAMPOS Agro-Industrial products
IANSA Agro-Industrial products
NORTEGRAN Investments and Real Estate
ORO BLANCO Mining
CALICHERAA Mining
SM CHILE E Mining
ECL Energy
QUINTEC Investments and Real Estate
NAVARINO Transport and Logistics
EMBONOR B Food and Beverage
PUCOBRE A Mining
SQM B Mining
GENER Energy
PROVIDA Pension Fund
SOMELA Metalmechanics
CINTAC Metalmechanics
ENERSIS Energy
COPEC Energy and Natural Resources
ENDESA Energy
ENTEL Telecommunications
CMPC Forest Products related
MADECO Mining Related
BSANTANDER Banking and Financial Services
FALABELLA Commerce and Retail
LAN Airline Services
CGE Energy
ALMENDRAL Investments and Real Estate
CAP Metalmechanics
(a) Third Largest Eigenvector
Company Business Sector
CGE Energy
ELECMETAL Metalmechanics
KOPOLAR Food and Beverage
ORO BLANCO Mining
EMBONOR B Food and Beverage
MARINSA Investments and Real Estate
SECURITY Banking and Financial Services
CAP Metalmechanics
ANDINA A Food and Beverage
CALICHERAA Mining
ENERSIS Energy
CHILE Banking and Financial Services
BANMEDICA Investments (health related)
NORTEGRAN Investments and Real Estate
PARAUCO Commerce and Retail
BSANTANDER Banking and Financial Services
EMBONOR A Food and Beverage
EMILIANA Food and Beverage
SM CHILE E Banking and Financial Services
ENDESA Energy
TELCOY Telecommunications
CINTAC Metalmechanics
CONCHATORO Food and Beverage
FOSFOROS Matches producers
(b) Smallest Eigenvector
Table B.2: Significant Participating Firms in Each Eigenvector
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Appendix C
Additional Analyses from
Chapter 8
C.1 Proof Equation 4.1
For this result in Equation 4.1, note for any real non-negative vector U1 in (3.31), the q power of
the matrix denoted as Θ′q, can be solved iteratively using the infinity norm of the vector Θ′qUq
denoted as ||Θ′qUq||∞ to normalise the vector as in the power iteration equation:
Uq+1 =
Θ′Uq
||Θ′Uq||∞ =
Θ′qU1
||Θ′qU1||∞ . (C.1)
The iteration is said to have converged at q + 1 when Uq+1 = Uq = V
L with an epsilon
margin of error. The vector V L is the left eigenvector of the matrix and ||Θ′qV L||∞ = λmax(Θ′).
Multiplying through by λmax(Θ
′) in the power iteration equation, we have the eigenvalue equa-
tion Θ′V L = λmaxV L ≡ Θ′qU1. This leads to the result in Equation 4.1. That is, the potential
capital loss for country i is given by ui,# ∼= λmax(Θ′)vi,∞.
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C.2 Simulation Algorithm for LRMES
Here we describe the simulation based procedure developed by Brownlees and Engle (2012) to
construct the LRMES forecasts. That is, we are interested in computing the LRMES of country
i on period T at horizon h, conditional on a global market decline equal to C (which for this
case we set it to 40%),
LRMESi,T = ET (Ri,T+1:T+h|Rm,T+1:T+h < C). (C.2)
The authors assume parameters to be known while in practice they use estimated parameters
using all of the information available up to time T .
1. Construct the GARCH-DCC standardised innovations
m,t =
rm,t
σm,t
and ξi,t =
(
ri,t
σi,t
− ρi,t rm,t
σm,t
)
/
√
1− ρ2i,t, (C.3)
for each t = 1, ..., T . Notice that by construction m,t and ξi,t are i.i.d ∼ F(0,1).
2. Sample with replacement Sxh pairs of standardised innovations [m,tξi,t]
′. Use these to
construct S pseudo samples of GARCH-DCC innovations from period T + 1 to period
T + h, that is
 sm,T+t
ξsi,T+t

t=1,...,h
s = 1, ..., S. (C.4)
3. Feed the pseudo samples of GARCH-DCC innovations into the DCC and GARCH filters
respectively using as initial conditions the last values of the conditional correlation ρi,T and
variances σ2m,T and σ
2
i,T . This step delivers S pseudo samples of GARCH-DCC returns from
period T + 1 to period T + h conditional on the realised process up to time T , that is
 rsm,T+t
rsi,T+t

t=1,...,h
|FT s = 1, ..., S. (C.5)
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4. Construct the multi-period arithmetic firm return of each pseudo sample
Rsi,T+1:T+h = exp
[
h∑
t=1
rsi,T+t
]
− 1, (C.6)
and compute the multi-period arithmetic market return Rsm,T+1:T+h analogously.
5. Compute the LRMES as the Monte Carlo average of the simulated multi-period returns
conditional on the systemic event
LRMESi,T =
∑S
s=1Ri,T+1:T+hI{Rm,T+1:T+h < C}∑S
s=1 I{Rm,T+1:T+h < C}
. (C.7)
C.3 Breakdown of the Core Global Banking System: SRISK#
As we can see from Figure C.1, leverage was, on average, already high of the order of 20 for the 18
national banking systems during 2005Q4, peaking at 23 in 2008Q4. If we think of the minimum
leverage ratio stipulated in Basel III of 3%1, which is equivalent to a leverage of the order of
33. This would imply that these national banking systems, on average, exhibit lower leverage
than what Basel III expects from them. However, in our sample, there are countries such as
Ireland that exhibit a leverage well above 33, prior to the crisis, reaching a peak of 51, during
2008Q4. In contrast, there are countries such as Canada that exhibit a leverage of 6 over the
entire sample. This definitively, tends to drive the results. As suggested by Engle et al. (2014),
the SRISK could be weighted by the market value of equity. However, this neglects the systemic
importance of many GIIPS countries, as they carry a very small weight in the overall equity and
these countries were precisely the ones that had the greatest potential to trigger capital losses in
the international banking system.
In addition, the LRMES remains subdued at 25% right up to 2007Q1, peaking to 76% during
2008Q4. This compensates the weight of leverage in the SRISK# formula, therefore, preventing
this latter from picking up in the run up to the crisis.
1Under Basel III, “leverage ratio” is defined as the ratio between Tier 1 capital and the bank’s average total
consolidated assets (sum of the exposures of all assets and non-balance sheet items).
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Figure C.1: Average Equity, Leverage, LRMES, and SRISK#
(a) EQUITY (b) LEVERAGE
(c) LRMES (d) SRISK#
C.4 Estimation Methodology for the Capital Threshold for
Losses
In Section 3.5 we argued that the stability of the networked system is given by the condition
λmax(Θ) < ρ, where ρ is the capital loss threshold. These thresholds have to be carefully
specified. In this appendix we determine how the absolute capital threshold, ρ, that works as a
buffer against losses relates to the regulatory Tier 1 Capital requirement.
Based on the Basel II criteria, the capital inadequacy in a bank from losses of receivables
from counterparties can be defined as follows:
EquityCapital − LGD
RWA
< 10% = TRWA. (C.8)
Here LGD is loss given default, which is the magnitude of likely losses on the exposure, usually
expressed as a percentage of the exposure and RWA is risk weighted assets. This condition states
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that equity capital minus losses should be greater than 10% of risk weighted assets. However,
as the practical aspects of avoiding insolvency requires recapitalization, it is important to see
the equivalence of the above Basel rule with permissible LGD as function of Equity capital,
denoted as TC . This equivalence is important as it hints at the permissible loss the country
should experience before being considered in distress. If we assume that this condition is exactly
met at TC · Equitycapital = LGD, by substituting this into C.8 when the condition in C.8 is
exactly met, we have:
TC = MAX
(
0, 1− TRWA RWA
EquityCapital
)
. (C.9)
For instance, when EquityCapitalRWA = 10% = TRWA, we have TC = 0, which means that there
is no room to lose anything and the bank/banking system requires recapitalization. In contrast,
if we allow a relatively small number for EquityCapitalRWA = 12% but above TRWA = 10%, we
have TC = 16.6%. What this implies is that when banks/banking systems have an average
Equity Capital/RWA of 12%, then by C.8, the permissible loss that can be sustained before
being considered in distress is 16.6% of Equity Capital. Based on this, we conclude that the
Basel II criteria of capital adequacy can be highly misleading in terms of signalling distress in
the system. In Table C.2 we calculated TC for every country for all the years and we plot the
minimum of TC together with λmax(Θ). We also provide the number of banking systems that
require recapitalization as indicated by their TC for every quarter. Here we observe that before
the GFC, capital buffers were very low ranging between 14% to 9% during 2008Q4. This period
also coincides with more than the half of the national banking systems requiring recapitalization.
This trend is reversed as we approach 2013Q4, where banks started to build their capital buffers
from historical lows to 9% to more than 35% in 2013Q4.
In general, there are growing concerns about the reliability of the denominator of capital
ratios, similar to the previous loss of confidence in the numerator in the run-up to the 2007
financial crisis. Back then, market participance moved away from regulatory measures2 and fo-
cused instead on capital measures, which better reflected true loss-absorbing capital. While Basel
III attempted to correct the main deficiencies of the denominator by adopting more stringent
2e.g., Core Tier 1 in Europe and Tangible Common Equity or Tier 1 Common in the US.
172
definitions of capital, there is an increasing loss of confidence in the way that banks calculate
their RWA (particularly the ones using Basel II advanced IRB approach). This is why some
market participants prefer to rely on unweighted capital measures to assess solvency or to re-
quire a higher capital ratio to compensate for the possible understatement of RWAs (Lesle´ and
Avramova, 2012). For our analysis, this suggests that the Tier 1/RWA ratio is overstated and
therefore we should expect TC to be much smaller in case RWAs were properly calculated.
Figure C.2: Note: For quarters between 2011Q4-2012Q4 the Maximum Eigenvalue, λmax (right
axis), is calculated for CGBS network without Greece, when it was virtually bankrupt with
negative equity capital in banking system. Nonetheless, the main source of instability is given
by the GIIPS countries.
C.5 Cross-Border Flows Breakdown used to Rescale λmax
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Figure C.3: Cross-border liabilities by type of counterparty. Left panel shows cross-border debt
liabilities by pairwise classiffication of borrower and lender. “Bank to bank” refers to cross-
border claims of banks on other banks (BIS banking statistics table 7A minus 7B). “Bank to
non-bank” refers to cross-border claims of banks on non-banks (BIS table 7B). Claims of non-
banks are from BIS international debt security statistics, tables 11A and 11B). The right panel
shows cross-border debt liabilities of developed countries according to BIS classiffication. Source:
Bruno and Shin (2015a).
Daily Returns MSCI Financials and World Leverage = Liabilities+Equity
Equity
Country Mean Std Max Min Mean Std Max Min
Australia 0.00% 1.39% 9.14% -8.87% 17.65 0.93 18.82 16.01
Austria -0.05% 2.60% 17.13% -18.53% 16.50 1.19 19.87 14.73
Belgium -0.06% 2.36% 16.70% -34.30% 22.25 2.97 29.60 17.66
Canada 0.01% 1.41% 11.70% -13.12% 6.76 4.59 12.09 2.12
France -0.01% 2.34% 17.05% -11.80% 23.83 2.25 29.76 19.44
Germany -0.01% 2.03% 16.08% -12.50% 25.88 3.62 32.81 17.93
Greece -0.16% 4.33% 25.74% -34.97% 36.44 36.33 105.63 12.80
India 0.04% 2.18% 19.23% -13.82% 14.56 0.6 16.14 13.82
Ireland -0.17% 5.26% 38.53% -56.65% 32.15 9.01 51.96 17.82
Italy -0.04% 2.22% 15.60% -10.49% 14.83 1.02 16.82 13.60
Japan -0.02% 2.00% 14.49% -12.40% 19.80 1.34 23.39 17.88
Netherlands -0.02% 3.08% 21.46% -20.31% 25.35 2.91 32.30 18.50
Portugal -0.09% 2.44% 15.28% -13.17% 21.35 1.71 24.60 18.46
Spain -0.02% 2.17% 19.55% -12.25% 18.34 1.24 21.84 15.92
Sweden 0.02% 1.98% 12.84% -9.50% 23.01 1.77 26.53 18.57
Switzerland -0.03% 2.11% 16.11% -11.75% 21.22 1.78 24.82 17.94
Turkey 0.02% 2.35% 15.41% -11.71% 9.26 1.54 16.00 8.27
United Kingdom -0.02% 1.99% 17.61% -13.43% 25.69 4.83 39.86 19.20
United States -0.01% 2.34% 16.04% -17.80% 13.43 1.32 15.60 11.64
MSCI World 0.01% 1.16% 8.90% -7.37% - - - -
Table C.1: Source: Bloomberg for the MSCI and Bankscope for Leverage. Authors calculations
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Country Equity (in Billion USD) RWA (in Billion USD)
Mean Std Max Min Mean Std Max Min
Australia 165.34 66.01 247.48 32.34 1132.7 324.5 1506.3 261.0
Austria 131.19 23.06 154.06 63.54 726.5 181.1 1042.7 317.8
Belgium 145.89 17.63 194.46 110.41 811.9 215.1 1107.6 401.9
Canada 242.60 136.16 435.96 94.27 573.4 640.8 1472.4 3.0
France 822.30 189.27 1141.83 401.32 3792.7 762.1 4660.4 2146.9
Germany 759.67 245.53 1161.15 247.19 3962.2 1197.2 5909.3 902.8
Greece 24.98 12.82 48.69 5.94 272.3 77.5 460.0 121.0
India 119.16 42.44 177.35 49.86 408.2 262.2 1158.5 7.7
Ireland 59.34 11.94 77.92 37.89 446.2 107.8 627.0 308.0
Italy 395.21 59.94 470.74 223.98 2473.9 515.9 2930.5 1180.4
Japan 1211.97 372.44 1674.03 673.06 4301.7 2996.4 8356.2 810.2
Netherlands 269.06 39.57 335.77 166.61 1242.9 135.1 1511.2 1034.2
Portugal 35.33 6.35 45.89 19.39 357.1 49.4 403.8 225.7
Spain 267.24 76.14 407.98 124.90 2192.8 492.7 2798.3 1108.4
Sweden 96.01 26.41 149.44 49.16 769.4 80.2 865.0 526.8
Switzerland 266.90 45.07 366.91 179.67 814.6 253.7 1485.9 428.3
Turkey 79.84 28.94 129.63 26.13 351.7 204.8 703.0 25.7
United Kingdom 1076.48 244.07 1441.59 637.18 5985.7 749.7 7014.2 3896.0
United States 2801.10 671.71 3765.27 1774.46 13779.2 3037.9 17590.3 7611.9
Table C.2: Equity and Risk Weighted Assets (RWA, in Billion USD) from Bankscope. Authors
calculations
Country Tier 1 Capital (in Billion USD) Tier 1 Capital /RWA (%)
Mean Std Max Min Mean Std Max Min
Australia 104.64 41.30 157.36 22.19 8.97% 1.28% 10.96% 7.15%
Austria 88.89 28.20 120.03 26.25 11.97% 1.64% 14.13% 8.26%
Belgium 89.96 30.10 127.12 34.36 11.25% 3.37% 15.72% 6.05%
Canada 77.73 86.00 190.63 0.48 16.47% 3.59% 27.04% 12.22%
France 461.74 182.22 677.44 119.30 11.6% 3.07% 15.81% 5.55%
Germany 436.17 211.98 848.40 67.92 10.42% 2.64% 14.49% 7.29%
Greece 17.71 9.59 34.08 1.60 6.43% 2.64% 11.20% 0.6%
India 61.60 33.92 120.61 10.58 28.7% 33.6% 136.7% 10.41%
Ireland 45.75 9.97 61.43 25.52 10.47% 2.16% 16.88% 8.07%
Italy 231.46 55.55 282.98 100.93 9.34% 1.18% 11.40% 7.86%
Japan 832.05 239.20 1153.12 444.09 31.40% 19.82% 67.74% 11.40%
Netherlands 152.02 24.84 222.37 113.06 12.37% 2.29% 15.24% 8.80%
Portugal 32.83 9.63 46.85 16.31 9.06% 1.92% 12.76% 6.69%
Spain 213.70 71.80 304.70 86.88 9.50% 1.52% 12.95% 7.65%
Sweden 82.37 22.64 114.84 41.81 10.63% 2.52% 14.22% 7.47%
Switzerland 146.84 51.73 269.24 74.74 17.93% 2.04% 20.11% 13.63%
Turkey 59.86 23.63 93.65 17.10 22.58% 12.47% 66.46% 12.77%
United Kingdom 820.21 239.23 1093.89 319.62 13.42% 2.70% 16.52% 8.20%
United States 1623.80 482.37 2316.40 874.23 11.61% 1.19% 13.17% 9.30%
Table C.3: Tier 1 Capital and Risk Weighted Assets (RWA, in Billion USD) from Bankscope.
Authors calculations
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C.6 Alternative Measures of Systemic Instability from Net-
work Theory
A hypothetical disconnection of the network is expected to lead to a global economic crisis, since
it disconnects international markets (Joseph et al., 2014). To measure this effect in the Global
Banking Network, we introduce the concept of algebraic connectivity of a graph, which is defined
as the real-part of the smallest non-zero eigenvalue of the normalised Laplacian, which is defined
as:
LN = I −D−1in ·WT , (C.10)
where D−1in = diag(1/s
in
1 , ..., 1/s
in
N ) is the diagonal matrix consisting of all node’s instrengths.
The Laplacian matrix has exactly one zero eigenvalue for every strongly connected component.
A graph is said to be strongly connected, if there is a directed path between any pair of nodes
(i, j). If such a path does not exists for all node pairs, but the underlying undirected graph is
connected, the network is said to be weakly-connected. For the case of a single strongly connected
component, the emphalgebraic connectivity, λ1 is the second smallest eigenvalue of LN . It is
a measure for the robustness of a network against edge/node removal. This is because a zero-
value means the decomposition of the network into two disconnected components. The results
of this exercise are in Figure C.4, where we plot the algebraic connectivity, λ1 together with
λmax for the whole sample. Here we observe that whenever λmax spikes up, there is a tweak
in the algebraic connectivity. This means that before a financial turmoil unravels, the network
becomes more disconnected. While this could be considered as an early warning, the absence of
a proper threshold unables to pinpoint exactly when system stability is at stake. In contrast,
lambdamax depicts growing instability and there is an specified threshold, through the condition
λmax(Θ
′) < ρ above which we can consider the system to be unstable.
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Figure C.4: Algebraic connectivity, λ1 and λmax. Author Calculations.
Figure C.5: Algebraic connectivity, λ1 and λmax, excluding Greece for 2011Q4-2012Q4. Author
Calculations.
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BIS Bank for International Settlement
CSAMP Sample Correlation Matrix
CSAMP1 Filtered Sample Correlation Matrix by keeping the Largest Eigenvalue
CSAMP−RMT1 Filtered Sample Correlation Matrix by the method of Plerou et al (2002)
CSAMP−RMT2 Filtered Sample Correlation Matrix by the method of Laloux et al (2000)
CCAPM Sample Correlation Matrix
CCAPM−RMT1 Filtered CAPM Correlation Matrix by the method of Plerou et al (2002)
CCAPM−RMT2 Filtered CAPM Correlation Matrix by the method of Laloux et al (2000)
CRS Sample Correlation Matrix
CRS−RMT1 Filtered Regime-Switching Correlation Matrix by the method of Plerou et al (2002)
CRS−RMT2 Filtered Regime-Switching Correlation Matrix by the method of Laloux et al (2000)
CAPM Capital Asset Pricing Model
CCC Constant Conditional Correlation
CDF Cumulative Distribution Function
CGBSN Core Global Banking System Network
DCC-MES Dynamic Conditional Correlation Marginal Expected Shortfall
DCC-∆CoVaR Dynamic Conditional Correlation Delta Value-at-Risk
∆CoVaR Delta Conditional Value-at-Risk
EQ Equity Capital
EWMA Exponentially Weighted Moving Average
FPE Final Prediction Error
GFC Global Financial Crisis
GIIPS Greece-Ireland-Italy-Portugal-Spain
γmax Gamma Ratio
Ik Inverse Participation Ratio
λ Maximum Eigenvalue of the Stability Matrix Ω
LTQ Liquidity
LRMES Long-run Marginal Expected Shortfall
LVG Leverage
MA Moving Average
MAPE Mean Average Percentage Error
MAR Minimum Acceptable Return
MES Marginal Expected Shortfall
MP Marc˘enko-Pastur Distribution
MPT Markowitz Portfolio Theory
MSCO Morgan Stanly Composite Index
MSE Mean Square Error
MV-GARCH Multivariate Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heterokedasticity
Neff Effective Portfolio Diversification
N90 Portfolio Diversification
Ωest Estimated Risk of the Portfolio
Ωreal Realised Risk of the Portfolio
Ω Omega Ratio
PR Participation Ratio
Π Cumulated Returns
RMT Random Matrix Theory
RS-GARCH Regime-Switching Generalised Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity Model
RWA Risk Weighted Assets
Sortino Sortino Ratio
SP Sharpe Ratio
SRI Systemic Risk Index
SRISK Systemic Risk
V L Left Eigenvector Centrality
V R Right Eigenvector Centrality
VAR Vector Autoregressive
Table C.4: Acronyms often used in the thesis.
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